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WELCOME REMARKS 
 
It is well-known that world of education plays a significant part of the economic 
development. First is by conducting policies analysis and sectoral researchers to pro-
vide reliable input to policy makers. Second, it to create a better generation through 
human development. Such application also works in the area of competition policy 
and law, whereas the world of academia is an engine of changes for supporting the 
development of competition policy and law study of a nation or a region. 
The world of the future is a very rapidly changing world. In order to take ad-
vantage of the dynamics wave of change, it requires a fast perceptual ability to all 
changes, so that it did not drift in the flow of change. That is why the study of com-
petition policy and law shall able to catch up with such robust development. Compe-
tition agency or regulator cannot stand alone to ride the wave of changes. It needs its 
relevant stakeholder to jointly assist them along the way, and that included the world 
of academics. 
However, the problem is, there has been slow growth of expertise in competition 
policy and law in East Asia. For the past decade, there has been no forum for the ac-
ademic to get together and discuss their recent works or studies in competition policy 
and law. Development in the number of the new expert in competition law in the re-
gion is also moving at a slow pace. 
That is why competition agency of Indonesia, KPPU, want to take such initiative 
to gather the academics in East Asia in the September‟s international seminar on 
competition policy, coincide with the 13th East Asia Top Level Officials Meeting on 
Competition Policy and Law. It hopes that at such seminar, the academic can declare 
the establishment of their network, the East Asia Academic Network on Competition 
Policy and Law. 
The East Asia Academic Network on Competition Policy will play the role of 
collaborating advance research and broadening network among themselves and with 
the regulator with the main objective of improving or developing knowledge hub and 
expertise in competition policy and law in East Asia. 
In specific, the main objective of the East Asia Academic Network on Competi-
tion Policy and Law is to serve as a virtual network of academics in East Asia having 
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interest in competition policy and law. The network will aim at improving the num-
ber of study or research in competition policy and law, as well as join hand with the 
competition agencies or regulators to build the expertise in competition area of both 
competition agency and university. 
The network will consist of academics in competition policy and law from uni-
versities in East Asia. Their chairmanship and management will be defined by them-
selves. Competition agency or regulator at the initial stage will assist the network to 
build and expand themselves. They are expected to have a yearly meeting as a back-
to-back event with the East Asia Top Level Officials Meeting on Competition Policy 
and Law so that it can secure the involvement of competition agencies and regulators 
at their forum. 
In addition, their activities may include conducting researches and studies in 
competition policy and law, conducting training or capacity building related activi-
ties or to the public, creating a web portal for their knowledge hub, and providing 
their expertise to competition agency or regulator. 
Upon their establishment, they may generate their own funding in hosting events, 
and or get a support from competition agencies or regulators, or potential interna-
tional development partners who share their common interest. At the initial stage, 
KPPU will secure its funding to assist with their initial works (like research/study 
and annual conference), as well as assist them to talk and discuss with international 
development partners. 
It sincerely hopes that this proposal can be supported by all member of East Asia 
Top Level Officials Meeting on Competition Policy and Law (EATOP Meeting), so 
that KPPU and they can start their initial works following the establishment. 
Thank you. 
Jakarta, September 6, 2017 
 
 
Muhammad Syarkawi Rauf 
Chairman of KPPU 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Business competition is a major topic in both legal and economic studies. There-
fore, a multidisciplinary approach is imperative in the assessment of business compe-
tition. In this approach, the role of universities is very important to fill the theoretical 
foundation so that the policy in handling cases of business competition can be taken 
appropriately. 
The Business Competition Lecturer Forum (FDPU) in Indonesia is an inde-
pendently founded academic association for the need to discuss business competition 
issues, through a multidisciplinary approach. Its members are spread from all over 
Indonesia, including lecturers from the areas of law, economics, and business, com-
ing from public and private universities. The activities of FDPU are very diverse, 
such as seminars, workshops, and publications. In those activities, the FDPU can co-
operate with other institutions, both government and private. The current internation-
al seminar held in Nusa Dua, Bali, Indonesia is one of them, in cooperation with the 
Indonesian Commission for Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU). 
Because the preparation time of this seminar is quite short, the participation of 
this seminar is not enough socialized. Nevertheless, the reviewer's role to evaluate 
the papers sent at the panel session, as the results presented in this proceeding, is 
quite encouraging. For that, I would like to acknowledge Dr. Udin Silalahi and Dr. 
Dedie S. Martadisasta together with the papers contributors for their hard work. 
Thanks also to the KPPU who have facilitated this seminar. Hopefully this proceed-
ing is useful to add references to business competition. 
 
Nusa Dua, Bali, September 6, 2017 
 
 
 
Shidarta 
Chairman of FDPU 
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The `Dieselgate-Affair` 
Claims for Damages of Consumers  
in the European Union Competition Law 
 
Prof. Dr. Stefan Koos 
 
One of the most important industry branches of Germany is the car industry. Few 
products are identified with `Made in Germany` as cars. German car manufacturers 
enjoyed excellent reputation in international markets in the past.  
However, two years ago clouds came over this successful industry as it was re-
vealed, that Volkswagen `tuned up` its turbo charged direct injection diesel engines 
using a secret software in order to reduce NOx  emissions during laboratory emission 
testings to meet US and EU emissions standards.
1
 Estimated 11 million cars world-
wide were sold with this software.
2
  
The following crisis was just worn out, when the popular German news maga-
zine “Der Spiegel” published an article about a gigantic cartel including all German 
car manufacturers. Pursuant to that article the car manufacturers Volkswagen, Audi, 
Porsche, Daimler and BMW colluded for years in a vast number of meetings forming 
a secret cartel internally called “Der 5er Kreis”. The magazine wrote, that since the 
1990s years more than 200 employees of the car producers met in more than 60 dif-
ferent secret coordinating task forces. The companies colluded on technical details, 
such as soft-tops of convertibles, the choice of suppliers and – especially important 
for the Diesel-Scandal - on the size of the urea, or AdBlue tank. Those tanks contain 
a substance to split nitrogen oxide into water and nitrogen. To get an optimal emis-
sion cleaning effect a big AdBlue-tank would be necessary, with small tanks the car 
owner has to refill the substance more often than the service intervals last. As small 
tanks are cheaper than bigger tanks the cartel made an agreement on implementing 
                                                 
1
 The software activates certain emissions controls under testing conditions. Under normal traffic con-
ditions the emissions are significantly higher (up to 40 times the US legal pollution limit, see 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/10/08/446861855/volkswagen-u-s-ceo-faces-questions-
on-capitol-hill  - link 08/14/2017). The discrepancy between laboratory emissions and real life emis-
sions can be also found in diesel engines of other car manufacturers such as Volvo, Nissan, Hyundai 
or Fiat, see https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/sep/30/wide-range-of-cars-emit-more-
pollution-in-real-driving-conditions-tests-show - 08/1472017. 
2
 Ewing, Jack (22 September 2015)."Volkswagen Says 11 Million Cars Worldwide Are Affected in 
Diesel Deception". The New York Times - Link 08/14/2017. 
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small AdBlue tanks into their models.
3
 In order to meet even with those small tanks 
the legal emission standards they used the mentioned secret software. 
It is obvious, that this cartel was infringing the interest of the consumers to a pe-
culiar extend. Especially in Germany relatively new cars are recently threatened by 
absolute driving bans for the inner city areas of the big cities such as Munich, 
Stuttgart or Hamburg.
4
 Now diesel cars suffer a precedented price decline in the 
German market of preowned cars as a result of the awaited restrictions to this tech-
nology. 
Can consumers sue the car dealer or car manufacturers for the damage they suf-
fer because of the restrictions of the use and because of the value loss of their cars as 
result of the collusive behavior of the cartel? 
Theoretically the car dealer could be sued applying §§ 434 ff. BGB (Bürgerlich-
es Gesetzbuch). The requirements for this claim are a quality defect, a negligence of 
the seller and a damage. A quality defect in German law is not only a material defect 
but can also be an aspect which influences the usability as agreed by the parties in 
the purchase contract. However it is difficult to substantiate a defect, taking into con-
sideration that most of the car producers used similar small AdBlue tanks and respec-
tive software to reduce the emissions. Latest when it comes to the test of the negli-
gence a claim for damage against the car dealer would fail because it would be diffi-
cult to prove, that the car dealers had any deeper knowledge of the collusive behavior 
of the manufacturers. In consequence a claim for damage against a car seller could 
fail. Until now there are controversial decisions of German civil courts on this issue; 
one new decision states that the dealer has to be accountable for the knowledge of the 
Car Producer, if he is part of the corporate organization (LG Munich I 04/14/2016 - 
23 O 23033/15). In another just recently published case the District Court of Bruns-
wick 08/31/2017 - (3 O 21/17) denied the litigation of Volkswagen because the ille-
gal software would not lead to a prohibition of the use of the car. The legal situation 
is therefore totally unclear at the moment. 
                                                 
3
 The companies agreed to use 8 liter AdBlue tanks in their vehicles sparing up to 80€ per vehicle, see 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/bertelschmitt/2017/07/22/dieselgate-product-of-vast-vw-bmw-daimler-
car-cartel-conspiracy-fresh-report-says/  - Link 08/14/2017. 
4
 https://www.cleanenergywire.org/news/cdu-forges-state-coalitions-coal-region-calls-restructuring-
funds/munich-plans-diesel-driving-ban - 08/14/2017. 
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If a claim against the car producers because of quality defects would fail, maybe 
a claim for damage may be possible: 
Cartels are forbidden in the German antitrust law in § 1 AARC (see also forbid-
den activities of market dominating enterprises § 19 AARC) and in the EU-Antitrust 
law in Art. 101 TFEU (see also misuse of market dominating position Art. 102 
TFEU). However so far there was no specific rule concerning claims for damages of 
consumers in case of an infringement of the antitrust law (similar to unfair competi-
tion law). In the German Civil Code BGB we find § 823 sentence 2, which states, 
that there is claim for damage in case of the “breaking of a law”. However this bro-
ken legal provision must be a rule protecting the claimant. Even if the cartel of the 
car manufacturers is an infringement of a legal rule, following the dominant theory in 
the German legal science competition, law rules have not the primary purpose to pro-
tect the consumer against competition infringements in his individual interest.  
A second structural problem to individual claims for damages of consumers is 
the lack of a class action in the German Civil Procedural Law comparable to US-
Law. Consumer claims fail typically because a bigger single damage often cannot be 
proved or because the suffered damage of the single consumer is not big enough to 
file a suit. 
In comparison to the autonomous German antitrust law we find in the EU-
legislation a tendency to protect individual interests of the consumers also in the 
competition law. With the EU-directive 2014/104/EU (“Cartel Damages Directive”) 
the claim for damages of individuals (consumers and concurrents) were strengthened 
binding for all member states of the EU. In the 9
th
 amendment to the Act Against Re-
straint of Competition which became effective in June 2017 Germany transposed this 
Directive into national law. With the same amendment the option to hold accountable 
a parent company for the competition infringements of its subsidiary companies was 
integrated into the AARC. 
The new claim for damages in § 33a AARC is referring to § 33 AARC which de-
termines that an intentionally or negligent violation of provisions of the German 
AARC, of Art 101 or 102 of the TFEU or of decisions by the competition authority 
leads to a claim for damage compensation and for injunction (sentence 1). Claimant 
can be any affected person, competitors and other market participants impaired by 
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the infringement (sentence 3), which means, that also consumers can have this claim. 
The new § 33a AARC determines the responsibility of anyone committing an in-
fringement in sense of § 33 sentence 1 AARC. Especially important for claims of 
consumers is the facilitation of the burden of proof in sentence 2 of § 33a AARC. 
This sentence states, that it is refutably supposed, that a cartel is causing a damage. 
The burden of proof was a big obstacle especially for consumer claims. Applied to 
the example of the Diesel-scandal it may now be possible to assume a damage of a 
consumer who bought a car affected by the cartel of the car producers. It is likely that 
the average loss of market value of such a car may be a damage in a claim; if the au-
thorities forbid certain car models for all use in public traffic in the future, the value 
of the car could be held as a damage of the car owner. Important for competitors is 
the option to take into account in particular the attributable profit made by the in-
fringement by the infringer (sentence 3). 
Once a national competition authority or the European Commission decided on 
the existence of a competition infringement the Civil Court which has to decide on 
the claim for damage is bound by this administrative decision (§ 33b AARC). 
As not only intentionally but also negligent infringements lead to a claim for 
damage, it is important, that all enterprises take effective measurements to implement 
an adequate internal compliance organization. Already in 2013 the European Court 
of Justice decided, that an enterprise cannot rely on the wrong advise of a lawyer 
(less of an internal company law department) or even on the wrong decision of a na-
tional competition authority (ECJ – C-682/11 – 6/18/2013 – Schenker). This bears 
the risk of an unclear legal situation for the enterprises. However, as the German An-
titrust Law is based on the principle of own responsibility of the enterprises to test in 
advance the compliance of their activities with the law and given the strong impact 
of non-compliance to the functioning of the competition, this is a consequent juris-
diction in order  to avoid, that enterprises find easy ways to stay off their responsibil-
ity, just presenting favorable legal opinions. As consequence of this jurisdiction en-
terprises will have to ensure an effective monitoring of their compliance and of legal 
advising relating to their market activities. Legal advise of own legal departments 
may not be sufficient to avoid the allegation of negligence. 
As conclusion it seems to be likely, that consumer claims may play a more im-
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portant role in the future than until now. Because of the lack of Class Actions this 
does not apply to typical small damages of consumers which are only relevant in a 
collective dimension. However in the Diesel-affair the damage of single consumers 
may already reach a significant size. 
 
Reference 
German AARC: https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gwb/index.html  
(26.8.2017 – still without the 9
th
 amendment to the AARC) 
TFEU: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12012E%2FTXT  
Sentences of the European Court of Justice (several languages): 
https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/j_6/en/ 
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Economic Policy Package:  
How Policy Delivery Affects Business Competition 
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Independent Legal Consultant, Alumni of Gadjah Mada University 
mireza_fitriadi@live.com; m.yudha.prawira@hotmail.co.id; 
zil.aidi93@gmail.com 
 
Abstract 
In the middle of 2015, Government of Indonesia has issued Economic Policy 
Package XII aimed to create better investment climate in the region/provincial. 
This policy was taken to improve business climate pursuant to the Indonesia‘s 
economic condition which are decreasing continuously and complicated in-
vestment climate for investors. In order to deliver the policy, local governments 
shall apply this deregulation packages into regulations as directed by central 
government. This paper brings facts that some of local government did not ap-
ply the Economic Policy Package XII. This condition has potential to create un-
fairness in business competition between regions. Therefore, KPPU as one of 
the committee to control business competition should take a part to provide ad-
vice to local government and central government in order to deliver their poli-
cy. Recommendations by KPPU are required to create better competition be-
tween regions. 
 
Keywords: Deregulation, Economic Policy Package, Local Government, Busi-
ness Competition 
 
Background 
In September 2015 to April 2016, Government of Indonesia (“GoI”) has issued a 
dozen economic policy packages as response to the weakening Indonesia‟s economic 
condition. Based on World Economic database, formerly economic growth of Indo-
nesia in general had slowed down in 2013 (5,6%), 2014 (5,0%) and 2015 (4,76%). 
Even for investment climate, the survey ease of doing business/EoDB) 2016, showed 
that Indonesia still have a bad investment climate which Indonesia be ranked 106 of 
189 countries in the world. 
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Thus, through economic policy packages, GoI seeks to encourage the economy 
in the region and creating better business climate. Specifically, with the economic 
policy package XII, GoI aimed to improve the business climate and EoDB rank in 
2017. This policy applied by regulatory reform which is to simplify procedure, time 
and cost. 
As for the policy package sequence still on-going today
1
, now economic policy 
packages has shown some positive impacts in 2016. The improvement of economic 
growth in 2016 already experiencing an economic downturn trend changes by being 
increased to 5.02 percent. In fact, after the economic package XII Indonesia position 
according to the results of the EoDB 2017, rose to 91 and Indonesia as well estab-
lished as the country‟s top reformers
2
. However, these positive impacts still not 
enough, considering the main objective of government policy package is the creation 
of the general welfare. 
Variated act from local government to implement the economic policy package 
XII potentially create some economic disparities between regions. As in the study of 
Komite Pemantauan Pelaksaan Otonomi Daerah (KPPOD), the economic policy 
package XII is not fully implemented in the regions. Only Jakarta and Surabaya who 
had implemented the policy better than the others. It was because the central gov-
ernment focus on socialization and monitoring intensively only for both regions. 
Meanwhile, the other regions tend to slower the follow up of policy package
3
. 
Policy disparities between regions may cause unfair business competition be-
tween them as well. Entrepreneurs in Jakarta-Surabaya tending to get ease on the li-
censing and the cost for local taxation, while entrepreneurs in other regions potential-
ly not having the same benefits. Burden on overlapping licensing and burden of tax 
cost is potentially creating barriers for entrepreneurs in other region. As unitary state, 
Indonesia should be able to create fairness on business competition in all regions. In 
advance, the various implementation on economic policy package between regions 
                                                 
1
 There are 15 Economic Policy Packages that has been issued by Government of Indonesia and still 
on going today. 
2
 Earlier Indonesia was on rank 106 of 189 countries. World Bank. (2017). Doing Business 2017: 
Equal Opportunity for All. Washington DC, USA: World Bank. 
3
 KPPOD. (2016). Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Paket Kebijakan Investasi di Daerah. Jakarta, Indonesia: 
Komite Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah 
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could create a larger economic gap between regions in Indonesia. 
Therefore, this writing arranged in order to describe the potential problems relat-
ed to unfair business competition that may occur when policy delivery of economic 
policy package XII being not implemented properly by local governments. By ap-
proaching on the concept of anti-competition policy making, regulation, economic 
impact disparities and the economic policy XII in the regions, this writing is going to 
discuss these problems. 
Economic Policy Package XII 
Economic Policy Package XII has been issued by GoI based on crummy invest-
ment climate in Indonesia which earlier, Indonesia was on the 106 of 189 countries 
on EoDB 2016. EoDB Measurement is used for viewing regulations and procedures 
to be complied by someone who wants to start business in Indonesia. The target 
business from EoDB measurement is the small medium enterprises (SME‟s) in trade 
and services sector. There are three indicators of EoDB measurement that must be 
followed by local government in Economic Policy Package XII: starting the busi-
ness, construction permit and registering property. Therefore at least local govern-
ment should change their regulation and implement the new policy. This policy is 
part of deregulation where the GoI change the regulation at ministry level to simplify 
the procedure, time and cost (specially for licensing). The differences between before 
(ex ante) and after (ex post) policy are exposed in following table: 
Table 1 Regulation of Economic Policy Package XII 
Before (Ex Ante) After (Ex Post) 
Trade Minister Regulation Number 
77/MDAG/PER/12/2013 concerning Publishing 
Trading License (Surat Izin Usaha 
Perdagangan/ SIUP) and Company Register 
(Tanda Daftar Perusahaan/TDP) Simultane-
ously for Trade Company 
 
Publishing SIUP and TDP simultaneously for 
trade company in three days. 
 
(Burden of time) 
Trade Minister Regulation Number 
14/MDAG/PER/3/2016 concerning revision of 
the Trade Minister Regulation Number 
77/MDAG/PER/12/2013 concerning Publish-
ing Trading License (Surat Izin Usaha 
Perdagangan/SIUP) and Company Register 
(Tanda Daftar Perusahaan/TDP) Simultane-
ously for Trade Company
4
 
 Publishing SIUP and TDP simultaneously for 
trade company in two days. 
 Online System 
(Simplify the procedure, time and cost) 
                                                 
4
 By 2017, GoI also issued new regulation to support this regulation which are Trade Minister Regula-
tion Number 7 of 2017 and Trade Minister Regulation Number 8 of 2017. The regulation stated that to 
abolished the re-registration process for SIUP and cost to re-registration process for TDP. 
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Publics Works and Public Housing Minister 
Regulation Number 24/PRT/M/2007 concern-
ing construction permit (Izin Mendirikan 
Bangunan/IMB) 
 Publishing construction permit for all con-
struction in 60 days.  
 Guidelines for publishing construction per-
mit in the region 
 
(Burden of time) 
Publics Works and Public Housing Minister 
Regulation Number 05.PRT/M/2016 concern-
ing construction permit (Izin Mendirikan 
Bangunan/IMB) 
 Publishing construction permit for simple 
construction (one floor) in three days  
 Publishing construction permit for simple 
construction (two floor-four floor) in three 
days 
 Guidelines for publishing construction per-
mit 
No specific regulations for guidance to publishing 
construction permit and certificate for SME‟s 
Publics Works and Public Housing Minister 
Letter Number 10/ SE/M/2016 concerning 
Publishing Construction Permit and Certifi-
cate for SME’s 
 
Guidance for local government to publishing 
construction permit and certificate for SME‟s  
(Simplify the procedure, time and cost) 
Regulation Number 90/M-DAG/PER/12/2014 
concerning the guidance warehouse 
 
Guidance for local government to publish ware-
house register (Tanda Daftar Gudang/TDG) and 
certificate separately 
Trade Minister Regulation Number 
16/MDAG/PER/3/2016 concerning revision of 
Trade Minister Regulation Number 90/M- 
DAG/PER/12/2014 concerning the guidance 
warehouse 
 
Guidance for local government to publish ware-
house register (Tanda Daftar Gudang/TDG) and 
certificate simultaneously 
 
(simultaneous procedure accelerating time 
and cutting burden of cost) 
Minister of Home Affairs Regulation Number 
27 of 2009 concerning nuisance permit 
 
nuisance permit is one of basic permit to starting 
business 
 
(overlapping with environment per-
mit/environment document and burden of cost 
and time) 
Minister of Home Affairs Regulation Number 
19 of 2017 concerning abolish nuisance permit 
 
Abolished nuisance permit 
 
In order to deliver this policy into beneficiaries (SME‟s), Local Government 
should revise their regulations as well. The new policy is just a guidance for Local 
Government. Therefore, Local Government should deliver the policy by change their 
policy (deregulation at local level) and implement the new policy. 
But in fact, there are some policy disparities that happened as the result of policy 
delivery process of Economic Policy Package XII did not going well in all regions. 
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There was only Jakarta and Surabaya who have followed up the policy by regulation 
and the implementation, while other regions have not done it yet. Other regions such 
as Bandung, Palembang, Pontianak and Manado did not implement Economic Policy 
Package XII comprehensively. Although in fact, those regions have an in-line policy 
with the Economic Policy Package XII, but this is not enough to accomplish all of 
the target of GoI policy. Only Jakarta and Surabaya had comprehensively imple-
mented specific regulation regarding the policy as table below. 
Table 2 Jakarta-Surabaya Implementation on Economic Policy Package XII 
Regions Regulation 
Jakarta 1. Governor Instruction DKI Jakarta Number 42 of 2016 concerning The Accelera-
tion of Ease of Doing Business Target. 
2. Decision of One Stop Service DKI Jakarta Number 31 of 2016 concerning The 
Target of Ease of Doing Business Licensing and Non-Licensing Services. 
Surabaya 1. Mayor Surabaya Regulation Number 6 of 2016 revision on Mayor Surabaya 
Regulation Number 1 of 2015 concerning business type that should have envi-
ronment license. 
2. Mayor Surabaya Instruction Number 3 of 2016 concerning the dismissal of nui-
sance permit in Surabaya 
 
The other regions still not comprehensively follow up the GoI policy. Even in the 
Manado for example, there are local units that did not even know about policy pack-
ages that have been issued by GoI. Based on KPPOD study, these are a few regions 
who are not implement the Economic Policy Package XII regulation
5
: 
1. Trade Minister Regulation Number 14/MDAG/PER/3/2016:  
Bandung, Denpasar and Palembang. 
2. Minister of Public Affairs Regulation Number 22 of 2016:  
Pontianak, Palembang, Manado and Bandung 
This condition happened because of several problems, especially from central 
and Local Government at the policy delivery process
6
. First, the packages infor-
mation carried out in different ways to regional by central government. Distinction 
delivery of policy information has caused the diversity of knowledge in delivering 
deregulation in the region. The early package XII related to the effort to increased 
                                                 
5
 KPPOD. (2016). Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Paket Kebijakan Investasi di Daerah. Jakarta, Indonesia: 
Komite Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah. 
6
 KPPOD. (2016). Evaluasi Pelaksanaan Paket Kebijakan Investasi di Daerah. Jakarta, Indonesia: 
Komite Pemantauan Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah. 
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EoDB by 2017 has been delivered only for Surabaya and Jakarta. Socialization to the 
leader of the regions brought a strong commitment to apply the policy. While social-
ization to other region still delivered in partial ways to local units by ministry and 
provincial government. 
Second, the low integrity of employee in the regions still part of the problems 
that the package XII did not delivered well in regions. Some of the employee in the 
local units (especially planning units) did not have an initiative to search the new 
regulation that has been issued by GoI. Not all of the local units have the same initia-
tive, therefore the implementation of policy delivered partially in the regions. 
Third, the difference goals and agendas between central and local governments 
are the main obstacles upon the region. By issuing the policy package regulations, 
every region expected were able to deliver it. But it is turns out that local government 
just focus only on their planning document (RPJMD and RKPD). This have the big 
impact where the government didn‟t have the same perspective with new regulation 
and plodding to implement the policy package. Only Jakarta and Surabaya were ac-
tually had the responsibilities on policy package XII because both regions are the 
sample for EoDB 2017 measurement. 
This disparities policy between region may create a problem for economy in In-
donesia, especially in competition issue. Unfairness in business competition could be 
generated by the gap policy between one region and another. Jakarta and Surabaya 
could make a better investment climate while others still have problems on it. 
 
Law Number 5 of 1999 Concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic Practices and 
Unfair Business Practices: Who Bound Who? 
In order to create fair business competition, Law Number 5 of 1999 was de-
signed to rectifies erroneous conduct by several economic actors who control the 
market.
7
 The entrepreneurs who have been close to the ruling elite acquired exces-
sive privileges that created a social gap, which leading to centralization of economic 
power against individual or certain groups. This condition was embodied in the form 
of, among others, monopolistic practices and unfair business competition which 
                                                 
7
 Sutrisno Iwantono. (2004). Status, Wewenang dan Tugas KPPU, presented at Worskhop of Business 
and Competition Law, Jakarta, 2004. 
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cause damage to the public and which are in contradiction with the goals of social 
justice.
8
 
The decision was made due to change of national economic policy paradigm 
from centralistic approach where the government primary role is acting as agent of 
economic development to reasonable economic system where entrepreneurs act as 
sole player in the market.
9
 Consequently, the two role of government that had long as 
businesses and regulator, turns into regulator only. Clear role separation between 
government as regulator and entrepreneur as economic player shall provoke better 
economic growth. Government as regulator is mandated to develop business climate 
to create fair and high competitive business environment in all economic sectors. 
One of government effort to create a fair business competition is clearly written in 
elucidation of Law Number 5 of 1999 stated that the law is promulgated to establish 
legal procedure and provide equal protection to all entrepreneurs, so it come to an 
end that Law Number 5 of 1999 was crafted to regulate fair business behaviour only 
between entrepreneurs/business actors. 
Although focused on business actors but there are other factors outside business 
actors that play a role in creating a competitive market. One of the significant factors 
comes from government by their law which is accommodated on article 50 point a of 
Law Number 5 of 1999. This becomes logical because it is not uncommon govern-
ment policy is contrary to the principle of fair business competition. 
Business actors are the main subject of Law Number 5 of 1999. For instance, ar-
ticle 17 -24 prohibits a number of activities that should not be done by a business ac-
tor. Another example can be found on articles 25-28 that regulate some prohibition 
related to dominant position. All of those articles clearly regulate activities that can 
be done by an individual business actor. Furthermore, article 4 through 16 which are 
classified as prohibited agreements prohibit activities that done by two or more 
business actors since an agreement only possible occurs if there is more than 
one party. 
The definition of business actor can be found on article 1 section e of Law Num-
                                                 
8
 General Elucidation of Law Number 5 of 1999. 
9
 Hermansyah. (2008). Pokok-pokok Hukum Persaingan Usaha di Indonesia. Jakarta, Prenada Media 
Group. 
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ber 5 of 1999 that define business actor as an individual person or a company, in the 
form of legal or non-legal entity established and domiciled or engaged in activities 
within the legal territory of the Republic of Indonesia, conducting various kinds of 
business activities in economic sector through contracts, both individually or collec-
tively. 
 
Unfair Competition as Result of Government Policies 
On the other hand, unfair competition is not only affected by and between entre-
preneurs, but also government policy by creating barrier on investment decisions for 
economic actor. The following paragraphs elucidate the components of a competition 
policy that have bearing on investment decisions:
10
 
1. Trade policy 
A country‟s trade policy can play an important part in shaping competition in 
its economy. The volume of goods available in the market depends on the ex-
tent to which the economy is open to the outside world. Having a tight trade 
policy restricts competition in the market, and can result in the manipulation 
of the market by dominant domestic firms. On the other hand, trade liberali-
zation results in an influx of goods into the economy, which could also have 
a huge impact on the nature and extent of competition in the market, and en-
courages domestic competition as well. In order to achieve an optimal level 
of competition in an economy the trade policy of a country should be formu-
lated to stimulate private participation in the economy (both in terms of at-
tracting new firms and also in strengthening the position of existing ones). 
2. Industrial openness 
The level of competition in an economy reflects the country‟s attitude to-
wards entry and growth of firms. Regulations focusing on entry and estab-
lishment of business in a country are important in shaping up competition. If 
a country has a restrictive industrial policy regime in which entry and growth 
of firms is subjected to stringent licensing conditions and monitoring, a low 
                                                 
10
 Centre for Competition, Investment & Economic Regulation (CCIER). (2008). Competition Policy 
Enforcement Experiences from Developing Countries and Implications for Investment, presented at 
OECD Global Forum on International Investment VII „Best practices in promoting investment for de-
velopment‟, Paris, France, 2008. 
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level of investment is guaranteed and the resulting level of competition is al-
so low. An effective competition policy advocates for the removal of obsta-
cles and facilitates investment flows by providing a predictable legal and 
regulatory environment that reduces the scope of arbitrary decision-making, 
thereby instilling transparency in the system. 
3. Attitude towards privatization 
Privatization enhances the potential for competition by providing conditions 
conducive for entry of new players. Government involvement in the econo-
my, particularly in direct competition with private companies, deters private 
participation and stifles competition. The intention of a country to improve 
competition in the market through privatization can be handicapped if proper 
care is not taken in planning its privatization program. 
4. Other critical policy considerations 
There are certain other policy considerations that can have an impact on 
competition by affecting the firms‟ decision to enter an industry. The formu-
lation of competition policy should take into consideration implications of 
such policies as well: 
a. Labour policy; 
Labour regulations impact production cost and convenience adversely 
and result in entry into the informal sector being preferred to significant 
investment in the formal sector. 
b. Exit Rules; 
Certain regulations like bankruptcy laws, insolvency laws might make it 
difficult for companies to exit their business in a country, and thus nega-
tively affect investment decisions by prospective investors. 
c. Consumer protection policy. 
Although it is generally accepted that there is a convergence between the 
objectives of consumer protection policy and competition policy, there 
exists scope for conflict as well which works to the detriment of invest-
ment. 
 
Dimension of policy is not only policy making but also policy implementation or 
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delivery. A policy may good in making but poor in delivery. Policy making does not 
end with the passage of a regulation by President. Rather, it shifts from President Of-
fice to the bureaucracy-to the departments, ministry, agencies, commissions of the 
executive branch and local governments.
11 Failure in delivery means failure in policy 
itself. This principal shall apply to Economic Policy Packages XII. 
Erroneous implementation of those policy could be considered as government 
policy that creating barriers. Disparities between region in competition is reflected by 
local government attitude towards entry and growth of firms. As mentioned above, 
entrepreneurs in Pontianak, Palembang, Manado and Bandung may impeded to es-
tablish business than Jakarta and Surabaya due to tangled procedure to obtain nui-
sance permit. 
Unfairness may generally occur in various of business and relevant market, if the 
local government does not remove the obstacle for licensing condition. This restric-
tive policy in local government may create obstacle to entry and shall continue when 
the impediment condition for business licensing still exist. 
As previously mentioned, unfair business competition may be generated by gov-
ernment policy. That is why KPPU as the enforcer of Law Number 5 of 1999 as stat-
ed on article 35 letter e has a function to provide advice and consideration to the 
government on policies that are considered contrary to fair business competition. 
The advice and consideration by KPPU does not have to wait for the request 
from the government but it can also come from KPPU's own initiative in observing 
the government policies that have potential creating unfair business competition. Fur-
thermore, the subject of advice and consideration by KPPU can be addressed to the 
central government as well as the local government depending on the object of that 
particular policy. 
There are several examples of government policies that considered contrary to 
fair business competition in Indonesia, as follows: 
1. Government policy on airline service industry is one example of government 
policies that are contrary to fair business competition. At the beginning, avia-
tion service industry is a prohibited sector for a new business actor. Moreo-
                                                 
11 See Thomas R Dye. (2013). Understanding Public Policy, 55-58. United States of 
America, Pearson Education Inc. 
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ver, The Government through the Minister of Transportation Decree Number 
25 of 1997 intervened the market by appointing Indonesian National Air Car-
riers Association (INACA) to fix the upper and lower limit price for flights. 
In July 2001, KPPU advised the government to revoke the authority to 
INACA and cancel the price fixing made by INACA.
12 The result of that ad-
vice can be seen from the current market of airline service which is very 
competitive and efficient. The airlines compete each other to make an afford-
able and safe product for customers. As today, we can see that flying by plane 
is no longer a luxury thing and everyone can enjoy it. 
2. In March 2014, KPPU advised the government of Aceh province to revoke 
The Instructions of the Governor of Aceh Number 01 INSTR / 2007 concern-
ing Enactment of Certificate of Business Entity / Certificate of Registration of 
Company in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province. This policy requires busi-
ness entities from outside the Aceh Province to re-register and obtain re-
certification for a business entity certificate, or a corporate registration certif-
icate from the Aceh Provincial Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In this 
policy, KPPU considers that the central government regulation on registration 
and certification obligation is national, so re-registration in the province will 
create barriers to entry for business actors outside the province in following 
the procurement process of goods and services in that area.
13 This condition 
also can lead to discrimination among the origin of business actors, as well as 
incurring new costs for business actors outside the region to compete in the 
province. 
3. In the end of 2016, KPPU gave advice and consideration to the government 
of DKI Jakarta province related to Electronic Road Pricing (ERP). The policy 
that stated in the Governor Regulation (Pergub) of DKI Jakarta Number 149 
of 2016 concerning Electronic Paid Traffic Control is considered potentially 
violate Law Number 5/1999 concerning Prohibition of Monopolistic Practic-
                                                 
12
 Banyak Kebijakan Pemerintah Tidak Pro Persaingan Sehat (2009, February 21). Retrieved from 
http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/hol21267/banyak-kebijakan-pemerintah-tidak-pro-
persaingan-sehat  
13
 Ini 5 Saran Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha untuk Pemerintah (2014, June 30). Retrieved from 
http://www.viva.co.id/berita/bisnis/517413-ini-5-saran-komisi-pengawas-persaingan-usaha-untuk-
pemerintah  
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es and Unfair Business Competition. The important points of the regulation 
that must be changed, namely Article 8 of Pergub DKI Jakarta Number 
149/2016. The reason of this change is because it is only allowing the use of 
Dedicated Short-Range Communication (DSRC) technology of 5.8 GHz fre-
quency in the application of ERP on the streets of Jakarta while there another 
technologies such as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) or Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS). As a result, the inclusion of DSRC technology with a 
certain frequency prevents vendors with other technologies to follow the pro-
curement.
14
 DKI Jakarta 
Government accepted the advice from KPPU and revised Article 8 paragraph 
1c of Pergub DKI Jakarta Number 149/2016 so that not only business actors 
with Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) technology can follow 
the tender of ERP but also all business actors in the sector of information and 
communication technology with other technologies. 
 
Government policies that mentioned above are the examples of policies that sub-
stantially or in policy making dimension contrary to fair business competition. Poli-
cies that are substantially inconsistent with fair business competition constitute the 
majority of the object of KPPU's advices and consideration. Potential problems arise 
when there is a policy that is not substantially contrary to fair business competition, 
otherwise aims to provide convenience for business actors but at the level of policy 
delivery leads to unfair business competition. 
This condition seems to be seen in the unevenness of policy delivery of Econom-
ic Policy Packages XII between regions. As previously mentioned, this condition has 
the potential for disparities related to ease of investment between regions and further 
will be able to cause barriers and unfair business competition. As KPPOD results, 
Economic Policy Package XII didn‟t delivered well because both government (Cen-
tral and Local) didn‟t delivered it well also. Distinction delivery of policy infor-
mation, low integrity of officer, and different goals-agendas between central and lo-
cal governments are the causes of lousy policy delivery. 
                                                 
14
 KPPU Apresiasi Langkah Pemprov DKI Merevisi Pergub ERP (2017, January 4) Retrieved from 
http://www.kppu.go.id/id/blog/2017/01/kppu-apresiasi-langkah-pemprov-dki-merevisi-pergub-erp/ 
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Based on explanation above, there is an urgency of KPPU to supervise and then 
provide advice and consideration to government policies that are not only substan-
tially contrary to fair business competition but also on its policy delivery potentially 
lead to unfair business competition. 
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of Law No 5 of 1999 is to ensure the certainty of equal business op-
portunities for large, medium, and small-scale business by regulating fair business 
behavior only between entrepreneurs/business actors. But it‟s not necessarily mean 
unfair competition occurred limited to condition provided by law. It also could be 
generated by improper policy delivery which creating barrier on investment deci-
sions for economic actor. Regulations focusing on entry and establishment of busi-
ness in a country are important in shaping up competition. If a country has a restric-
tive industrial policy regime in which entry and growth of firms is subjected to strin-
gent licensing conditions and monitoring, a low level of investment is guaranteed and 
the resulting level of competition is also low, which is considered as barrier to entry 
those business. 
Pursuant to the concept of government policy may shape unfairness in competi-
tion, improper implementation of deregulation may lead to generating unfair business 
competition by gap or discrepant policy between one region and another. Different 
treatment regarding ease on the licensing and the cost for local taxation (Economic 
Policy Package XII) between Jakarta-Surabaya and other regions, while entrepre-
neurs in other regions potentially not having the same benefits, may considered as 
unfair. 
As discussed earlier, government policy as one of the things that can lead to un-
fair business competition can occur at a substantial level and at the level of imple-
mentation of the policy. So far, KPPU has given more advises and considerations on 
policies that are substantially contrary to fair business competition. Meanwhile, there 
are also government policies that are in implementation contrary to fair business 
competition as occurred in Economic Policy Packages XII. Therefore, it is important 
for KPPU to actively supervise government policies in the implementation level in 
order to realize the fair competition. Role of KPPU as leading institution on promot-
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ing competitive market in Indonesia is necessary to provide advice and consideration 
to the government related to unfair policies or improper policy delivery. KPPU can 
assist and conducting advocacy to local government to shape better business climate. 
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Abstract 
On 27 June this year, the European Commission ruled a landmark decision im-
posing Google with € 2.42 fine for abusing dominance by giving illegal ad-
vantage to its own shopping services. While the legal battle after the Commis-
sion decision and debates remain, the decision could lend us magnifying glass-
es to look into how innovation in the digital market might affect competition 
law analysis. The Google case exemplifies the complexities when competition 
law analysis deals with disruptive innovation. The paper aims at identifying: 
(1) factors that play roles in the construction of illegality under the principle of 
equal treatment in Google comparison shopping service and (2) elements of 
analysis under EU Competition Law, in particular Article 102 TFEU, that 
could be useful for Indonesian competition law analysis. The study uses legal 
normative approach to tackle the issues. As regards the first issue, the paper 
identifies important factors for the applicability of the principle of equal treat-
ment in the case: (1) the leveraging of market power in general search into 
comparison shopping, (2) the nature of multi-sided platforms (MSPs) and net-
work effects, and (3) the concept of indispensability. On the second issue, it 
suggests that (1) for the use of relevant market as a basis for competition law 
analysis in competition for the market, instead of relying on the pure product 
market consideration, i.e. substitution concept, another parameter such as R&D 
investments for the relevant market definition could be used. (2) User data plays 
significantly important role for online business to gain market power and 
hence, for competition law analysis. (3) In considering the harmful effects of 
conducts, account should be taken of the impact to the interest of consumers in 
terms of the availability of choice and innovation, instead of on price. 
Keywords: Google, innovation, MSPs, data 
1. Introduction 
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When Politico commented on the European Commission (hereafter, the Com-
mission) Decision on Google Shopping Case under the headline “Margrethe Vestag-
ers Google Decision Risks Messy Endgame”,
1
 it did not only address the Commis-
sion‟s reputation in handling competition law cases and the likely length and brutali-
ty of legal battle in the appeal process. It also addressed that the decision might set a 
precedent for online business empires in various sectors such as social networks and 
e-commerce. The decision seems to not only deliver a message that there is no com-
pany that is too big to get into competition authority scrutiny, but also to show the 
willingness of the Commission to tackle new and difficult challenges brought by the 
emergence of the digital market. As The Economist wrote under the headline „Not So 
Froogle: The European Commission Levies A Huge Fine on Google„: ―[i]ts case is 
not perfect, but it asks the right questions‖,
2
 the end of the case remains to be seen in 
the coming years, but the Commission has at least found the exact competition law 
problems that exemplify the complexities when competition law analysis deals with 
disruptive innovation. 
In its decision on 27 June, the European Commission fined Google € 2.42 billion 
- the highest fine in the European competition enforcement history - for abusing 
dominance by giving illegal advantages to its own comparison shopping services.
3
 
Focusing on the relevant market of general internet search in the entire 31 European 
Economic Area (EEA), the Commission found Google to be dominant in the market 
with over 90%
4
 market share since 2008 with the exception of Czech Republic where 
Google is dominant since 2011.
5
 What Google basically does is that it offers its 
                                                 
1
 Politico, „Margrethe Vestagers Google Decision Risks Messy Endgame‟ 
<http://www.politico.eu/article/margrethe-vestagers-google-decision-risks-messy-endgame/> accessed 
13 August 2017. 
2
 The Economist, „Not So Froogle: The European Commission Levies A Huge Fine on Google„ 
<https://www.economist.com/news/business/21724436-its-case-not-perfect-it-asks-right-questions-
european-commission-levies-huge> accessed 1 July 2017. 
3
 European Commission Memo, „Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing 
Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service – 
Factsheet‟, 27 June 2017 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1785_en.htm> accessed 27 
June 2017. 
4
 StatCounter, „Search Engine Market Share in Europe‟ <http://gs.statcounter.com/search-engine-
market-share/all/europe/#yearly-2009-2017-bar> accessed 12 August 2017. 
5
 European Commission Memo, „Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing 
Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service – 
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search services for zero prices to users and gains its revenue from advertisers. Ac-
cording to the Commission decision, under the principle of equal treatment, Google 
is obliged not to favor its own product advertisements over its competitors. The obli-
gation cannot be separated from the fact that Google is dominant in the market. The 
outcome might have been different if it is conducted by small players. Thus, the case 
also emphasizes the additional responsibility under the EU competition law for dom-
inant players in the market to maintain competition by ensuring not to create entry 
barriers.  
The Commission decision in the Google Shopping Case might affect how 
Google would do business throughout Europe and how the Commission would take 
its stance in other cases, such as in the Google Android Case. Furthermore, it also 
lends us magnifying glasses to look into how innovation in the digital market might 
affect competition law analysis.  
While price has traditionally been the main parameter for static competition 
analysis, in dynamic competition such as that taking place in the online business, the 
relevant parameter shifts to another indicator, namely innovation.
6
 Innovation can re-
sult in the improvement of existing products (sustaining innovation) or in new tech-
nologies/business models that displace the earlier and create a new market (disrup-
tive innovation).
7
 However, current competition law may not be sufficiently suitable 
for considering innovation resulting in the introduction of new products that displace 
existing markets.
8
 A method which paves the way for including dynamic efficiency 
                                                                                                                                          
Factsheet‟, Brussels, 27 June 2017 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1785_en.htm> 
accessed 27 June 2017. 
6
 J. Drexl, „Anticompetitive Stumbling Stones on the Way to a Cleaner World: Protecting Competition 
in Innovation Without a Market‟, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2012, vol. 8, no. 3, 
(507), p. 511; J.G. Sidak and D.J. Teece, „Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law‟, Journal of 
Competition Law and Economics 2009, vol. 5, no. 4, (581), p. 585; T.A. Hemphill, „Antitrust, Dynam-
ic Competition, and Business Ethics, Journal of Business Ethics 2004, Vol. 50, Issue 2, (127), p. 128; 
J. Ellig and D. Lin, „A Taxonomy of Dynamic Competition Theories‟, in J. Ellig, (Ed.), Dynamic 
Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues, (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2001), p. 21; R.J. Gilbert and S.C. Sunshine, „Incorporating Dynamic Efficiency 
Concerns in Merger Analysis: The Use of Innovation Markets‟, Antitrust Law Journal 1995, Vol. 63, 
No. 2, (569), p. 570; J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1942 (Routledge 2003), 
p. 82-83. 
7
 C.M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma. When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail, 
Boston, Massachusetts, Harvard Business School Press, 1997, p. 10. 
8
 C. Argenton, et.al., „Law, Economics and Growth in Europe - Integrating Innovation into Competi-
tion Policy and Economic Regulation‟, Final Draft July 2013, p. 10. 
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into competition law analysis is required to analyze competition in a way that reflects 
the needs of innovative, new markets. 
The paper will be structured in four parts. After discussing the background and 
presenting research questions in the first part, the second part discusses how various 
factors play roles in the construction of illegality under the principle of equal treat-
ment in Google comparison shopping service. The third part analyses which which 
elements of analysis under EU Competition Law, in particular Article 102 TFEU, 
could be useful for Indonesian competition law analysis under Law No. 5 of 1999. 
The fourth concludes. 
2. The Principle of Equal Treatment and the Construction of Illegality in the 
Google Shopping Case 
The Commission ruling on the Google Shopping Case is based on the principle 
of equal treatment under which Google is obliged to treat its comparison shopping 
service and its rival‟s equally. This is also the same principle underlining the concept 
of essential facility doctrine that obliges companies to provide access to its facility 
for competitors under condition that the facility is essential for competitors to enter 
the market. This part of the paper discusses how the principle of equal treatment ap-
plies in constructing the illegality of Google conducts taking account of various ele-
ments, namely the concept of disruptive innovation and dynamic competition, the 
analysis of relevant market and market dominance, the nature of multi-sided plat-
forms (MSPs) and network effects. 
2.1 Disruptive Innovation and Dynamic Competition 
Bower and Christensen introduced the concept of disruptive innovation to ex-
plain the reason behind the failure of prominent companies to stay at the top of their 
industry when technologies or markets change.
9
 They distinguish between two types 
of technological innovations: sustaining and disruptive technologies. Despite present-
ing improvement of an existing product, sustaining technologies do not affect estab-
lished markets the way disruptive innovation does.
10
 Disruptive innovation, on the 
other hand, introduces new technologies that displace existing markets. Such phe-
                                                 
9
 See C.M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma. When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to 
Fail, Boston, Massachusetts, Harvard Business School Press, 1997. 
10
 J.L. Bower and C.M. Christensen, "Disruptive Technologies: Catching the Wave", Harvard 
Business Review 1995, vol. 73, no. 1 (January-February), (43), p. 45. 
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nomenon is also referred to as „dynamic competition‟ or „competition for the market‟ 
to be contrasted with „competition in the market‟ or „static competition‟ that refers to 
the conventional type of competition taking place in established markets on the basis 
of price and product volume.
11
  
Dynamic competition can be traced back to Schumpeter‟s concept of „creative 
destruction‟.
12
 It typically leads to a monopoly position that is likely to persist for 
some time, until a new monopolist comes up that upsets the position of the previous 
incumbent. 
2.2 Analyzing Relevant Market and Market Dominance 
Under Article 102 TFEU, dominant companies are prohibited from abusing their 
power. To qualify an abuse of dominance, first of all dominance is required and for 
this purpose, a relevant market shall be defined. Based on the defined relevant mar-
ket, several aspects shall be examined in the next phases to understand (1) the market 
structure (whether there are sufficient players or the market is concentrated to (a) cer-
tain market player(s) instead); (2) the level of competition (whether there is effective 
competition in the market); (3) how powerful the firm under scrutiny is in the market 
as regards the quantity aspects (market share) and quality aspects (its ability to influ-
ence prices, production, and distribution) and (4) how the company under scrutiny 
behaves in the market. The following paragraphs offer some views on the complexity 
in defining relevant market disruptive innovation cases. 
In Google Shopping case, the Commission focuses on Google practices in the 
general internet search market and the impact to the comparison shopping market. 
While the design of Google's generic search algorithms, the demotion, and the way 
that Google displays or organises its search results pages as such are legal, the con-
cern lies on the leveraging of Google‟s dominance in general internet search into a 
separate market: comparison shopping.  
Here, the case shows the use of the concept of leveraging of market power which 
is a type of abuse that consists of an undertaking with market dominance in one 
market engaging in anticompetitive conducts in order to expand its market power 
                                                 
11
 D.S. Evans and R. Schmalensee, "Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically 
Competitive Industries" in A.B. Jaffe, J. Lerner en S. Stern (eds.), Innovation Policy and the 
Economy, Volume 2, MIT Press, 2002, (1), p. 1. 
12
 J.A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1942 (Routledge 2003), p. 82-83. 
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into another market (traditional leveraging) or to protect its market dominance in the 
first market (dynamic leveraging).
13
 However, it can be applied only in exceptional 
circumstances, because otherwise it could substantially reduce the incentive to 
innovate. Exceptional circumstances only occur when there are strong indications of 
the existence of opportunity and incentive to leverage market power. In the case of 
Google/DoubleClick, the problem is that the second market did not even exist during 
the merger assessment and the competition authority would also have difficulties to 
prove that R&D activities in both undertakings are conducted with the purpose of 
creating a new market. 
Next to defining relevant market is the importance of market shares considera-
tion to assess the competitive ability of companies in the market. Although useful, in 
dynamic markets such as the information and communication technology (ICT) sec-
tor, market shares may fluctuate over a short period of time. In the Cisco judgment, 
following the statement of the Commission, the General Court argued that in dynam-
ic and quickly evolving markets, market shares are not an appropriate means to as-
sess whether an undertaking has a dominant position, because they could be transito-
ry in nature.
14
  
Other online services such as search engines and social networks exemplify dy-
namic sectors that are subject to such observation. In practice, however, the Commis-
sion still used market shares in the markets for internet search and online advertising 
as can be seen in the acquisition of Yahoo‟s search business by Microsoft, the acqui-
sition of DoubleClick by Google,
 15
 and the recent case of Google Shopping
16
. The 
Commission Decision does not include different service to merchant platforms, such 
as Amazon and eBay, in the same market. While comparison shopping services offer 
                                                 
13
 P. Crocioni, Leveraging of Market Power in Emerging Markets: A Review of Cases, Literature, and 
A Suggested Framework‟, Journal of Competition Law and Economics 2007, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 452 
ff.; Case C-333/94P - Tetra Pak International SA v Commission. 
14
 Case T-79/12, Cisco Systems Inc. and Messagenet SpA v. Commission, judgment of 11 December 
2013, not yet reported, par. 69. 
15
 Case No COMP/M.5727 – Microsoft/Yahoo! Search Business, 18 February 2010, par. 112-130 and 
Case No COMP/M.4731 – Google/ DoubleClick, 11 March 2008, par. 96-118. 
16
 European Commission Memo, „Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing 
Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service – 
Factsheet‟, Brussels, 27 June 2017 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1785_en.htm> 
accessed 27 June 2017. 
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a tool for consumers to compare products and prices online and find deals from 
online retailers of all types, they do not offer the possibility for products to be bought 
on their site, which is exactly the business of merchant platforms.
 17
 
2.3 Multi-Sided Platforms (MSPs) and Network Effects  
Google offers a good example of how multi-sided platforms (hereafter MSPs) 
and network effects work. According to Rochet and Tirole‟s definition, two-sided - 
or more generally multi-sided - markets are ―markets in which one or several plat-
forms enable interactions between end-users and try to get the two (or multiple) sides 
"on board" by appropriately charging each side.‖
18
 The term “market” here is used 
with a loose meaning, unlike the use of the term in competition law analysis, such as 
in “relevant market”. This term is often used interchangeably with “platform”. Both 
terms “market” and “platform” refer to a place where different group of customers 
meet and interact.
19
  
MSPs have been long recognized in traditional advertising-supported media like 
newspapers.
20
 In the new-economy industries, MSPs become more common for in-
stance in industries that are based on advertising-supported online platforms like 
Google or Facebook, software platforms and web portals. Understanding how MSPs 
work is important for competition law analysis, because it brings certain implications 
that differ from single-sided markets. 
MSPs serve different groups of customers. One characteristic of MSP is that one 
group of customers will value the platform more when there are more customers of 
another group.
 21
 Google attracts advertisers because it has large number of users as 
                                                 
17
 European Commission Memo, „Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing 
Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service – 
Factsheet‟, 27 June 2017 <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-1785_en.htm> accessed 27 
June 2017. 
18
 J.C. Rochet and J. Tirole, 'Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report,' 37 The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics 645 (2006), p. 645. 
19
 See D.S. Evans, (Ed.), 'Platform Economics: Essays on Multi-Sided Businesses', Competition Poli-
cy International, 2011, p. vi, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1974020 
accessed 5 August 2017. 
20
 L. Filistrucchi, T.J. Klein, and T.O. Michielsen, 'Assessing Unilateral Merger Effects in a Two-
Sided Market: An Application to the Dutch Daily Newspaper Market', 8 (2) Journal of Competition 
Law and Economics 297 (2012), p. 298. 
21
 M. Armstrong and J. Wright, 'Two-sided Markets, Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Con-
tracts', 32(2) Economic Theory 353(2007), p. 353. 
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the audience as potential buyers for the advertisers. 
This implies that a group of customers is influenced by another group of custom-
ers. The link between the two groups is called „indirect network effects‟, or „indirect 
network externalities‟, as the two groups do not internalize the networks effects, ra-
ther they are internalized by the platform. In the examples above, we can see positive 
indirect network effects (or positive feedback effects).
22
 The positive indirect net-
work effects result from the reduction of transaction costs, facilitation of matching, 
and making it easier for different groups of customers to exchange value between 
each other.
23
 
The indirect network effects character requires a MSP to attract customers on ei-
ther side of its platforms. The platforms will have to secure enough customers on 
both sides (critical mass) and bring enough value to either group of customers.
24
  
The implication of this is that it may be necessary to charge asymmetrical pricing 
to different groups of customers (“skewed pricing”)
25
 in order to recover most costs 
for one side of the platforms while favouring the other. Therefore, it is common to 
find platforms that charge price at marginal cost or even provide services for free to a 
group of customers, while charging normal prices to the other group. These free ser-
vices combined might at certain level generate dependence of users on the platform 
and can contribute to the maintenance of dominance in the market. 
Users, in return, provide Google with different types of data that help Google an-
alyze their behaviour to enable behavioural advertising. Indeed, users do not really 
get the services for free, but “paying” with data is difficult to convert into price. Not 
taking this into account could lead to a false perception of a selling below cost on 
                                                 
22
 D.S. Evans and R. Schmalensee, 'The Antitrust Analysis of Multi-Sided Platform Businesses', 
NBER Working Paper No. 18783 February 2013, <http://www.nber.org/papers/w18783> accessed 8 
August 2017. 
23
 However, users may also dislike too many advertisements and hence, are discouraged to use the 
platform (negative indirect network effects). Unless indicated as negative, the term indirect network 
effects refer to the positive effects. 
24
 C. Saphiro and H.R. Varian, Information Rules: A Strategic Guide to the Network Economy, Har-
vard, Harvard Business Press, 1999, p. 14. 
25
 W. Bolt and A.F. Tieman, 'Heavily Skewed Pricing in Two-sided Markets', 26 (5) International 
Journal of Industrial Organization 1250 (2008), p. 1250; W. Bolt and A.F. Tieman, 'Skewed Pricing 
in Two-Sided Markets: An IO Approach', Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Con-
ference 2005, p. 2-3, <http://econpapers.repec.org/paper/mmfmmfc05/75.htm> accessed 5 August 
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one side of the platform. It is also incorrect to conclude that there is no market, simp-
ly because the services are at zero prices.  
The merger case of Google/DoubleClick clearly exemplifies the issues concern-
ing multi-sidedness, network effects, problems of defining relevant markets, and lim-
itations of existing legal tools. The two parties concerned operated, in the case of 
Google, as an internet search engine providing online advertising space on its own 
websites and its network, and ran, in the case of DoubleClick, ads business for ad 
serving, management, and reporting technology worldwide, as well as services for 
intermediation platform (ad exchange). The fact that both undertakings did not oper-
ate in a single market, was a determinative factor in the Commission‟s decision to 
approve the merger. What was not taken into account, however, was that the merger 
would remove the border between search advertising (Google) and display advertis-
ing (DoubleClick) and in turn, contribute to Google dominance in the new market. 
2.4 Indispensability and the Principle of Equal Treatment  
In the Google Shopping Case, the Commission investigates the allegation of 
dominance abuse by „allegedly lowering the ranking of unpaid search results of 
competing services‟ and „according preferential placement to the results of its own 
vertical search services in order to shut out competing services‟, and lowering the 
'Quality Score' for sponsored links of competing vertical search services, a decisive 
element to define the price for Google advertisers.
 26
 
The Commission in its ruling argues that Google's algorithm that places its 
comparison shopping service appears much higher in Google's search results than 
rival comparison shopping services has had a significant impact on competition in 
comparison shopping markets for the following reason: First, the impact on user 
clicks (traffic): according to the real-world consumer behaviour, surveys and eye-
tracking studies, consumers generally click significantly more on search results at or 
otherwise near the top of the first search results page than on results lower down the 
first page, or on subsequent pages, where rival comparison shopping services were 
most often found. Second, the more visibility in the search results has increased traf-
fic to Google‟s comparison shopping service, while rivals have suffered a decrease in 
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traffic from Google's search results pages on a lasting basis.
27
  
Google's illegal practices and the distortions to competition led to Google's 
comparison shopping service gaining significant market share at the expense of 
rivals. This has deprived European consumers of the benefits of competition on the 
merits: genuine choice and innovation. 
The illegality of Google‟s practices lies in the different treatment applied to its 
own comparison shopping services and the rivals‟ that is prohibited under the princi-
ple of equal treatment. The principle applies under circumstances that the company is 
dominant in the market and the services provided have significant importance for ri-
vals to enter the market. This sounds like a similar concept of indispensability in the 
Microsoft case
28
 below. 
For the application of the prohibition of refusal to deal, essential facility doctrine 
would become a useful tool to analyse under which circumstances a certain conduct 
qualifies a refusal to deal. In the EU Microsoft case, the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union has accepted that a refusal to provide essential facility to competitors in 
order to enable them to enter or operate in the same market can amount to a violation 
of Art. 82 of the Treaty (now Art. 102 TFEU).
29 
 
In the Microsoft case,
30
 European Commission ruled that Microsoft abused its 
dominance against Art. 82 EC by refusing to supply interoperability information to 
its competitors and thereby, restricting the interoperability between Windows PCs 
and non-Microsoft workgroup servers.
31
 In its ruling, the Commission required Mi-
crosoft to disclose complete and accurate interface documentation in order to allow 
non-Microsoft workgroup servers for full interoperability with Windows PCs and 
servers.
32
 Refusal to make interoperability information available would adversely 
                                                 
27
 European Commission Memo, „Antitrust: Commission Fines Google €2.42 Billion for Abusing 
Dominance as Search Engine by Giving Illegal Advantage to Own Comparison Shopping Service – 
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June 2017. 
28
 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, para 36. 
29
 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission [2007] ECR II-3601, para 36. 
30
 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission. 
31
 Case T-201/04 Microsoft v Commission, para 36. 
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impinge on the incentives of others to innovate and create new products.
33
 However, 
from competition law viewpoint, under the general rule, there is no obligation to dis-
close interoperability information.
34 
Only under exceptional circumstances, a refusal 
to provide interoperability information can qualify an abuse of dominant position un-
der Art. 102 TFEU.  
Art. 102 TFEU presupposes first of all a dominant position in the market.
35
 In the 
next step, a compulsory licensing for interoperability as shown in the Microsoft case 
could be imposed only when (1) the product is indispensable,
36
 2) the refusal pre-
vents the emergence of a new product, while there is a consumer potential demand 
for the new product,
37 
(3) the refusal is not justified,
38
 and (4) it excludes all competi-
tion on a secondary market.
39
 
40
 The element of indispensability in the Microsoft case 
referred to the degree of interoperability that ‗was necessary in order to enable de-
velopers of non-Microsoft work group server operating systems to remain viably on 
the market‘.
41
 The interoperability information was indispensable because of its im-
portance to allow non-Microsoft work group server to interoperate with client PCs 
and because of Microsoft‟s significantly leading position in the client PC operating 
system market.
42
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The concept of indispensability can also be seen in Google Shopping case. The 
indispensability element lies on the market dominance of Google that leads to access 
– number of user views - needed by competitors to enter the market. Although EU 
competition law does not prohibit market dominance, it obliges dominant companies 
to observe the equal treatment principle under Art. 86 lit. c of EC Treaty. 
In Indonesian case laws, the use of essential facility doctrine
43
 can be seen for in-
stance in the judgment of KPPU in Telkom case
44
 in 2004. The case dealt with forc-
ing other companies in retail level to refuse to deal with competitors.
 45
 In the judg-
ment, KPPU stated that Telekom‟s local network was an essential facility for each 
international call service provider that offers the services on the local network.
46
 In 
its decision, KPPU emphasized the freedom of consumers to choose services and the 
right to interconnection.
47
 
 
3. Useful Elements for Competition Law Analysis 
3.1 Relevant Market and Competition for the Market 
Traditional competition analysis relies on an assessment of the effects of a cer-
tain type of behaviour in existing markets. However, disruptive innovation is harder 
to accommodate in such analysis, because the market itself might have not yet been 
existing.
48
 Hence, a new approach to analyze competition for a future market or 
competition in innovation is needed. 
The problem to define relevant market in cases of competition for the market 
might suggest that another basis for competition law analysis other than relevant 
market is necessary. Nevertheless, while this problem remains unresolved, it could 
be useful to consider a shift from the concept of substitution to another parameter for 
                                                 
43
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defining relevant market. 
In Graef, Wahyuningtyas, and Valcke,
49
 we propose to look into the approach in 
the area of Article 101 TFEU in the EU Horizontal Guidelines, in which the Europe-
an Commission could look at R&D investments for the relevant market definition. 
The reason is because R&D expenses can be considered as input to new products and 
technologies – output that would create a new market that until then cannot yet iden-
tified. The counter argument against this is that (at least in the EU Horizontal Guide-
lines), this method requires visibility to identify R&D efforts at an early stage, while 
in the ICT sector (Google included), companies often do not disclose this type of in-
formation. However, in cases when it is hard to observe the precise R&D efforts, we 
could look into the assets to which potential competitors need access in order to take 
part in the ex-ante competition, i.e. competition for the new innovation and technolo-
gy, and thus, the new market. 
3.2 User Data and Market Dominance 
The access to data on online platforms has become one of the issues that calls for 
the attention of competition authorities and courts worldwide.
50
 When a dominant 
online platform refuses to give access to user data – under condition that the provi-
sion of access to user data has met the requirements under data protection and priva-
cy rules - , this could constitute a refusal to deal and lead to liability under essential 
facilities doctrine. However, data already plays a role much earlier in competition 
analysis before it comes to a question on data access. Data control amounts to market 
power. Data in this regard refers to user data.  
User data has become an asset for companies due to its potential to bring profit, 
among other things its use for the purposes of targeted marketing. To attract users, 
online platforms usually provide services for users for zero prices, while the revenue 
comes from other customers such as advertisers. Although users make their personal 
data available on online platforms, they cannot be treated as undertakings that supply 
                                                 
49
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data. Personal data is not to be regarded as a trade commodity although it has eco-
nomic value. When users upload their personal data on online platform, the action is 
seen as a necessity for the purpose of merely using the service or getting the access 
to enable the use of the service and not to sell the data. Unlike other types of asset, 
despite being under the control of the online platform to which the data is submitted, 
user data is not under the proprietorship of the data controller. Thus, it cannot be 
used, processed, and transferred, traded to or shared with any third party without pri-
or consent of the individual user as the data subject. 
If competition law shall treat personal data as it treats other types of company as-
set, the differences with other types of asset mentioned above shall be taken into ac-
count. However, it shall not focus on whether a violation of the user right to their 
personal data has occurred. Instead, as proposed by Geradin and Kuschewsky, the 
question addressed by competition law shall be whether online platforms have taken 
anticompetitive measures in the collection and processing such data, or in hindering 
competitors from acquiring user data, against the will of their users to port it.
51
  
The prohibition of dominance abuse in Article 102 TFEU encompasses exploita-
tive abuse and exclusionary behaviours. Among other forms of dominance abuse 
prohibited in the provision, Article 102 TFEU prohibits undertakings from “imposing 
unfair prices or unfair trading conditions” in lit. a. Hence, when consumers are re-
quired to give their personal data in return for using services provided by online plat-
forms, competition law might intervene with the question whether exploitation of 
dominance has taken place in the collection and processing of data. Such question 
could be addressed for instance in cases when users are required to provide personal 
data beyond what is necessary for using the online platform services or when users 
are not or not sufficiently informed about the use and processing of the data being 
collected. Exclusionary behaviour occurs for instance when there is an element of 
excluding competition in the process of collecting, processing data, and impeding the 
portability of data. 
3.3 Impact of Harms to Consumer Choice and Innovation 
The Google Shopping Case shows how Google's illegal practices that led to the 
                                                 
51
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distortions to competition have deprived consumers of the benefits of competition on 
the merits: genuine choice and innovation. As addressed by Neelie Kroes, a former 
EU Competition Commissioner, ―[d]efending consumers‘ interests is at the heart of 
the Commission‘s competition policy‖,
52
 protecting consumers is the main goal of 
European competition law. Illegality under Article 102 TFEU is not defined per se. 
Instead, it falls under the assessment on the qualification of dominance and the effect 
of harms. For defining the harmful effects, it relies on the impact of conducts to the 
interest of consumers. In the Google Shopping Case, the Commission displays how 
the interest of consumers in dynamic competition have been taken into account, 
where they are no longer defined by the level of price, but by genuine choice and in-
novation.
53
 
In dynamic competition such as that taking place in the online business, innova-
tion becomes a relevant parameter for competition. Especially where users get access 
with zero prices to online services such as search engines and social networks, their 
choice on service provider is based on aspects other than price, such as quality and 
the level of innovation. The term „genuine choice‟ means that consumers should not 
be left with the choice of „take it or leave it‟, but they should have choices first of all 
to negotiate their interests and second, to be able to switch to any other service pro-
vider without significant loss.  
 
4. Conclusion 
The paper concludes as follows: 
(1) Various factors play roles in the construction of illegality under the principle 
of equal treatment in Google Shopping case. The papers identifies important 
factors for the applicability of the principle of equal treatment in the case: the 
use of the concept of leveraging of market power in one market (general 
search) into a separate market (comparison shopping), the nature of multi-
sided platforms (MSPs) and network effects, and the concept of indispensa-
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 Neelie Kroes, „Consumers at the heart of EU Competition Policy‟, Address at BEUC dinner (The 
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bility.  
(2) The elements of analysis under EU Competition Law, in particular Article 
102 TFEU, that could be useful for Indonesian competition law analysis is 
first of all, for the use of relevant market as a basis for competition law anal-
ysis in competition for the new market, instead of relying on the pure product 
market consideration, i.e. substitution concept, another parameter such as 
R&D investments for the relevant market definition cold be used. Second, user 
data plays significantly important role for online business to gain market 
power and hence, for competition law analysis. Third, in considering the 
harmful effects of conducts, consideration should be taken of the impact to 
the interest of consumers in terms of the availability of choice and innova-
tion, instead of on price. 
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Abstract 
Merger control is one of the important aspects in the business competition re-
gime, considering the impact of merger can lead to monopolistic practices and 
unfair business competition. The purpose of merger control in the perspective 
of competition law is to prevent potential violations of anti-monopoly laws 
through corporate actions in the form of mergers or acquisitions. Business 
competition supervisory authority in Indonesia (KPPU) has a role in control-
ling mergers by defining criteria for mergers, such as notification systems, noti-
fication conditions, substantive tests and time periods, notification results, and 
other technical matters related to parties required to make notifications, for-
eign mergers and challenges. How does the system of merger control in Indo-
nesia and its comparison with the system in other ASEAN Member States 
(AMS)? And how AMS synergize on regional merger control system, particular-
ly in the ASEAN region? One of the most interesting things about the merger 
control system in Indonesia is using mandatory post merger notification, that 
can lead to a heavy penalty for late reporting. This merger control comparative 
study aims to know merger control regulations and system in the ASEAN re-
gion, particularly some AMS which had already promulgated its competition 
law. The merger control in the ASEAN economic region requires an initial step 
to form a harmonization of the system by the competition authority of the re-
spective country.  
 
Keywords: Merger Control, Competition Law, ASEAN Member States. 
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A. Introduction 
Merger is a form of joining of two or more independent business actors or inte-
grating activities carried out by two business actors thoroughly and permanently.
1
 
There are three forms of merger in competition law, namely horizontal merger, verti-
cal merger, and conglomerate merger. A horizontal merger occurs when two compa-
nies have the same line of business join or when firms competing in the same indus-
try merge. Vertical mergers involve different stages of production operations that are 
interconnected with each other, from upstream to downstream. Vertical mergers can 
also take the form of two types, namely upstream vertical merger and downstream 
vertical merger. Conglomerate merger occurs when two companies do not have the 
same line of business join. In other words, a conglomerate merger occurs between 
non-competing firms and has no buyer-seller relationship. 
There are several objectives of the merger from the perspective of competition, 
among others:
2
 
1. Mergers, consolidations, and takeovers constantly improves economic effi-
ciency as an effort to improve national welfare; 
2. Prevent monopolistic practices and/or unfair business competition by busi-
ness actors as a result of merger, consolidation or acquisition; 
3. Mergers, consolidations or acquisitions aimed at enhancing effectiveness and 
efficiency in business activities. 
Corporate restructuring means a basic revitalization to all business conduct aim-
ing at creating more competitiveness. Such revitalization is not only related to busi-
ness aspect, but also organization, financial management, and legal aspect.
3
 To com-
pete with big corporations both overseas and domestic, a company always tries to 
strengthen its capital, reduce production cost, pursue tax planning, increase produc-
tion cost, trying to produce goods at the most efficient point aiming at increasing 
                                                 
1
Earnest Gellhorn and William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Law and Economics (St. Paul, Mennesota: West 
Publishing, 1994), p. 348. 
2
The KPPU Regulation No. 2 Year 2013 (Merger Guideline), Appendix, p. 1. 
3
Placidius Sudibyo, “Restrukturisasi Perusahaan,” ("Corporate Restructuring"), paper presented at Na-
tional Seminar on Corporate Restructuring Organized by Faculty of Law for the 41st Anniversary of 
Diponegoro University, Semarang, September 28, 1988). 
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profit, and at the same time reduce inefficiency.
4
 
In general, maximizing profit can be expected from merger and acquisition, be-
cause merger and acquisition can reduce production cost that is resulting to a more 
efficient product.
5
 In this paper, merger comprises of merger, consolidation, and ac-
quisition. Efficiency is created through the economic scale of the merger companies 
in their production aspect. In addition to it, efficiency can be achieved through a 
merger scheme such as exploiting economic scope, marketing efficiency, or central-
izing research and development. Hence, merger can be used as a solution when busi-
ness actor facing some difficulties, particularly liquidity, so that creditor, owner and 
employees can be protected from bankruptcy.
6
 
Merger activities can be pro or anti competition. It can be anti-competitive if 
there is no control from the competition authorities. The existence of mergers in the 
business world should have a positive impact on failed companies. However, in prac-
tice, many merger activities are misused by business actors intending to expand their 
market share. In addition, there is often a clash between merger interests and effi-
ciency reasons and business competition. Merger can directly or indirectly bring a 
relatively large influence on the competitive conditions in the relevant market. It can 
also cause or strengthen market power by increasing concentration on relevant mar-
ket. The increase in market power can also increase their ability to coordinate either 
implicitly or explicitly.
7
 
The main concern of competition law is more on the negative impact of merger. 
Therefore, the control of mergers by the competition authority is aimed at preventing 
monopolistic practices and unfair business competition in the relevant market. Mer-
ger, consolidation, or acquisition can affect market concentration in the relevant 
market. These three kinds of corporate actions can lead to increase or decrease of 
                                                 
4
Viscusi, W. Kip, John M. Vernon and Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, Economics of Regulation and Anti-
trust, 3rd Ed., (London: The MIT Press, 2001), p. 195.  
5
Syamsul Maarif, Merger Dalam Perspektif Hukum Persaingan Usaha (Merger in the Business Com-
petition Law Perspective), (Jakarta: PT. Penebar Swadaya, 2010), p. 10.   
6
Andi Fahmi Lubis, et. al., Hukum Persaingan Usaha Antara Teks dan Konteks (“Business Competi-
tion Law Between Text and Context”), (Jakarta: The Business Competition Supervisory Commission 
(KPPU) in cooperation with Deutsche Gesselschaft fur Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) GmbH, 
2009), p. 189. 
7
Debra J. Pearlstein, et.al., Antitrust Law Developments, 5th ed. Vol. I (American Bar Association, 
2002), p. 317-319.  
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competition in the market that can be potentially harmful to consumer and the socie-
ty.  
In the United States, the main concern of the merger is the creation or strength-
ening of the market power of the merger company. While in the EU, some of the 
concern as a result of a merger, among others: 
1. Fear of the birth of a giant business; 
2. Foreign-controlled of strategic sectors; 
3. Resulting in unemployment at merger related companies. 
This is an important issue which often raise in the merger control such as juris-
dictional thresholds, notification system, either mandatory or voluntary, criteria of 
foreign merger, notification requirement, duration reporting period until the issuance 
of opinion of the competition authority, as well as sanctions for infringement of mer-
ger control regulations. Competition law generally prohibits three main practices: (i) 
anti-competitive agreements; (ii) abuse of a dominant position or a monopoly; (iii) 
anti-competitive mergers. It can also have provisions related to unfair commercial 
practices.
8
 Generally, competition law covers the following categories of mergers: 
mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures (joint ventures may be regulated either un-
der merger or anti-competitive agreement provisions).  
Mergers falling under the prohibition should be screened and approved by the 
Competition Authority or other competent agency. Competition law may establish a 
system of either voluntary or mandatory notification of the (proposed) transaction to 
the Competition Authority. Competition law often provides for minimum (market 
share and/or turnover) thresholds over which a transaction shall or may be notified. 
Where notification is mandatory, failure to notify may lead to sanctions. Generally, a 
merger cannot be completed until approved by the Competition Authority.  
This paper aimed to conducting comparative study of merger control in Indone-
sia as well as in some AMS. That is because merger control regulations can affect 
business activities in the ASEAN region, particularly after the promulgation of 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as of the end of 2015. This paper also aims to 
describe merger control system, either voluntary or mandatory notification of the 
                                                 
8
Le Luong Minh, Handbook on Competition Policy and Law in ASEAN for Business 2013, 3
rd
 Ed., Ja-
karta: ASEAN Secretariat, May 2013.  
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transaction to competition authority, the thresholds over which a transaction shall or 
may be notified, the substantive test, including the sanction of non-compliant with 
such regulations.  
 
B. Merger Control System from the Perspective of Competition Law 
Merger discussion usually also involves reporting system, the relevant competi-
tion authority, obligation to report before or after effective date, threshold criteria, 
substantive test, the Commission‟s opinion consisting of either objection, or no ob-
jection, and/or no objection with certain conditions. Here we choose comparison in 
four ASEAN member states (AMS), namely Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, and Sin-
gapore. The reason for that is because those four countries had already issued merger 
control regulations.  
1. Merger Notification System and the Relevant Competition Authority 
In Indonesia, merger regulation is regulated in Law No. 5 Year 1999 concerning 
Prohibitions of Monopolistic Practices and Unfair Business Competition (Law No. 
5/1999) article 28 and article 29, as well as in the Government Regulation No. 57 
Year 2010 regarding Merger and Acquisition (PP No. 57/2010). A specific technical 
regulation to implement the aforementioned Government Regulation is made by the 
Indonesian Anti Monopoly Agency (KPPU) by issuing the Commission Regulation 
number 02 Year 2013 regarding Merger Guideline. KPPU is an independent institu-
tion which has the authority to handle, decide or conduct an investigation of a mo-
nopoly practices case, either government or private sector having conflict of interest. 
In the exercise of authority and duties the agency is accountable to the president.
9
 
One of the duties of KPPU is to conduct merger review. 
One of the ASEAN Member Countries (AMS) which regulates the merger and 
implementing it is Thailand. This country regulates the provisions of merger in Sec-
tion 26 Trade Competition Act (TCA) BE 3542 (1999). Section 26 TCA prohibits 
mergers of businesses that may result in a monopoly or unfair competition, as pre-
scribed by the Trade Competition Commission (TCC), unless permission is obtained 
from the TCC. The TCA empowers the TCC to enforce the merger control provi-
                                                 
9
Hermansyah, Pokok-Pokok Hukum Persaingan Usaha di Indonesia (“The Principles of Business 
Competition Law in Indonesia”) (Jakarta: Kencana, 2008), 1
st 
Ed., p. 73.  
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sions. In addition, the TCC is responsible for prescribing notifications to enforce the 
TCA, including issuing notifications concerning the specific process by which cer-
tain mergers will be examined. TCC is empowered to set a minimum threshold of 
market share, total sales, amount of capital, the number of shares or quantity of assets 
that will be subject to prohibition under this section, this is part of the pre-merger no-
tification requirement.  
Merger control provisions mandating pre-merger notification filing are included 
in Vietnam‟s competition legislation. Article 18 of the Law on Competition No. 
27/2004/ QH11 prohibits mergers and acquisitions that result in a combined market 
share of 50%, unless expressly exempted by government legislation. The merger 
control regime entails mandatory pre-merger notification to the Vietnam Competition 
Authority (VCA), if the post-merger or post-acquisition combined market share is 
between 30% and 50%. The VCA, which is responsible for discovering, investigat-
ing, collecting, and searching for relevant evidence in restrictive competition cases,
10 
co-exists with the Vietnam Competition Council (VCC), which is in charge of judg-
ing, making decisions, and resolving the complaints related to the competition re-
striction cases.
11
 
The relevant regulation is the Singapore Competition Act (SCA), which was 
passed in October 2004. The SCA is enforced by the Competition Commission of 
Singapore (CCS), which was established as a statutory body under the SCA, and is 
under the purview of the Ministry of Trade and Industry. The CCS has power to in-
vestigate and impose sanctions. The SCA applies generally to prohibit: anticompeti-
tive agreements,
12
 the abuse of dominant position,
13
 and mergers and acquisitions 
that substantially, or maybe expected to substantially, lessen competition within any 
market in Singapore.
14
 The SCA was implemented in three phases, on 1 January 
2005, the provisions establishing the Commission came into force. The provisions on 
anticompetitive agreements, decisions and practices, abuse of dominance, enforce-
                                                 
10
Article 49 of the Vietnam Competition Act. 
11
Article 53 of the Vietnam Competition Act. 
12
Section 34 the Singapore Competition Act, Chapter 50B, (Original Enactment: Act 4; Revised Edi-
tion 2006, 31
st
 January 2006) 
13
Section 47 the Singapore Competition Act. 
14
Section 54 the Singapore Competition Act. 
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ment, appeal processes and other miscellaneous areas under the Competition Act 
came into force on 1 January 2006. The provisions relating to mergers and acquisi-
tions came into force on 1 July 2007. 
The discussion of the merger reporting system is whether the reporting nature is 
mandatory or voluntary before (pre-merger) or after effective merger (post-merger). 
One of the fundamental differences of merger control in Indonesia lies in its report-
ing system which legally requires reporting to be made after mergers and acquisi-
tions are effective on a post-merger basis rather than before mergers (pre-merger no-
tification) as generally done in other countries.
15
 This is caused by the content of Ar-
ticle 29 of Law No. 5/1999 explicitly stating that reporting must be made no later 
than 30 working days after the date of merger and acquisition. Therefore, when a 
merger has been effectively enacted juridically becomes very important to be identi-
fied, and that date will be the starting point for the calculation of 30 working days of 
the business actors limit to report the merger or acquisition. The delay in making a 
notice to KPPU causes the business actor to pay a significant fine of Rp 1 Billion 
(US $ 110 thousand) per working day of delay with a maximum fine of Rp 25 Billion 
(US $ 2.84 million).
16
  
Thailand‟s generic competition law includes a mandatory merger control filing 
regime, but with no fixed filing deadlines or guidelines for notification. Section 26 of 
The Trade Competition Act 1999 (TCA) prohibits companies from operating any 
merger that might give rise to a monopoly or unfair competition. The merger control 
regime entails mandatory notification to the Office of Thai Trade Competition 
Commission (TCC) once certain thresholds are met.
17  
However, as the specific 
thresholds that have to be met to trigger mandatory notification have yet to be re-
leased, Section 26 of the TCA is not enforceable.
18 
Accordingly, it may be concluded 
that it is possible for merging parties to bypass Section 26 of TCA as merger filing is 
                                                 
15
Syamsul Maarif, Merger Dalam Perspektif Hukum Persaingan Usaha (“Merger in the Business 
Competition Law Perspective”) (Jakarta: Degraf Publishing, 2010), p. 32. 
16
Article 6 Government Regulation No 57/2010. 
17
Section 26 of the Trade Competition Act 1999 (Thailand). 
18
http://otcc.dit.go.th/otcc/ index_en.php. accessed 12 February 2016. 
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not yet in force.
19
  
The TCA empowers the TCC to enforce the merger control provisions. The TCC 
is responsible for prescribing notifications to enforce of the TCA, including issuing 
notifications concerning the specific process by which certain mergers will be exam-
ined. The TCC is empowered to set a minimum threshold of market share, total sales, 
amount of capital, the number of shares or quantity of assets that will be subject to 
prohibition under Section 26. This is part of pre-merger notification requirement. As 
no notification pursuant to Section 26 has been issued, the restrictions on mergers are 
not enforceable.
20
 
Singapore‟s governing competition laws prescribed under the Competition Act, 
Section 50B of Singapore (SCA) includes a merger control regime that is based on 
voluntary notification. Section 54 of the Act came into force in 2007, and prohibits 
mergers (including autonomous full-function joint ventures made on a lasting basis) 
that have resulted, or may be expected to result, in a substantial lessening of competi-
tion within any market in Singapore for goods and services.
21 
Practitioners should be 
aware that while merger notification to the CCS is voluntary, the CCS requires all 
parties to mergers to conduct a mandatory self-assessment, in accordance with the 
methodologies in the guidelines published by the CCS, read alongside its decided 
cases, on whether a merger filing is necessary. The self-assessment must be docu-
mented in a customary form which the CCS would accept as documentary evidence 
in order for the self-assessment to be accepted by the CCS.  
The merger reporting system in some ASEAN Member Countries (AMSs) gen-
erally ordered to report before the merger was effective. This is a preventive effort of 
competition authorities to conduct an assessment of mergers that could lead to mo-
nopolistic practices and unfair business competition. The merger provisions in Indo-
nesia are the only one that stipulates the mandatory post-merger notification system, 
with the consequence of imposing high sanctions on reporting delays. Therefore, the 
                                                 
19
Daren Shiau and Elsa Chen, “ASEAN Developments in Merger Control”, Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice, 2014, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 151-152.  
20
Ibid. 
21
The Section 54 Prohibition may apply even where the merger takes place outside of Singapore, or 
where any merger party is located outside Singapore, so long as the merger has effect on any market 
in Singapore.  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draft amendments to antimonopoly laws proposed by the House of Representatives 
changed the reporting system to mandatory post-merger notification. This will 
change the pattern, that every merger plan that meets all requirements of the merger 
or threshold definition aspect, must be reported to KPPU. 
2. Jurisdiction, Threshold, and Substantive Test 
There are limits to reporting the merger to KPPU, and there are at least three 
conditions that must be reported, namely fulfillment of: 
a. definitions of mergers; 
b. not merger between affiliated companies; 
c. the asset or turnover threshold. 
 
ad. a) Merger Definition  
Government Regulation (GR) No. 57/2010 has defined the merger. But the im-
portant thing to note is the concept of control, especially in terms of acquisitions. The 
question of what percentage of the company's shares is taken over so that the defini-
tion of acquisition is met must always be linked to the concept of change in control. 
Acquisitions are deemed to occur in the event of a change of control, regardless of 
percentage of the company's shares are taken over.
22
  
ad. b) Merger between Affiliated Companies 
GR 57/2010 expressly states that merger or acquisition between affiliated com-
panies is not an object that must be reported to KPPU. This is based on the notion 
that the focus of competition law is not on the event of mergers and acquisitions, but 
on the impact of mergers on competitiveness. 
ad. c) Threshold of Asset or Turnover 
Article 29 of Law No. 5/1999 specifically limits mergers that reach certain val-
ues of assets and turnover which must be reported to the KPPU. GR 57/2010 has 
stipulated the asset value of Rp 2.5 trillion or more and/or the turnover value of Rp 5 
trillion or more.
23
 As for the banking sector, it is based on the asset value of Rp 20 
trillion or more.
24
 Whether a merger is qualified and/or does not require intense dia-
                                                 
22
Article 1 Government Regulation (GR) No 57/2010. 
23
Article 5 paragraph (2) GR No 57/2010. 
24
Article 5 paragraph (3) Gr No 57/2010. 
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logue between the merger party and the KPPU is depending on the complexity. In 
practice, KPPU is always open for discussion to assess whether a merger needs to be 
reported or not. Opportunities to open the dialogue will prevent the company from 
being fined or sanctioned from delay in reporting. 
Pursuant to Section 26 TCA, the merger of businesses in Thailand include the 
following: 
1) The merger made by a producer with another producer, by a distributor with 
another distributor, by a producer with a distributor, or by a service provider 
with another service provider, which has the effect of maintaining the status 
of one business and terminating the status of the other business or creating a 
new business;  
2) The purchase of the whole or part of assets of another business with a view to 
controlling business administration policies, administration and management;  
3) The purchase of the whole or part of shares of another business with a view to 
controlling business administration policies, administration and management.  
Once the transaction is determined to be within the scope of the merger of busi-
nesses, that transaction will be evaluated against the criteria set by the TCC. A busi-
ness operator who is involved in the of businesses as aforementioned that triggers the 
minimum threshold as prescribed in the notification by the TCC must obtain approv-
al from the TCC. 
Filing will be mandatory if the merger may result in a monopoly or unfair com-
petition as prescribed in the notification issued by the TCC. An applicant who will 
perform a merger under section 26 of the TCA will be required to submit an applica-
tion to the TCC in accordance with the form, rules, procedures, and conditions pre-
scribed by the TCC pursuant to section 35 of the TCA. In addition, section 35 of the 
TCA requires the contents of an application for approval of a proposed merger of 
businesses, must specify, at least, the following: 
1) the reasons and necessity for the proposed merger; 
2) the method of achieving the proposed merger; and 
3) the duration of the proposed merger. 
The TCC has not issued any notifications on the filing application or the mini-
mum thresholds for mergers. Therefore, pre-merger filing is not required, and there is 
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no notification prescribing any exceptions.
25
 
In Singapore, generally merger should be notified to the SCA if the merger par-
ties think the merger may result in a substantial lessening of competition (SLC) with-
in any market in Singapore. Merger parties should note the risk that if a merger is not 
notified, and the SCA may investigate a merger or anticipated merger on its own ini-
tiative if it has reasonable grounds for believing that Section 54 been infringed or 
will be infringed. The SCA has the ability to subsequently make directions or impose 
financial penalties in respect of any infringement.
26
 
The SCA is unlikely to consider to consider a merger or anticipated merger to 
give rise to competition concerns unless it meets or crosses the following indicative 
thresholds: 
a. The merged entity will have a market share of 40% or more; 
b. The merged entity will have a market share of between 20% or 40% and the 
post-merger market share of the three largest firms, that is, the concentration 
ratio of three firms (CR3), is 70% or more. 
The above thresholds are merely indicative, and the SCA may investigate merger 
situations that fall below these indicative thresholds in appropriate circumstances. 
Conversely, merger situations that meet or exceed the thresholds stated in the notifi-
cation guidelines are not necessarily prohibited by section 54. 
In the case of a test system of a merger plan, there shall be at least 3 (three) main 
reasons for preventing or closing a merger transaction, namely (1) that a merger is 
conducted to establish a dominant position (dominant position=DP test); or (2) to 
substantially reduce competition (substantial lessening competition=SLC test); or (3) 
harmful to the public interest (PI test).  
DP test is more commonly known as the substance test used in Europe, this 
standard essentially says that merger transactions should be prevented "(if it is) likely 
to create or strengthening dominant position. SLC test is used by competition author-
ities in the United States, which is then followed by many countries. In essence the 
                                                 
25
Pakdee Paknara and Pattraporn Poovasathien, “Thailand Merger Control”, 
file:///Users/annamaria/Documents/Merger%20and%20Akuisisi%20(konsultasi)/Thailand%20Merger
%20Control%20–%20Getting%20The%20Deal%20Through%20–%20GTDT.webarchive, accessed 
10 August 2017.  
26
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SLC test says that merger transactions should be banned "(if it is) likely to substan-
tially lessen competition or to facilitate its exercise". Some criteria must be analyzed 
to determine whether a merger transaction has the potential to reduce competition. 
The PI test says that mergers need to be prohibited when harming the public interest. 
In the United States, for example, the public interest, particularly employment, is 
taken into account in assessing merger transactions in the rail and telecommunica-
tions sectors. 
The regulations on mergers in Indonesia do not explicitly address the use of test-
ing system but from the procedures it can be categorized that Indonesia uses SLC 
test. Related to the substantive test, GR 57/2010 explains at least five factors that will 
be assessed to see the impact of competition resulted from a merger: 
a. market concentration; 
b. barriers to entry; 
c. the potential of anti-competitive behavior; 
d. efficiency; and/or 
e. bankruptcy. 
The Merger Guidelines provide further elaboration of each of those factors and 
in the assessment phase. If KPPU finds the reason of merger will cause negative im-
pact to competition in further (comprehensive) assessment stage. KPPU will open a 
dialogue to discuss the possibility of actions needed by business actors who merger 
remedies in order to maintain the competition condition. KPPU also provides the 
possibility of remedies in order to maintain fair competition.  
The type of substantive test conducted by KPPU shows the similarity of merger 
control system in Singapore and Thailand, using Substantial Lessening Competition 
(SLC) test. This testing system does not merely consider the impact after a merger 
resulting in a dominant position, called the Dominant Position (DP) test, or even a 
Public Interest (PI) test.
27
  
After conducting the assessment, KPPU will issue a Commission Opinion on the 
merger or acquisition, either through the Consultation scheme or the Notification 
scheme. There are three possible opinions of the Commission, namely:
 28
 
                                                 
27
Andi Fahmi Lubis et. al., Loc. Cit. 
28
Merger Guideline, p. 29. 
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a. No allegations of monopolistic practices or unfair business competition re-
sulting from merger (no objection); 
b. There are allegations of monopolistic practices or unfair business competition 
of merger merger (objection); 
c. There is no allegation of monopolistic practices or unfair business competi-
tion due to merger with a form of advice / guidance to be met (conditionally 
no objection). 
Based on the opinion of points b and c above, the merger party can not take any 
legal action against the Commission's opinion, because the law does not regulate so. 
Merger Guidelines states that if the business actor after obtaining the Opinion of 
Commission point c above does not carry out the record or essence of the note given, 
or after obtaining Commission Opinion b above b still carry out the merger or acqui-
sition, KPPU will take necessary action based on article 28 of Law no. 5/1999. In 
this case, KPPU has some differences of opinion with the merger party on the impact 
of the merger, so KPPU continued the process of handling cases which will be ended 
in a final decision.
29
  
The table below shows the differences in merger control system in some ASEAN 
countries.  
No AMS Provisions 
Type of  
Notifications 
Threshold 
Length of 
Review 
Penalty 
1 Indonesia  Art. 28, art. 
29 Law No. 
5/1999 
Voluntary pre-
merger 
notification.  
Mandatory 
post-merger 
notification, if 
thresholds are 
met.  
 
the asset 
exceeds IDR 
2.5 trillion; or 
the turnover 
exceeds IDR 5 
trillion or 
more than 20 
trillion for 
banking 
 
Pre-merger 
notification: 
Phase 1 
Review: 
maximum of 
30 working 
days.   
Phase 2 
Review: 
maximum of 
60 working 
days.   
Post-merger 
notification: 
Maximum of 
90 working 
days.  
(SLC test) 
Financial 
penalty of IDR 
1 billion for 
each day of 
delay up to a 
maximum fine 
of IDR 25 
billion. 
                                                 
29
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2 Thailand Art 26 Trade 
Competition 
Act (TCA) 
BE 3542 
(1999). 
Mandatory 
merger 
notification if 
thresholds are 
met. There are 
currently no 
jurisdictional 
thresholds that 
have been 
issued. 
There are no 
jurisdictional 
thresholds. 
Jurisdictional 
thresholds are 
to be set by 
the 
notification, 
but no 
notifications 
have been 
issued yet.  
 
90 days. 
However, if 
a decision 
cannot be 
completed 
within such 
period, the 
TCC may 
extend up to 
15 days.  
 
If a filing is 
not made for a 
merger of the 
businesses 
under section 
26, a person 
would be 
liable to a 
term of 
imprisonment 
not exceeding 
three years or 
a fine of not 
exceeding 
THB 6 
million, or 
both. A repeat 
offender is 
liable to 
double the 
penalty.  
3 Vietnam  Section 16 to 
24, The 
Competition 
Law No: 
27/2004/QH 
11  
 
Mandatory 
merger 
notification if 
thresholds are 
met.  
 
Economic 
concentrations 
where the 
parties have a 
combined 
market share 
of between 
30% and 50% 
are required to 
notify.  
45 days with 
up to two 
extensions of 
a maximum 
of 30 days 
each.  
 
Financial 
penalty of 1% 
- 3% of the 
total revenue 
in the financial 
year prior to 
the year in 
which there 
was a failure 
to notify shall 
be applied 
accordingly.  
4 Singapore Section 54, 
Chapter 50B 
Competition 
Act, Original 
Enactment 
Act 46 of 
2004, 
Revised 
Edition 31
st
 
January 2006 
 
Voluntary 
notification is 
encouraged for 
mergers that 
are likely to 
substantially 
lessen 
competition.  
The merged 
entity will 
have a market 
share of 40% 
or more; or   
The merged 
entity will 
have a market 
share of 
between 20% 
to 40% and the 
post-merger 
combined 
market share 
of the three 
largest firms is 
70% or more 
Phase 1 
Review – 30 
working 
days. 
 
Phase 2 
Review – 
120 working 
days.  
 
Merger parties 
may face a 
financial 
penalty not 
exceeding 
10% of the 
turnover of 
each relevant 
merger party.  
 
5 Malaysia Competition 
Act 712, 
2010. 
(No merger 
provisions) 
NA NA NA NA 
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The table above shows that each country in comparison has set a merger control 
system except Malaysia. Five other AMS governed the merger control in the provi-
sions of competition law, such as: 
1. Philippines: Chapter IV Section 16 – Section 23 Competition Act, No. 
10667, 2015; 
2. Brunai Darussalam: Chapter IV Section 23 – Section 30 Competition Order, 
2015 Art 83 (3) Constitution of Brunai; 
3. Myanmar: Chapter X, Section 30 - Section 33 The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law 
No. 9, 2015 (Competition Law); 
4. Lao: Article 2 and 37 Law on Business Competition No. 60/NA 14 July 
2015) 
5. Cambodia: Draft Law on Competition of Cambodia (7 March 2016); 
 
Foreign mergers are also included in the merger control system in Indonesia, 
considering the activities of business actors who do not recognize national borders. 
Although Law No. 5/1999 and GR No. 57/2010 does not govern this matter, the 
Merger Guideline stipulates it. KPPU states that it has jurisdiction over merger out-
side Indonesia as long as the merger has a direct impact on Indonesia domestic mar-
ket. For foreign mergers, all reporting systems, reporting requirements, substantive 
tests, and applicable legal measures are similar to mergers occurring within the terri-
tory of Indonesia. Especially for the threshold value of the assets and turnover, Mer-
ger Guideline states that the assets are assets located calculated in parts of Indonesia 
and the turnover is sales originating in the territory of Indonesia. Thus, the asset 
threshold and turnover for foreign mergers do not take into account assets and turno-
ver in abroad countries.
30
 
In addition, Merger Guideline shows that KPPU adopts single economic entity 
doctrine,
31
 because it considers business actors in Indonesia controlled by foreign 
party as one economic entity, so that Indonesian law can be applied to overseas par-
                                                 
30
Merger Guideline p. 10. 
31
Alison Jones and Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law, Text, Cases, and Materials, (New York: Ox-
ford University Press, 2004), p. 123. KPPU used this doctrine for the first time in Temasek case (De-
cision No. 07/KPPU-L/2007), affirmed by Central Jakarta District Court Decision No. 02/KPPU/ 
2007/PN.JKT.PST and Supreme Court Decision No. 01 /KPPU. 496 K/Pdt.khs /2008. 
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ent company through extension of its business in Indonesia. It is stated in the Merger 
Guidelines that KPPU can impose a fine to a negligent foreign merger; or to business 
actors residing in Indonesia controlled by overseas business actors.
32
 
 
3. The Implementation of Merger Control Based on Law No. 5/1999 
Here is one example of KPPU‟s evaluation of the merger report in Indonesia. On 
February 12, 2013 KPPU has received PT Carrefour Indonesia Takeover Notification 
by PT Trans Retail which has been registered with registration number A10713. On 
22 April 2013, the Notice document shall be declared complete and the Commission 
shall conduct the Rating by issuing the KPPU Decision Number 11/KPPU/Kep/ 
IV/2013. 
The result of assessment of the acquisition of PT Carrefour Indonesia shares by 
PT Trans Retail Indonesia is that with regard to the difference in price and 
specification of the products owned by CT Corp and PT Carrefour Indonesia, there is 
no overlap market due to the acquisition of PT Carrefour Indonesia shares by PT 
Trans Retail. After the acquisition, PT Trans Retail Indonesia will continue to use the 
Carrefour brand, and will consider the change of name to Trans-Carrefour. In the 
absence of overlapping business activities from the parties, it will not change the 
market structure in Indonesia's retail industry. The takeover of PT Carrefour 
Indonesia did not raise concerns about Carrefour's competitors and suppliers. In 
addition, there will be no foreclosure barriers due to the takeover of PT Carrefour 
Indonesia by CT Corp. The CT Corp has only one mall in Bandung City, so that 
other retail competitors still have the option to used other mall to conduct their 
business activities. 
The conclusion made by KPPU is that the Commission considered that there was 
no allegation of monopolistic practices or unfair business competition caused by the 
acquisition of shares, as follows: 
1) PT Trans Retail and PT Carrefour Indonesia do not have the same business 
activities; 
2) in terms of price and product characteristics, PT Trans Retail products are not 
in the same relevant market with PT Carrefour Indonesia; 
                                                 
32
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3) there will be no foreclosure barriers in the mall and shoping mall 
management market with the retail market, due to the large number of 
options to cooperate with other mall managers; 
4) The Commission's opinion is only limited to the process of PT Carrefour 
Indonesia's shares takeover by PT Trans Retail. If in the future there is anti-
competitive behavior done by both parties and subsidiaries, then the behavior 
is not excluded from Law Number 5 Year 1999 concerning Prohibition of 
Monopolistic Practices and or Unfair Business Competition. 
Based on the above conclusions, the Commission is of the opinion that there is 
no allegation of monopolistic practices or unfair business competition caused by the 
acquisition of PT Carrefour Indonesia shares by PT Trans Retail. 
 
C. The Need of Merger Control in ASEAN Region 
Economic cooperation at the level of ASEAN within the ASEAN Economic 
Community (AEC) includes several elements such as (i) a single market and produc-
tion base, (ii) a highly competitive economic region, (iii) a region of equitable eco-
nomic development, and (iv) a region fully integrated into the global economy. In the 
AEC Blueprint, competition policy is identified as the keyword for creating “a highly 
competitive economic region”. Such objective is to be achieved gradually by the year 
2015. Such accomplishment in the area of business competition is marked by the fi-
nalization of guidelines under the title Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies 
Policy and Law for ASEAN.
33
  
The embryo of cooperation in the area of competition policy and law was 
marked by, among other things, the establishment of the AEGC (ASEAN Experts 
Group on Competition).
34
 Further development of cooperation was marked by the es-
tablishment of Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies Policy and Law for 
ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy in 2010 serving as a priority for 
                                                 
33
Cassey Lee and Yoshifumi Fukunaga, “ASEAN Regional Cooperation on Competition Policy”, 
ERIA Discussion Paper Series, http://www.eria.org/ERIA-DP-2013-03.pdf.  
34
Anonymous, “ASEAN Experts Group on Competition”, http://www.asean-competition.org/aegc, 
accessed March 16, 2017. 
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AEGC.
35
 Subsequently, at a meeting in Bangkok on November 28-29, 2012 the said 
document was finalized under the title Guidelines on Developing Core Competencies 
Policy and Law for ASEAN.
36
 
The Regional Guidelines are based on the experience of individual countries as 
well as international best practices. Such Guidelines provide for various policy and 
institutional choices which can serve as guidelines for ASEAN Member States (here-
inafter referred to as AMSs) in the context of endeavors towards creating an envi-
ronment for fair business competition. The Guidelines are expected to raise aware-
ness among AMSs about the significance of competition policy, aimed at encourag-
ing development and enhancing cooperation among AMSs. 
In general, the Guidelines set out provisions concerning the objective of estab-
lishing the guidelines, the benefits of competition policy, the scope of Competition 
Policy and Law (CPL), the role and responsibility of competition authorities, law en-
forcement powers, due process of law, technical assistance and capacity building, 
advocacy, and international cooperation in the area of competition in the context of 
free trade agreements (FTAs). The Guidelines adopted in August 2010 provide for 
three primary prohibitions, namely (i) anticompetitive agreements; (ii) abuse of a 
dominant position; and (iii) anticompetitive mergers (and acquisitions). However, 
neither the EC Blueprint nor the ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition have a 
binding effect on the respective member states.
37
  
The mutual agreement on the prohibition of anti-competitive merger will bring 
legal consequences for every AMS to follow the agreement by enacting a joint mer-
ger control system in ASEAN region. The first thing is to establish the rules and reg-
ulations on the merger control system in each AMS state. To date, only four AMS 
countries, namely Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and Singapore have explicitly ar-
                                                 
35
ASEAN Secretariat, “ASEAN Regional Guidelines on Competition Policy”, 2010. The Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established on 8 August 1967. “…The Member States of 
the Association are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao PDR, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philip-
pines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam. The ASEAN Secretariat is based in Jakarta, Indonesia...” 
36
The 6
th
 ASEAN Competition Conference, 27-28 July 2016, Bangkok, Thailand. 
http://asean.org/asean-combat-cartels-region/ accessed 12 March 2017. See also M. Muchtar Rivai 
and Darwin Erhandy, “Kebijakan dan Hukum Persaingan Usaha Yang Sehat: Sinergitas Kawasan 
ASEAN di Era Globalisasi”, [“Fair Business Competition Policy and Law: Synergy in the ASEAN 
Region in the Era of Globalization”], Jurnal Liquidity, vol. 2, No. 2, July-December 2013, p.199-200. 
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September 6, 2017  Nusa Dua, Bali 
Proceeding International Seminar on Competition Policy and Law | KPPU  
63 
ranged the following formation of the Merger Guidelines. 
Malaysia is the one of the AMS with a generic competition law that does not in-
clude merger control provisions. The Competition Act 2010 (effective January 2012) 
(the MyCC Act) only regulates anticompetitive agreements
38 
and abuse of dominant 
market positions,
39 
but does not regulate anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. 
The Malaysia Competition Commission (MyCC) is the enforcement agency for the 
MyCC Act.
40
 Similarly, Myanmar has not explicitly set the mechanism of merger 
control on The Competition Law (The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 9, 2015) The 
7th
 
Waxing Day of Taboung, 1376 M.E (24th
 
February, 2015). 
Meanwhile, the Philippines regulates merger control within Act No. 10667 con-
cerning di Chapter IV concerning Mergers and Acquisitions, Section 16 - section 23, 
an Act Providing for a National Competition Policy Prohibiting Anti-Competitive 
Agreements, Abuse of Dominant Positions and Anti-Competitive Mergers and Ac-
quititions, establishing the Philippine Competition Commission and Appropriating 
Funds therefor. Brunai also stipulates merger control in Chapter IV, section 23-30 
Constitution of Brunei Darussalam, Order Made Under Article 83(3) Competition 
Order, 2015. Myanmar regulates merger control on Chapter X, Section 30 - Section 
33 The Pyidaungsu Hluttaw Law No. 9, 2015. While Cambodia is still drafting its 
competition law in draft Law on Competition of Cambodia, version 5.5. 7 March 
2016. 
Merger control regulations in the ASEAN economic region is an important thing 
as a guarantee of business certainty. Currently only some AMS countries have rules 
and guidelines for the implementation of merger control, while some AMS countries 
only have the law without further implementing regulations. In contrary, some coun-
tries have not even regulated it. Meanwhile, there are some member states still draft-
ing antimonopoly laws. The diversity of these conditions will hinder the formation of 
a merger control mechanism in the ASEAN region. Nevertheless, the signing of the 
AMS Guidelines on Competition Policy and Law (CPL) will facilitate the merger 
control in the ASEAN region. 
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D. Conclusion  
Based on the above explanations, we conclude that all ASEAN Member States in 
fact have had competition law, except for Cambodia which is still in the the final 
draft for further promulgation. With respect to merger control, there are several as-
pects to be examined, such as such as notification systems, notification conditions, 
substantive tests and time periods, notification results, and other technical matters re-
lated to parties required to make notifications, foreign mergers and challenges; which 
need to be included in the competition laws and regulations. In the comparison 
among ten (10) AMS we find out that only Malaysia still has not regulate it in their 
competition law.  
Among ten AMS, only Indonesia adopts mandatory post merger notification and 
voluntary pre-merger notification; while other AMS adopt pre-merger notification 
only. Considering that the intention of merger control regulation is to preventing mo-
nopolistic practices and unfair business competition, therefore it would be better if 
Indonesia could adopt pre-merger notification, similar with other AMS. 
In view of the above, as the way forward, it would be best if AMS competition 
authorities can start to discuss and make harmonization to the merger control in the 
ASEAN region, so that the aim of ASEAN Economic Community in making an effi-
cient and competitive business environment can be achieved. 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this research is to provide an understanding of the Entry Mode 
– Joint Venture strategy which applied by Alfamart in expanding the market to 
the Philippines. The case study methode used is qualitative. Data is collected 
through interviews to several resource persons involved in the Department of 
International Business at PT SUMBER ALFARIA TRIJAYA, TBK. Based on 
result of the research, found the process of corporate internationalization, 
barriers to enter foreign markets, describe the factors affecting the choice of 
entry mode Entry Mode and provide a better recommendation for other entry 
mode strategies.  
 
Keywords: Internationalization, Entry Mode Strategy, Joint Venture 
 
Introduction 
Technological developments and globalization already provide opportunities for 
free trade to be widely open. The ASEAN Economic Community (MEA) represents 
an achievement by 2015 by establishing regional economic integration, where the 
flow of trade in goods, services, capital and investment and labor flows moves freely 
without geographical obstacles. With the existence of the MEA, it is expected that 
economic growth in the ASEAN region will be a competitive economic area with 
equitable economic development. MEA is an important moment because it will 
provide opportunities for business actors in Indonesia to expand the market for 
national industrial products. On the other hand, the implementation of the MEA will 
also be a challenge, given the enormous population of Indonesia will become a 
market destination for other ASEAN country products. In the era of economic 
globalization, companies tend to merge, either with existing partners in one country 
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or with partners abroad. Through mergers, there will be at least some advantages 
such as ease of entry into new business, new market penetration, cheaper research 
costs, strengthened competitiveness, and increased productivity and efficiency. 
Retail companies is one important part of the country's economic life of course in 
this era of globalization. Kotler (2009) explain that own retail business is all activity 
in selling goods or services directly to end consumers for personal and non-business 
needs. Retail is an important link of the distribution channel that connects the whole 
of the business and those that include physical transfer and transfer of ownership of 
goods or services from producers to consumers. 
 
Figure 1 Popularity Shopping Channels Graphic 
Source: MarkPlus Youth Study, 2015 
 
MarkPlus Youth Study shows how minimarkets become the most popular chan-
nels to buy daily necessities in 18 cities in Indonesia, although traditional markets are 
still favored. As many as 61.1% of respondents prefer to visit minimarket, followed 
by traditional market by 57.2% and retail shop by 55.6%. The rest, namely 
supermarkets, hypermarkets, and department stores are still far behind. 
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Table 1 Composition of Modern Retail Sales Indonesia (%) 
 
Source: Euromonitor, 2014 
 
Based on the Table 1, show that for the category of mini market or convenience 
store, Alfamart occupies the first position that has the highest sales rate in Indonesia 
with continued improvement for four consecutive years starting from 2009 to 2012. 
Then followed by Indomart in the second and last position Is Circle K, which is a 
chain of international convenience store franchises from the United States. 
To face the existence of MEA in 2015 PT Sumber Alfaria Trijaya, Tbk 
(Alfamart) has been expanding into overseas markets, precisely in the Philippines 
since 2014 ago. The existence of Indonesian retail in the Philippines is seen as an 
excellent opportunity to pave the way for penetration of Indonesian products to the 
Philippines. At present, a number of daily needs products from Indonesia are well 
known by Filipinos, such as Kopiko instant coffee, Bimoli cooking oil, Energen 
cereals, Indomie instant noodles, Wings soaps and detergents. 
The Philippines is Southeast Asia's largest consumer-oriented food and beverage 
marketplace for products and one of the fastest growing markets in the world, 
importing $ 898.4 billion in US flagship products by 2015. This condition is sure to 
be Profitable for retailers in the food and beverage sector (USDA, 2016). In the 
Philippines, modern retail markets such as supermarkets, hypermarkets and 
convenience stores (including 'minimarts) are essential for those who live in Metro 
Manila and other big cities because customers want more convenience and 
flexibility. Alfamart's entry into the Philippines in an effort to expand the market has 
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been running for three years, with a joint venture strategy (Audriene, 2016). 
Literature Review 
Studies of the internationalization of Swedish companies resulted in formation of 
the Uppsala model by Johanson & Vahlne in 1977. In 1988, the network aspect was 
added to the model by Johanson & Mattson, which led to the network model of in-
ternationalization (Johanson&Vahlne, 2009). 
The Uppsala model presents that a company goes through four steps of gradual 
engagement during the internationalization process. In the beginning, the firm has no 
regular export activities. On the next phase, the firm engages in indirect exporting. 
Third phase is the establishment of a sales agency and finally, on the fourth phase, 
the company sets up a wholly owned foreign subsidiary (Johanson & Wiedersheim-
Paul in Bedi & Kharbanda, 2010). Overpass through stages of the process is referred 
as the establishment chain. The selection of the target country depends on so called 
psychic distance which means the psychologically perceived difference between 
home and the target countries that the managers may have. It consists of factors that 
make it difficult to understand foreign environments (Johanson & Vahlne, 2009). 
These factors can be such as language, political system, level of education and indus-
trial development. An internationalizing firm seeks to find a target country where the 
psychic distance is low.  
The creators of Uppsala model have developed revised model in 2009 which is 
taking into account also networks. Thus the firm is embedded in an enabling yet con-
straining business network where firms are engaged in many different interdependent 
relationships. In the model firms are acting for strengthening their positions in net-
works, which results in internationalization. Existing business relationships have a 
considerable impact on the particular geographical market a firm will penetrate. 
Moreover, the relationships impact which mode to use because they enable identify-
ing and exploiting opportunities. Identifying opportunities is altogether essential and 
learning and commitment are strongly related to this. In order to create opportunities 
the firm has to create strong commitment in the network so that it has better access 
into the knowledge, which is told only to network insiders (Johanson & Vahlne, 
2009). 
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Figure 2 The business network internationalization process model  
Source: Johanson & Vahlne, 2009 
The Figure 2 shows that the opportunity is part of the knowledge. Needs, capa-
bilities, strategies and networks are also important factors. In all things there are dif-
ferences ranging from knowledge, trust and commitment and may therefore be dif-
ferent in the way they promote successful internationalization. In a profitable pro-
cess, providing learning outcomes, beliefs, and commitments that are expected to be 
the focus of the company to enjoy friendship and position within the network. The 
last important difference in the new model is that current activity can lead to learn-
ing, creation and development of trust for the future. 
Yip (in Ofili, 2016) identifies four factors that drive the internationalization of an 
enterprise, as illustrated in Figure 3. The first factor identified is the market factor. 
Companies are moving into new markets with the simple fact that consumers have 
the same needs in different markets. Some consumer needs also become visible glob-
ally in the sense that the same customers in one market may require similar products 
or services in other markets. Furthermore, marketing also encourages companies to 
benefit from the fact that they can use similar advertising and branding strategies in 
different markets. 
September 6, 2017  Nusa Dua, Bali 
KPPU | Proceeding International Seminar on Competition Policy and Law 
72 
 
International
Strategies
Market Drivers
 Similar customer 
needs
 Global customer
 Transferrable 
marketing
Cost Drivers
 Scale economies
 Country-specific 
differences
 Favourable 
logistics
Competitive Drivers
 Interdependence 
between countries
 Competitors 
global strategies
Government 
Drivers
 Trade policies
 Technical 
standards
 Host government 
policies
 
Figure 3.Internationalization Drivers  
Source: Yip (in Ofili, 2016: 204) 
 
Joint ventures occur when companies of at least two different countries (usually 
one from a local), set up a new company to produce products or provide services to-
gether. Strategic alliances are more or less the same as joint ventures. However, the 
main difference between the two is that in strategic alliances, most parties do not 
place equity or invest in an alliance whereas if their joint ventures invest (Albaum & 
Duerr, 2011). In an equity joint venture, a legal entity or a new joint company is cre-
ated, whereas in strategic alliance partners do not create any legal entity, but separate 
after they reach their destination. In addition, a joint venture in which no committed 
equity can be referred to as a contractual non-equity contract or a project-based un-
dertaking. Thus, it can be concluded that strategic alliances and non-equity joint ven-
tures are the same thing. 
According to Yan & Luo (2015) there are two models of organizational effec-
tiveness most relevant to the international joint venture, the Goals Model and the 
Strategic Constituencies Model. The Goals Model is undoubtedly the most popular 
and dominant approach to assessing the effectiveness of an organization in the inter-
national joint venture context. Viewing the organization as a rational and goal-
oriented system, this model focuses on organizational goals and deals with the extent 
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to which the organization can achieve its objectives. The effectiveness criteria em-
phasized in this model typically include the organization's end results, such as quanti-
ty and quantity and product quality, profit benchmarks for non-profit firms, hospital 
beds, championship numbers for sports teams, or nationally rewarding ratings for the 
program MBA. The appeal of this criterion is that its performance level can be calcu-
lated, not diverse, and easy to compare between different organizations or between 
different time periods in the same organization. 
While the Strategic Constituencies Model views the organization as a political 
entity, in which personal interests compete for control of resources. Unlike the Goals 
Model, where the higher the level of goal achievement, the more effective the organ-
ization, the Strategic Constituencies Model does not necessarily link the maximiza-
tion of satisfaction of all its constituents to organizational effectiveness. Ironically, in 
the view of this model, organizational effectiveness becomes "the organizational 
ability to minimally meet the demands of its various constituents for the sustainabil-
ity and development of the organization, since each organizational constituency has a 
different purpose and value orientation that is unlikely to be fully met". 
 
Research Design 
The research method used is qualitative exploratory using secondary and primary 
data. Interview conducted on 4 respondents who occupy management positions in 
Alfamart. Data analysis techniques used to process research findings that have been 
transcribed through the process of data reduction, data filtered and compiled again, 
presented, verified or made conclusions. 
 
Discussion 
Trading competition in various industries is growing rapidly every time. These 
developments encourage business owners to raise their wings to the upper classes to 
maintain their existence. It is increasingly pressing business actors to continue to 
struggle and innovate is because of the free trade that began to grow, thus encourag-
ing foreign companies into the country and shift gradually the local players. In addi-
tion, changes in international regulations and governance have also increased signifi-
cantly in many countries compared to what happened in the past. As well as the ad-
vent of internet and cheaper travel facilities (especially air travel) has also contribut-
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ed positively to the growth and development of international business. As for the de-
velopment of this business, business actors do internationalization of their market, 
with the aim that they can develop and maintain their business amid increasingly 
competitive market conditions.  
Along with the emergence of globalization, Alfamart's market expansion is also 
supported by the existence of the ASEAN Economic Community (MEA) which has 
been launched since 2015. ASEAN is a big market where ASEAN's population 
reaches 8.49% of the world's population or reaches more than 586 million in 2012 
with ASEAN's GDP value reaching USD 2.093 billion or about 2.99% of world 
GDP. Seeing the good market potential in ASEAN countries, since 2014 the Philip-
pines was chosen as the destination of Alfamart's overseas market expansion which 
is also a "gateway" to other ASEAN countries due to the strong demographic aspect 
in the Philippines and various other aspects. According to Kotler in Daulay (2011: 
61) in considering the markets for the purpose of international expansion must study 
the economic situation of each country. There are three characteristics that reflect the 
attractiveness of a State as an export market. First, the population of that State. Se-
cond, the industrial structure of a State. The industrial structure of a State determines 
the need for its products and services, the level of income, the level of employment 
and so on. Third, the distribution of State income. 
Thus, in addition to the population factor, the market growth factor is an im-
portant consideration for a company to choose a market abroad. The pattern of con-
sumption of a country is a market appeal that needs to be taken into account to 
choose and enter the global market (Toyene & Walters in Daulay, 2011: 61). In 
terms of lifestyle and consumption patterns of the community it can be concluded 
that the Philippine market has excellent potential for the retail sector. In addition, the 
food retail sector in the Philippines is well established and growing. Sales of the food 
retail business increased 7% in 2015 to $ 45.04 billion. This growth is the result of an 
increase in consumer spending capacity, continuing mid-term segment growth, in-
creased tourism activity in the country, and positive economic growth outlook. The 
following graph shows the level of retail food sales in the Philippines from 2011 to 
2016. 
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Figure 4 Food Retail Sales in the Philippines Graphic  
Source: USDA, 2016 
 
From the graphic shows that food retail sales in the Philippines has increased 
since last year. The highest increase in sales as mentioned earlier occurred in 2015, at 
7% after having only increased by 5% (in 2013) and 4% (in 2014). This is allegedly 
due to the robust performance of the Philippines economy in 2015 has boosted the 
performance of the local food retail market. Population growth, rising middle in-
come, rising number of multiple income families, higher disposable income, and a 
rapidly changing lifestyle and awareness of food quality and safety have contributed 
to the continued growth of the food sector.  
Furthermore, when companies have decided to enter certain markets they must 
understand important issues, such as political stability, per capita income, the pace of 
economic growth, business cycles, fuel prices, exchange rates and inflation rates in 
the target country. In addition, things to note are the availability of skilled workers, 
the size, and the dissemination of demographic, security, and cultural market seg-
ments (Thomas in Ofili, 2016) 
The economic growth of the Philippines over the last 3 years was the greatest in 
Asia, beating China. The increase is 7% annually. Here is a graph showing the Phil-
ippines' economic growth for 3 years from 2013 to 2016: 
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Figure 5. Phi Philippines’ Economic Growth Chart 
Source: databoks, 2016 
 
The Philippines economy in the third quarter of 2016 recorded the highest 
growth in the last three years and the fastest in Asia compared with China which 
grew only 6.7 percent and Vietnam 6.7 percent, and Indonesia 5.02 percent. Reports 
from the Philippine Institute of Statistics show that in Q3 / 2016, the Gross Domestic 
Product of the Philippines grew 7.1 percent compared to the same quarter of the pre-
vious year. This achievement exceeds the estimate of analysts in the previous 
Bloomberg survey, which is 6.7 percent. This growth is the highest since the third 
quarter of 2013. Compared with the previous quarter, the Philippine economy also 
grew 1.2 percent. The high growth indicates the strength of the Philippine economy 
is facing a global economic slowdown. 
 
A. Relationship Commitment Decisions 
Globalization increasingly fosters the phenomenon of International Joint Venture 
(IJV). Entry mode of foreign markets is an internationalization process in which a 
corporate entity that initially national scale then expands the market to reach an in-
ternational area with an export medium which then leads to a joint venture. The need 
to obtain resources and markets that are outside of its traditional operating area. For 
companies with weaknesses in infrastructure, resources, experience, and manage-
ment, alliances with other companies in the form of joint ventures are an effective al-
ternative to entering the international market. In addition, the joint venture can be the 
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ideal choice when it comes to entering areas that have political differences, laws, 
laws, cultures, languages, and currencies. Joint ventures are also an effective way to 
enter new markets quickly, in addition to partnering, sharing risks while taking ad-
vantage of knowledge concerning the expertise of local companies. From here the 
main motives and motives of the joint venture as a strengthening of existing busi-
ness, restructuring and development of new capabilities of the company. Benefits in-
clude consideration of economies of scale and synergy, access to opportunities and 
greater resources, elimination of competitors and entering overseas markets. 
The legal-political environment in the face of global market entry into a country 
must be different for each country. Some entry strategies will be more feasible in 
some countries because of their implementation Supported by the rules and regula-
tions as well as the conditions of the country itself (Koch in Tepjun, 2016: 81). If 
host country governments place excessive restrictions on foreign ownership, this will 
encourage companies to adopt a lower control mode of entry (Brouthers in Tepjun, 
2016: 81). 
Another reason to join a joint venture with another company is that the risks and 
costs that arise in an effort to achieve targets in international markets can be shared 
with foreign partner companies. Of course, income is also shared, but after all, if a 
company wants to expand its business faster to overseas markets, have a goal on a 
large scale, or are developing new technologies it will surely need help from other 
companies that may have technologies to achieve its objectives. 
However, sometimes companies that want to enter foreign markets should spend 
a little more capital. This is as submitted by Informant III that in the Philippines itself 
for the problem of sophisticated technology in terms of quantity is still inadequate, 
thus causing the technology there the price becomes very expensive. In addition, 
joint ventures are often used to deal with competition by creating stronger competi-
tive units with better value, better quality, and accelerated access to markets. Al-
famart took the SM Group company, a business group founded by Henry Sy, the re-
tail king in the Philippines. This is certainly a favorable point for Alfamart's side in 
terms of competition or strength in the market and its capital, and can help minimize 
the challenges that may arise when entering the Philippine market. 
SM Group through SM Investments Corporation (SMIC) is the parent company 
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of a number of companies in the development of shopping centers, retail, real estate, 
banks, and tourism. SM Group manages retail business through SM Prime Holdings 
Inc. SM Prime Holdings houses over 40 shopping centers and retail outlets in the 
Philippines. The network consists of three forms, namely SM Supermarket, SM Hy-
permarket, and SaveMore. 
In addition to working with the largest retailer there is SM Group, Alfamart also 
took several local companies to support their facilities, one of which is a provider 
company. Thus, in addition to government regulations requiring foreign retailers to 
cooperate with local retailers, relationships with local partners also enable companies 
to acquire knowledge and skills and access to markets that require high resources  
 
B. Current Activities 
Furthermore, after successfully entering into the Philippine market through a 
joint venture strategy with strong local players, Alfamart had to do a marketing strat-
egy to be successful as it is today. Companies also need to make marketing efforts 
using a strategy through a situation-driven approach, based on culture, population 
and market conditions. The first thing that became the focus of Alfamart is about the 
introduction of the concept of minimarket carried by Alfamart in the Philippines. 
Where before Alfamart's presence in the Philippines, people only know the concept 
of convenience stores, such as 7-Eleven, FamilyMart, and so forth. The difference 
between minimarkets and convenience stores is minimarkets selling daily necessities 
ranging from rice, oil, cigarettes, toiletries, food, drinks and others. While conven-
ience stores only sell goods that are directly consumed, and more dominated food 
and beverages. 
Table 2. Type of Channels by Definition 
Type Definition 
Supermarket A selling area of between 400 square meters and 2,500 square meters, at 
least 70% of which is devoted to food and everyday commodities. Most-
ly located inside shopping malls, department stores or within a commer-
cial complex.  
Hypermarket / 
Warehouse Store 
A hybrid of a department store and supermarket with a sales area of at 
least 2,500 square meters, 35% of which is allocated for non-food prod-
ucts. Non- food items offered include: furniture, appliances, clothes, etc.  
„Mini-marts‟  
(New Category) 
A new retail format in-between the convenience store and the supermar-
ket. It is a type of neighborhood grocery store that offers basic goods, 
fresh meat, poultry and vegetables as well as food-to-go products. 
September 6, 2017  Nusa Dua, Bali 
Proceeding International Seminar on Competition Policy and Law | KPPU  
79 
Type Definition 
Convenience Stores 
(Including gas 
marts) 
A store with sales area of 150- 300 square meters and operates for long-
er hours (usually on a 24 hr. basis) that serve for impulse purchases. 
Mostly found in a condominium building, beside gasoline stations, near 
intersections or corner streets or near a BPO office. Offers ready-to-eat 
meals and have limited line of f&b and non-food/household items.  
“Mom & Pop” / Sa-
ri-Sari Stores 
Small neighborhood stores owned and managed by a household in the 
community, selling a variety of essential items such as rice, cooking oil, 
sugar, etc. Much smaller than convenience stores, they are usually built 
within or beside operator/owner's own house.  
Wet Markets Usually sell "fresh" meat, fish, vegetables, fruits and other domestically- 
produced items. Mostly local products but offer some imported items, 
especially fresh fruits.  
Source: USDA, 2016 
This minimarket concept can also be said to be the "differentiation" of Alfamart 
from its competitors who have already started operating in the Philippines. Differen-
tiation is an action performed by a company in winning the competition in the market 
by establishing a set of meaningful differences on the products offered to differenti-
ate the product of the company with its competitors' products, so that it can be per-
ceived or perceived by the consumer that the product has the added value expected 
by the consumer. In addition to bringing added value, Alfamart minimarket concept 
is also used to tailor its business to the consumer behavior or culture of local com-
munities and business needs in the Philippines. Here are some consumer behavior in 
the Philippines that Alfamart attention to bring added value to his business, namely: 
1) They like frozen food, so Alfamart provides it, like whole chicken, fish, 
squid, etc. 
2) They have eating habit for snack feeding (RTE) and ready to drink (RTD), 
then Alfamart sells grab and go food, such as grilled chicken with rice, bak-
pao, siomay, hot dog, and Sort of. 
3) They are not afraid to drive by motorcycle and do not like to walk away, then 
Alfamart has a concept to get closer to consumers, so consumers do not have 
to go all the way to the supermarket to shop for everyday needs, simply go to 
the minimarket almost Equally complete and easier to reach without having 
to drive by car or board a public transport. 
4) They like to dress neatly just to go to a supermarket or modern retail, then 
Alfamart comes with facilities that are almost the same as the supermarket 
and the location close to the residential area. The goal is that consumers can 
be more relaxed to shop, do not have to wear a neat dress or a splashy 
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makeup. 
 
Furthermore, it takes marketing and branding efforts to introduce the concept of 
minimarket to the local Filipino community. Marketing and branding itself are two 
things that are used to create a comprehensive and much more reliable marketing ap-
proach for businesses that want to grow rapidly and last long. Which in doing mar-
keting should bring the prospect closer to making a purchase. If it has become a con-
sumer, then it should take it closer to making repeat purchases. While the task of 
branding is to demand that every marketing communications can communicate the 
uniqueness of business directly and light to the prospect of consumers in a way that 
makes the business more compelling than the competitors and of course preferred by 
anyone in the market. 
 
C. Existing Challenges in Philippines Market 
For new companies starting a joint venture is not easy. Not many companies 
have the expertise to negotiate in the formation of a joint venture company. Because 
the company must have a broad view of helicopter view, understand the commercial 
aspects of business, understand corporate finance, understand how to fund, and mas-
ter the legal aspects. Moreover, the company must also have adequate flying hours 
and reliable negotiating skills. Alfamart's trade activities in the Philippines there are 
obstacles to deal with. Some international trade barriers include language, cultural, 
legal and regulatory differences. Trading companies may also experience misunder-
standings during the contract term, causing problems with payments for goods, 
transport or insurance. Land-based law, work property, intellectual and public health 
vary from country to country and can cause problems for international companies. 
The movement of currency exchange rates and rising inflation or interest rates in for-
eign countries is a trap for traders. Tariffs and quotas on imported goods, combined 
with subsidies for domestic industries, contain dice against foreign firms in many 
countries. 
In accordance with the Institutional Theory of Luo (in Tepjun, 2016: 80), it is 
explained that in countries with large cultural distances from country of origin, the 
role of important agents or partners demonstrating the importance of networks to 
overcome international obstacles. In order to enter a high-risk country, the company 
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may need help from a local partner who can provide with access to knowledge of 
foreign markets and stock risk. It also relates to Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) 
where companies can find the most efficient and economical way to minimize the 
transaction costs involved in doing business in overseas markets such as information 
seeking costs and opportunistic costs must be able to deal with internal and external 
uncertainty. Some scientists say that cultural distance can create high internal uncer-
tainty for the company (Hollensen, 2011). The second type of uncertainty is external 
uncertainty. They can be seen in terms of state risks such as technological, political, 
currency changes and economic fluctuations (Anderson & Gatignon in Tepjun, 2016: 
79). 
Furthermore, in Barney's Resource-based Theory (in Tepjun, 2016: 79) it de-
scribes the firm's perspective of the specific resources they possess and their ability 
to produce competitive advantage. If a company has sufficient resources and can be 
used effectively to contribute in their competitive advantage, the company can com-
pete and achieve long-term goals in overseas markets. With regard to resources and 
manpower, the challenge Alfamart encounters in its business process is about the 
termination of labor contracts different from those in Indonesia. Philippine govern-
ment regulations have a rule that each worker is only given a six-month work con-
tract. This is as conveyed by a spokesman for the Philippine president; Ernesto Abel-
la on, that the DOLE (Ministry of Labor and Employment) in a cabinet meeting held 
in Malacañang, Philippines in 2016 has committed to reducing an end of contract 
worker 's contract within six months (http://www.philstar.com). In many ways, con-
tractualization is rampant in this country. The 'endo' workers in particular are bound 
by a period of six months so the company will not make them permanent employees 
after six months under the Employment Act. From this arrangement, a 6-6-6 scheme 
in which an 'endo' worker is employed and fired every five months so employers will 
not make them permanent employees. This regulation is certainly a challenge for Al-
famart, because it will be difficult to find experienced and potential employees, thus 
making them have to do recruitment and training over and over again. 
Another obstacle in terms of human resources is the lack of mobility of Filipino 
society itself that is influenced by local culture. Most of the people there have no pri-
vate vehicles, such as two-wheeled ones, which are not only due to poverty levels, 
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but also because of their fear of two-wheel drive that they consider dangerous. This 
can certainly hinder the company's operational processes that require speed. 
In addition, each country has unique tax regulatory and business environment 
characteristics. Based on data from Philippines Sales Tax Rate (2017), in the Philip-
pines alone the Sales Tax rate reached 12 percent. The Sales Tax rate in the Philip-
pines averages 11.82 percent from 2006 to 2016. Sales tax rates are taxes charged to 
consumers based on the purchase price of certain goods and services. Revenue from 
Sales Tax Rates is an important source of revenue for the Philippine government 
(Romero, 2016). This tax regulation difference is one of the obstacles Alfamart in the 
Philippines. 
Another issue that is a problem for Alfamart in the Philippines is a business op-
erational system there that is different from in Indonesia, so that needed some chang-
es. Based on the Philippine Retail Food Sector Report 2016, it is mentioned that 
there are several credit conditions including for the retail sector, including: 
 For retail, most of its products are consigned. Importer collects payment after 
30 days.  
 For products purchased directly, retailers request a 60-90 day credit terms 
from the importer. 
 Food service industry, hotels and restaurants require 30-60 day credit. 
 Food manufacturing industry demands 30 days of credit. 
 
D. The impact of internationalization on company performance 
In running a business or leading a company, every leader must be able to meas-
ure the performance of the company as a tool of navigation or indicators in order to 
grow larger and competitive. Company performance indicators are usually called 
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and everyone in the company from board man-
agement level to staff have the accountability to achieve the KPI. The measured 
things can be various types ranging from the amount of income, the number of units 
sold, service level, cost of service, conversion rate, productivity rate, on time deliv-
ery, collection rate, net profit, etc. 
To measure whether or not the achievements of each of the KPIs are concerned, 
we should be able to compare them based on the following three points: 
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1) Growth compared to last year. The most easily calculated indicator is by 
comparing the performance of last year.  
2) Achievement of the budget. Usually at the end of each year the company al-
ways does budget planning for next year. 
3) Growth compared to industry or competitors. It is important to see how the 
performance of competitors or the industry as a whole, the data can be ob-
tained from various sources ranging from formal such as Nielsen (for FMCG, 
retail), Media Partner Asia (for the media industry) or informally leaked from 
the salesmen in the field 
 
To see Alfamart's achievement in the context of its joint venture with SM Group 
in the Philippines, the following comparison of Alfamart with its competitors in the 
Philippines is related to its sales growth in 2015 (a year after Alfamart started its ex-
pansion in the Philippines): 
1) Lowest average sales per store but catching up fast 
 
 
 
Figure 6 above shows that among the four retail chains (excluding Circle K and 
Lawson), the average sales per store for Alfamart is the lowest in PHP 9.5 million 
(USD 0.2 million) by 2015. However, the average sales per store went up so fast 
from the previous year, due to the large number of stores opened by Alfamart for less 
Figure 6. Revenue from merchandise sales in PHP million per store. 
Source: Hong, 2016  
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than a year of standing and also due to the fact that Alfamart is the only retail com-
pany with a mini market concept that sells products at prices comparable to super-
markets, but lower than convenience stores. Another notable difference is Alfamart 
sells frozen ready to cook meat, a category that can not be found in convenience 
stores. 
2) Alfamart net sales up by 9x times in 2015 
 
 
Of the four retail chains, Alfamart posted the highest revenue increase, up 9x 
times, in 2015 compared with a year ago. The strong growth is attributed the net in-
crease of 44 outlets in 2015 and a very small base in 2014. The first Alfamart outlet 
opened in June 2014, as seen in Figure 7. 
1) Expenses 
 
Figure 7. Comparison of Net Chains Four Convenience Store Retail Chains in the Philippines  
Source: Hong, 2016 
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Those are a few ratios to benchmark Alfmart‟s cost structure with its conven-
ience store peers. As the minimart chain commenced operation in 2014, it took a 
while before operation stabilised. Newcomers are more likely to experience higher 
rent and personnel cost as a share of revenue from merchandise sales. Strangely, util-
ities cost (communications, light and water) for Alfamart is very low at at 0.94% of 
its revenue in 2015 compared to 5.23% of its revenue a year ago as seen in Figure 8. 
 
E. Key Success Factors of Alfamart in Philippines 
Behind all the obstacles and challenges that exist in the business process of 
course Alfamart have their best solutions and ways to deal with all the challenges 
that exist. Alfamart has some key to their success in raising their business in foreign 
markets. Persistence is meant here is where the flow on the business process graph is 
up and down but still within safe limits, not out of the way it should be. When a de-
cline does not result in significant losses. 
The function of management itself is the basic elements that always exist in the 
management process that becomes the guideline for managers in carrying out activi-
ties to achieve goals. 
1. Planning  
Munnjaya (in Mairizon & Kiswanto, 2013) explains that there are several 
benefits to be gained if an organization has a plan, then the organization will 
know clearly the goals to be achieved and how to achieve them. 
2. Organizing 
Organizing is a process for designing formal structures, grouping and organ-
izing and dividing tasks or work among members of the organization, so that 
organizational goals can be achieved efficiently. Organizing is the process of 
organizing the organizational structure in accordance with the goals of the 
organization, the resources it has, and the environment that surrounds it. 
3. Actuating  
Movement is a function of guidance and giving of leadership and movement 
of people so that people want and like to work. Based on this understanding 
it is clear that the role of movement (actuating) is very important, because the 
Figure 8. Comparison of Expenses’ Convenience Store Retail chains in the Philippines  
Source: Hong, 2016 
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movement serves to move other management functions, such as planning, or-
ganizing, and supervision. 
4. Controlling 
Controlling is a determinant of what has been done by means of evaluating 
work performance and if necessary applying corrective actions so that the re-
sults of work in accordance with the monitoring plan are an affectivity for 
determining, correcting important deviations from the planned activities. 
Controlling can be defined as a process to "guarantee" that the goals of or-
ganization and management are achieved. It deals with how to make the ac-
tivities as planned. 
 
The success of a business will also be achieved when the company is able to 
know the shortcomings and advantages they have. In addition, companies that have 
decided to enter certain markets, they also need to conduct PESTEL analysis (Politi-
cal, Economic, Social, Technology, Environment and Legal). This analysis contains 
important issues on the intended country, such as political stability, per capita in-
come, the pace of economic growth, business cycle, fuel prices, exchange rates and 
inflation rate in the target country. In addition, things to note are the availability of 
skilled workers, the size, and the dissemination of demographic, security, and cultur-
al market segments (Thomas in Ofili, 2016). This analysis is useful for companies to 
take appropriate steps to implement their strategies in foreign markets. 
So, it can be seen that the key success factors of Alfamart in the Philippines is to 
maintain the persistence of flow in their business process graph, applying POAC 
(Planning, Organizing, Actuating, Controlling) from the management side, and do 
not forget to analyze market development, PESTEL (Political, economic, social, 
technology, environment and legal) model before deciding to enter the intended 
country. 
Conclusion 
This research is expected to provide practical implications for companies to gain 
a better understanding of entry mode strategies. Alfamart's organizational effective-
ness in the Philippines itself proves that the performance of their joint venture strate-
gy has been successfully executed. Of course this is because it is supported by a net-
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work with strong local partners and regulation from the Philippine government itself, 
so this strategy needs to be maintained. 
In addition, PT. Source Alfaria Trijaya, Tbk. As one of the largest retail compa-
nies in Indonesia with their business, infrastructure, sales, marketing and financial 
experience, they can increase their business expansion to different countries by re-
using joint venture strategies or apply other strategies, such as master franchise, As 
has been done by other major retail companies. Expected by the increasing number 
of Alfamart business expansion in the global market, Alfamart name can be increas-
ingly recognized in overseas markets. This is certainly also a positive value for Indo-
nesia, because through Alfamart outlets abroad, national products, including products 
from SMEs (Small and Medium Enterprises) can reach a wider market. 
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Abstract 
This research proposes a horizontal merger and acquisition (M&A) analysis in 
the pre-merger notification regime using a pre-evaluation of the technical effi-
ciency gains. This study uses panel data from all commercial banks in Indone-
sia during period 2002-2013. To predict the level of the technical efficiency of 
the banks in the M&A plan, this research uses a modified data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) approach. Moreover, the predicted technical efficiency score of 
the banks in the M&A plan is compared with the real technical efficiency score 
after the M&A. This research found that there were potential gains from the 
M&A plan of the banks. Furthermore, this research concluded that there was 
no a significant difference between the predicted technical efficiency score of 
the M&A plan and the real technical efficiency score after the M&A. This re-
search also found that the potential gains from the M&A mostly came from the 
learning effects rather than from the harmony and scale effects. 
Keywords: Data envelopment analysis, efficiency, banking, potential gains from 
merger and acquisition 
 
I. Introduction 
Indonesian Commission for the Supervision and Business Competition (KPPU) 
is amending the UU No. 5 Year 1999 and KPPU has been discussing the amendment 
with the House of Representative (DPR) since previous years. One of the important 
points that is included in the amendment is a transformation from the post-merger 
notification to the pre-merger notification. This future transformation requires KPPU 
to assess the impact of the merger and acquisition (M&A) plan on the competition 
and efficiency before the merger takes place. 
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In the post-merger regime notification, KPPU has established methods to assess 
the impact of the merger on the competition and efficiency. The assessment is usual-
ly based on the merger impact on the market structure and/or market pow-
er/efficiency. Another criteria is also based on the assessment on the possibility of 
the undertakings to conduct anti-competitive practices after the merger and acquisi-
tion is approved. The merger will be cancelled if the M&A causes a significant in-
crease in the market structure and/or market power/efficiency. This can cause the 
high cost for the undertakings if the KPPU cancelled the merger and acquisition. 
Therefore, this can be considered as one of the reasons to switch from the post-
merger notification to the pre-merger notification. 
During their period 2010-2016, KPPU evaluated about 332 merger cases (KPPU, 
2017). All the merger cases have been passed by KPPU. In spite of this, some mer-
gers have been passed with some conditional requirements and remedies. The condi-
tional requirements and remedies were related to clearing up the potention of the 
damage from the M&A on the competition and market efficiency. The future pre-
merger notification system may allow KPPU to reject or give remedies before the 
M&A takes place. Thus, the possibility of the welfare losses from the merger and ac-
quisition (M&A) will be reduced earlier. 
Regarding the methods to evaluate the merger, there is a different approach be-
tween the assessment method in the post-merger notification and the pre-merger noti-
fication. The assessment in the post-merger notification is mostly aim to provide the 
impact evaluation of the on-going M&A on the competition and efficiency compared 
to the period before the M&A. On the other hand, the evaluation of the M&A plan in 
the pre-merger notification regime is aimed to predict the impact of the M&A plan 
on the competition and efficiency that may cause losses to the consumer. Therefore, 
study about the pre-evaluation approach to assess the M&A plan in the Indonesian 
economy is important for the KPPU as well as the business sectors. 
This research proposes a method to assess the impact of the M&A plan by using 
a pre-evaluating technical efficiency gains before the M&A takes place. This is an 
alternative method that can be used by KPPU to assess the impact of the M&A plan 
on the efficiency in the pre-merger notification regime. This also can be used to 
complement the analysis of the market structure. The advantage of using this pre-
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evaluation approach is that KPPU can have an impact prediction of the merger plan 
on the competition and efficiency by using the inputs and outputs data which are eas-
ily available. However, the limitation of this method is related to the inability of this 
method to assess the market power directly which is also a concern of the KPPU in 
the merger assessment. Also since this method is a prediction, an evaluation of this 
prediction should be conducted routinely for the result validity. 
Furthermore, this research uses the bank as the empirical case for the merger 
plan assessment. Indonesian banking sector is a nice case to evaluate the merger as-
sessment in the pre-merger notification regime, since this sector has been consolidat-
ed from the period after the economic crisis in 1997 until the current period. Based 
on the data from Central Bank of Indonesia (2014) and Indonesian Financial Service 
Authority (OJK) (2015), there were about 21 commercial banks consolidating into 9 
banks during the period 2002-2013. Moreover, the banking sector also has a com-
plete data for the M&A evaluation. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Previous research has ever investigated the merger and acquisition assessment 
using both pre-and post-merger impact evaluation. Regarding the post-merger impact 
evaluation, Avkiran (1999) investigated the effect of the merger and acquisition on 
the Australian Bank in the period 1986-1995 using the data envelopment analysis 
(DEA) method. The research found that the merger causes lower efficiency for the 
acquiring banks indicating the negative effect of the merger on the efficiency. Drake 
and Hall (2003) investigated the effect of merger on the Japanese banks in the finan-
cial year ending March 1997. This research found that merger between big banks 
caused lower efficiency while the merger for the small banks created higher efficien-
cy. Furthermore, Santoso (2010) investigated the effect of the merger on the efficien-
cy in the Indonesian banks using DEA. The research found that merger and acquisi-
tion did not increase efficiency significantly. However, there is a rare research asses-
ing the efficiency impact of the merger in the Indonesian economy. 
Regarding the pre-evaluation of the merger impact, Kristensen, Bogetoft, dan 
Pedersen (2010) found that merger can have a potential for the firms to be efficient. 
This potential comes from the skill exchange and re-allocation of the resources after 
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the firms joint together in their operations. Bogetoff and Otto (2011) introduced a 
method to assess the merger impact of the merger plan on the technical efficiency by 
using the condition in the transformation of the input into the output before the mer-
ger. Potential gains from the merger and acquisition encompass three effects includ-
ing technical efficiency/learning effect, scope or harmony effect, and size/scale ef-
fect. Learning effect is related to the ability of the firms to adjust with the best prac-
tices when they joint together in the merger and acquisition. Scope/harmony effect is 
related to the mix or combination of resources used causing less resources to produce 
or use the inputs combination in better ways. Size effect or scale effect is related to 
the larger scale of operation that can reduce the use of resources. Furthermore, Halk-
os et al. (2014) conducted pre-evaluating technical efficiency gains from the merger 
and acquisition (M&A) in Japanese regional banks. They found that possible M&A 
formed by smaller banks performed better efficiency compared to the larger banks. 
Therefore, the M&A for the larger banks should be evaluated carefully. Moreover, 
there is a sparse research conducting the pre-evaluation impact of the merger and ac-
quisition in the Indonesian banks. 
 
III. Modeling approach 
This research uses the pre-evaluation of the technical efficiency gains from the 
M&A plan using the method of Bogetoff and Otto (2011). The total efficiency gains 
from the merger and acquisition can be assessed using the formal a radial Farrel like 
input based measure, as follows: 
                 (       
       
 )       (1) 
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H
 is the maximal proportional reduction in the aggregate inputs      
  
that can produce the aggregate output profile      
 . If E
H
 <1 there is an efficiency 
gain from the M&A and if E
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H
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H
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the firms integration. The total efficiency gains from the M&A can be divided into 
technical efficiency/learning effect, scope or harmony effect, and size/scale effect. 
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firm and use the projected plans (E
k
x
k
, y
k
 ), ks H, as the basis for calculating the ad-
justed overall gains E*
H
 from the merger and acquisition: 
E
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k
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k
, £ y
k
 ) e T (2) 
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Thus, the learning effect (LH
E
) can be defined as: 
      
  
  
  (3) 
 
Scope or harmony effect (HA
H
) can be derived from the examination on how much 
we can reduce the average input in the production of the average output: 
HA H =min{ HA GK+ |(HA— TE k x, — VJ)GI (4) 
[ Ht^H Ht£r J 
 
Where H is both the set and the number of elements in the set of the firms in the 
merger and acquisition. The use of average input and output is intended not to take 
into account the expansion of size yet. This is also relevant if the merged firms do 
not have the significant differences in size. If the HA
H
 < 1 indicates a potential gains 
due to improved harmony, while HA
H
>1 indicates a cost in harmonizing the inputs 
and outputs. 
Moreover, the size and scale effect Sf is measured by how much could have been 
saved by operating at full scale rather than average scale: 
1 
SI
H
 =min\SlGK+|(SI.HA
H
Y4E
k
x,Y.y
k
)^T\ (5) 
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If the Sf
I
<l, the rescaling is advantageous and the integration has economies of 
scale. If the Sf > 1 , the rescaling is costly and the returns to scale property doest not 
favor with the larger firms after the integration. 
Regarding the potential gains from the merger and acquisition, the basic decom-
position of the overall potential efficiency gains from the M&A can be derived by: 
 
E
H
 =LE
H
.HA
H
.SI
H
 (6) 
 
Where LE
H
 measures what can be gained by making the individual firms effi-
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cient. The another potential gain is E*
H
 which is created by the harmony effect HA
H
 
and the size effect Sf. 
Table 1. Mergers and acquisition between banks 
No. Bank After M&A Banks before M&A M&A Period 
1. Mutiara Bank 
CIC Bank, Danpac Bank and Pico 
Bank 
2004 
2. Artha Graha International Bank 
Interpacific Bank and Artha Graha 
Bank 
2005 
3. Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ Bank 
Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi and UFJ 
Bank 
2006 
4. Commonwealth Bank 
Arta Niaga Kencana Bank and Com-
monwealth Bank 
2008 
5. Windu Bank 
Winu Kentjana Bank and Mulicor 
Bank 
2008 
6. CIMB Niaga Bank Niaga bank, CIMB/Lippo Bank 2008 
7. Index Selindo Bank 
Index Selindo bank and Harmoni Inter-
national Bank 
2008 
8. Rabbo Bank International Bank 
Haga Bank, Hagakita Bank, Rabobank 
Duta Bank 
2008 
9. OCBC NISP Bank OCBC Indonesia Bank and NISP Bank 2010 
Source: Central Bank of Indonesia (2014) and OJK (2015) 
 
IV. Data 
This research uses secondary data from all the commercial banks having M&A 
in Indonesia during the period 2002-2013. There were 9 mergers and acquisitions 
during the period 2002-2013 as shown in the Table 1. The banks having M&A dur-
ing the periods include Mutiara bank, Artha Graha International bank, Tokyo 
Mitsubishi UFJ Bank, Commonwealth bank, Windu bank, CIMB Niaga bank, Index 
Selindo Bank, Rabbo Bank International bank and OCBC NISP bank. The merger 
periods of the banks were different between the banks. However, 5 of the 9 merged 
banks occured in 2008 including Commontwealth bank, Windu bank, CIMB Niaga 
bank, Index Selindo bank and Rabbo Bank International bank. 
To estimate the technical efficiency, this research uses the intermediation ap-
proach as applied by Sealey and Lindley (1997). The input variables include deposit, 
administration and employment cost, interest cost and commission. The deposit in-
cludes giro, saving account, and other deposits. The interest cost and commission in-
clude all interest cost and commission paid by the bank. Administration and em-
ployment cost include salary and wages and all administration costs such as rent cost, 
promotion, etc. The output variables include total of loan and interest revenue and 
commission. The total loan is defined as the loan given to the debtor/customer both 
September 6, 2017  Nusa Dua, Bali 
Proceeding International Seminar on Competition Policy and Law | KPPU  
95 
in Rupiah and foreign exchange. Interest revenue and commission include all the 
bank revenues from the operation. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Deposits (Million Rp) 12,272,106 23,693,631 13,957 157,323,703 
Interest cost and commission 
(Million Rp) 
730,120 1,568,723 7,026 12,017,195 
Administration and employment 
cost (Million Rp) 
515,194 1,161,074 6,754 9,232,744 
Loan (Million Rp) 10,925,913 22,897,666 11,354 143,641,115 
Interest revenue and commission 
(Million Rp) 
1,392,773 2,975,057 16,590 19,783,489 
Source: own calculation 
 
Table 2 is the descriptive statistics of the variables used for the estimation of the 
technical efficiency before and after the merger and acquisition. Most of the varia-
bles vary significantly between banks and periods. This is shown by the larger stand-
ard deviations of the variables compared to their means. For example, average depos-
its of the banks were 12,272,106 million Rupiah and this is less than the standard de-
viation of the variable which reached to 23693631 million Rupiah. 
 
V. Results 
Table 3 shows the average technical efficiency of the banks before the merger 
and acquisition including Mutiara Bank, Artha Graha bank, Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ 
bank, Commonwealth bank, Windu bank, CIMB Niaga bank, Index Selindo bank, 
Rabbo Bank International bank and OCBC NISP bank. The banks were not efficient 
with the average technical efficiency score was 0.520. This indicates that the banks 
can still decrease the inputs by 48% given the same output. Tokyo Mitsubishi UFJ 
bank is the bank with highest average technical efficiency score compared to the rest 
of the banks. Likewise, the Mutiara bank is the bank with the lowest technical effi-
ciency score compared to the rest of the banks. 
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Table 3. Average technical efficiency before merger and acquisition 
No. Bank after M&A Banks before M&A 
Period 
before 
M&A 
Average technical  
efficiency of the 
banks  
before M&A 
1. Mutiara bank CIC bank, Danpac bank and Pico bank 2002-2003 0.281 
2. 
Artha Graha 
International bank 
Interpacific bank and Artha Graha 
Bank 
2002-2004 0.602 
3. 
Tokyo Mitsubishi 
UFJ Bank 
Bank of Tokyo Mitsubishi and 
UFJ Bank 
2002-2005 0.855 
4. 
Commonwealth 
bank 
Arta Niaga Kencana Bank and 
Commonwealth bank 
2002-2007 0.428 
5. Windu bank 
Winu Kentjana bank and Mulicor 
bank 
2002-2007 0.425 
6. CIMB Niaga bank Niaga bank, CIMB/Lippo Bank 2003-2007 0.485 
7. Index Selindo bank 
Index Selindo bank and Harmoni 
International Bank 
2002-2007 0.525 
8. 
Rabbo Bank 
International bank 
Haga bank, Hagakita bank, 
Rabobank Duta Bank 
2002-2007 0.562 
9. OCBC NISP bank 
OCBC Indonesia bank and NISP 
bank 
2002-2010 0.518 
Average technical efficiency 2002-2013 0.520 
Source: own calculation 
 
Table 4 provides the estimation of the predicted technical efficiency score or 
overall gains from the merger and acquisition plan as well as the real technical effi-
ciency score after the merger. From the Table 4, it is seen that there are differences 
between the the predicted technical efficiency scores and the real technical efficiency 
scores. In spite of this, the prediction of the technical efficiency in the M&A of Index 
Selindo bank (0.573) reached the close value to the real value of the technical effi-
ciency after the merger (0.576). 
Table 4. Efficiency gains from merger and acquisition 
 
Bank after M&A 
Period of 
M&A 
Predicted technical  
efficiency or  
overall efficiency gains 
Technical efficiency after the M&A 
Period 
Average technical 
efficiency 
Mutiara bank 2004 0.299 2004-2013 0.326 
Artha Graha 
International bank 
2005 0.427 2005-2013 0.516 
Tokyo Mitsubishi 
UFJ Bank 
2006 0.729 2006-2013 0.904 
Commonwealth bank 2008 0.499 2008-2013 0.430 
Windu bank 2008 0.488 2008-2013 0.441 
CIMB Niaga bank 2008 0.644 2008-2013 0.563 
Index Selindo bank 2008 0.573 2008-2013 0.576 
Rabbo Bank 
International bank 
2008 0.691 2008-2013 0.511 
OCBC NISP bank 2010 0.408 2010-2013 0.645 
Source: own calculation 
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Table 5 provides the test to analyze on whether the differences between predicted 
technical efficiency score and real average technical efficiency score are significant 
statistically. From the Table 5 it is seen that F-stat=0.056 is less than the F-
critical=4.494 indicating that the hypothesis of no significant differences between the 
predicted technical efficiency score and the real technical efficiency score is not re-
jected. Thus, there is no difference between the two technical efficiency scores statis-
tically. The result can be an indication that this pre-evaluation method can be used by 
KPPU or other competition authorities to measure the efficiency gains of the hori-
zontal M&A plan. 
Table 5. ANOVA test 
Source of Variation SS Df MS F P-value F crit 
Between Groups 0.001 1 0.001 0.056 0.816 4.494 
Within Groups 0.376 16 0.024    
Total 0.377 17     
 
Table 6 provides the information of the basic decomposition of the overall gains 
from the merger. From Table 6 it is seen that the average of the predicted technical 
efficiency for the merged banks was 0.529. The coefficient indicates that there is a 
potential saving about 47.10% after the merger and acquisition. The average poten-
tial gain from the merger and acquisition was 0.959 indicating that there is a potential 
adjustment of the technical efficiency after the M&A. The coefficient indicates that 
there is still adjustment in the resources by 4.1% if the banks already reached the full 
technical efficiency before the merger. The average gain from the learning effect was 
55.90% indicating that there will be resources saving about 44.10% because of the 
exchange skills or resources in the best practices after the consolidation. The average 
gain from the harmony effect was 96.10% indicating that there still can be a resource 
saving about 3.9% after the merger because of the new or mix combination of inputs 
and outputs. Lastly, the gain from the size effect was 99.90% indicating that 0.1% of 
the inputs still can be reduced because of the larger size after the merger. 
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Table 6. Decomposition of the overall gains from the merger and acquisition 
Merger  
period 
Bank after M&A 
Predicted efficiency 
after M&A  
(E
H
) 
Learning 
effect  
(LE
H
) 
Potential  
gains  
(E
*H
) 
Harmony 
effect  
(HA
H
) 
Size 
effect  
(SI
H
) 
2004 Mutiara bank 0.299 0.301 0.992 0.996 0.996 
2005 
Artha Graha 
International bank 
0.427 0.431 0.991 0.991 1.000 
2006 
Tokyo Mitsubishi 
UFJ Bank 
0.729 0.908 0.802 0.802 1.000 
2008 Commonwealth bank 0.499 0.501 0.995 0.995 1.000 
2008 Windu bank 0.644 0.645 0.998 0.998 1.000 
2008 CIMB Niaga bank 0.573 0.624 0.918 0.923 0.994 
2008 Index Selindo bank 0.691 0.714 0.967 0.967 1.000 
2008 
Rabbo Bank 
International bank 
0.488 0.502 0.972 0.974 0.998 
2011 OCBC NISP bank 0.408 0.408 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Average 0.529 0.559 0.959 0.961 0.999 
Source: own calculation 
 
VI. Conclusion 
This research proposes a method to pre-evaluate the technical efficiency gains 
from the merger and acquisition (M&A) plan in the pre-merger notification regime. 
The method applies a modified data envelopment analysis (DEA). The method is ap-
plied on the 9 cases of the merger and acquisition (M&A) in the Indonesian banking 
sector during the period from 2002 to 2013. 
This research found that there were potential gains from the merger and acquisi-
tion plan of the banks. Although the predictions of the overall gains or technical effi-
ciency scores were slightly different from the real average technical efficiency scores 
after the merger and acquisition, the differences of the technical efficiency scores be-
tween the periods were not statistically significant. This can be an indication that the 
pre-evaluation method can be used by KPPU or other competition authorities to 
measure the efficiency gains of the horizontal M&A plan in the pre-merger notifica-
tion regime. Furthermore, the basic decomposition of the overall gains from the 
M&A shows that the banks mostly gained the efficiency from the learning effects ra-
ther than from the harmony and size effects. 
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Abstract 
This study aims to understand the role of Sharia fintech in providing 
transaction and business convenience. The development of financial technology 
(fintech) encourages sharia businessmen to create sharia fintech products. In 
addition to using sharia principles, sharia fintech develops because it provides 
the benefits of ease to its users to solve various financial problems and help in 
running a business. The role and benefits of sharia fintech are measured using 
user satisfaction on sharia fintech products. Based on the Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM) construct, perceived easy of use (PEoU), perceived 
usefulness (PU), and attitude are the determinants of user satisfaction in sharia 
fintech products. 
This study used self-administered survey. The sample in this research is sharia 
fintech users in Indonesia. The results indicate that the community perceives 
the usefulness of sharia fintech in conducting various transactions. They are 
satisfied with sharia fintech products because they use digital technology and 
sharia principle. The existence of sharia fintech alters their perceptions and 
behaviors to continue using the product in various transactions and business. 
This research contributes both practically and theoretically. For goverment, 
this research can be a reference to make regulations related to sharia fintech.  
 
Keywords: Sharia Fintech, Perceived Easy of Use (PEoU), Perceived 
Usefulness (PU), Attitude, Satisfaction 
 
1. Introduction 
Technological developments have an impact on development of financial indus-
try (Nam et al., 2016). Currently, many emerging new markets in cyberspace (digital 
market), one of them is financial technology (fintech). In Indonesia, development of 
financial technology or fintech began booming in 2015 and growing rapidly in 2016. 
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Policy makers respond quickly to this development by attending the 2015 World 
Economic Forum (WEF) to determine the pace in facing fintech development. 
Fintech becomes an alternative transaction for community because it makes easier 
for people to access financial products, simplify transactions, and increase financial 
literacy. The development of fintech is very rapid in Non-Bank Financial Industry 
(IKNB). Some types of fintech developing in Indonesia are payment, lending, finan-
cial planning, retail investment, crowd funding, remittance, and financial research. 
The number of fintech in Indonesia until 2016 reached 142 companies with transac-
tion value during 2016 as much as Rp 199 trillion. The rapid development of fintech 
be a concern for Bank Indonesia and Financial Services Authority (OJK) which is 
applied by establishing various regulations such as regulation of Peer to Peer (P2P) 
lending business which was released on December 29, 2016. In addition, the concrete 
form undertaken to oversee fintech is a regulatory sandbox as a testing laboratory for 
fintech actors to be monitored and evaluated in terms of feasibility, domino effect, 
consumer protection, licensing aspect, and taxation on products before products re-
leased to the market (Pratama, 2017). 
The number of startup fintech encourage the growth of sharia fintech. Sharia 
fintech services have great potential as more than 85% of Indonesians are Muslim. In 
fact, the number of sharia fintech in Indonesia is still very small. Fintech is dominat-
ed by conventional business finance. There are three crowd funding platform based 
on equity and two crowd funding platforms based on active loans in accordance with 
sharia compliant in 2016. The small number of sharia fintech in Indonesia is reflect-
ed in development of sharia fintech in Southeast Asia. In Southeast Asia, there are 
two largest sharia fintech namely Ethis Crowd and Kapital Boost. In addition, sharia 
finance industry is also dominated by sharia crowd funding platforms from other 
countries such as Blossom, Launch Good, Narwi, and Skola Fund. 
The rapid development of sharia fintech abroad is caused by the many benefits 
and success of business in this sector. For example, EthisCrowd (Singapore sharia 
crowd funding Platform) established in 2014 successfully collected a collective fund 
of USD 362.44 million from institutions and investors in Southeast Asia and the Gulf 
region. This achievement confirms that global investor confidence in sharia fintech 
business. The funds collected are used by EthisCrowd to finance its expansion plans 
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in Asia Pacific, supporting corporate governance, project selection processes, and 
improving technology infrastructure. EthisCrowd is also investing in subsidized 
housing projects in Indonesia. 
Indonesia is still lagging for the sharia fintech startup. However, since 2015 
began to emerge sharia fintech in Indonesia such as Paytren and SyarQ. Paytren is 
the largest local sharia fintech in Indonesia that emphasizes the sharia principles. 
Paytren's goal is to make it easier for partners to access financial products, increase 
financial literacy, and simplify transactions. Paytren provides convenience to its 
partners to make various payment transactions easily and practically. One merchan 
Paytren that provides financial products is Financial Treni (FinTren). Fintren has 
three categories: SaveTren (savings product), InvesTren (Investment product), and 
ProTren (protection product/insurance). The rapid development of sharia fintech in 
Indonesia and in some Asian countries can not be separated from the sharia 
principles which is used as a basis in making transactions such as murabahah. 
Today, more and more individual users and businesses are using fintech sharia 
products. This happens because of the benefits that they feel from these products.  
The advantages of sharia system from conventional system is the existence of 
profit and loss sharing (PLS) which gives justice between fintech company and its 
consumer. According to Universite Catholique de Louvain, the growth of sharia fi-
nance segment is the fastest. Furthermore, Indonesia also has a large market for halal 
products and is included in the Top 10 expenditure in each halal industry, the first 
rank is halal food industry and the 10 rank is the sharia finance industry. Sharia fi-
nancial system no doubt, because we can see how the development of Islamic bank-
ing in Indonesia, but still a homework is the perception of consumers about this sha-
ria financial system. Therefore, this paper will discuss consumer perceptions of sha-
ria fintech, whether useful for solving financial problem and business activities or 
not.  
The benefits of sharia fintech should be measured quantitatively. The benefits 
perceived by sharia fintech users are proxied with their satisfaction with a product. 
The more they feel satisfied means the product is increasingly beneficial in transac-
tions and running a business. Satisfaction is a positive affective reaction to the out-
come of previous experience (Ganesan, 1994). Based on experience using sharia 
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fintech then users can feel positive or negative benefits of products they use. 
Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) is used in this study to explain some fac-
tors that cause individuals feel the benefits from using a product, because TAM ex-
plains or predicts user acceptance of information technology (Hu et al., 1999). TAM 
explains that perceived easy of use (PEoU), perceived usefulness (PU), and attitude 
are factors that encourage individual acceptance a product (Igbaria et al., 1995). 
PEoU is a convenience in using or applying a product. The easier to use the more sat-
isfied users on a product because individuals like something instant and not difficult. 
Jung et al. (2015) states that PEoU has a positive relationship with user satisfaction. 
The importance of PEoU factors in influencing user perceptions becomes a reference 
for business owners to create innovative products that are easy to use. In addition, 
PEoU is also a determinant of PU. PU is the benefit/usefulness of a product in meet-
ing the needs of users. When an individual feels that sharia fintech product is a prod-
uct that is easy to use then they will assume that the product is useful to them (Hu et 
al., 1999). Perceptions of usefulness arise when they are able to operate sharia 
fintech products. Furthermore, PU is also a determinant of user satisfaction. Users 
who feel the usefulness of a product will feel the benefits of ease in solving financial 
problems. This can be seen from perception of their satisfaction.  
PU and PEoU are factors that determine individual acceptance of technology. 
Both have a positive effect on attitude (Chuang, 2016). Attitude is individual's (posi-
tive or negative) judgment on new technology (Ajzen, 2002; Halilovic & Cicic, 
2011). Users believe that sharia fintech is easy to use (can start to use without guid-
ance) and is useful in solving their financial problems (can accomplish their tasks or 
work quickly) thus helping to improve user attitude towards sharia fintech services. 
That is, when consumers believe that sharia fintech service is easy to use and useful 
for their work then their positive judgment on the use of sharia fintech products will 
be higher. Thus, PEoU and PU in the use of sharia fintech products are cognitive fac-
tors for consumers to accept sharia fintech products (Hu et al., 1999). 
In addition to PEoU and PU, attitude is also a factor affecting user satisfaction. 
Attitude is reflected in the trust and positive judgment of users on new technologies 
(Chau & Hu, 2002; Davis, 1989). They will like sharia fintech products and will uti-
lize the product to increase their satisfaction. Users of sharia fintech products who 
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feel that sharia fintech products are easy to use and useful will increase trust and pos-
itive feelings (attitude). Furthermore, positive feelings and judgments on sharia 
fintech products will have an impact on the perception of product usefulness in solv-
ing user financial problems, which in this study is measured using user satisfaction.  
This research is the first study to test TAM on user satisfaction with sharia 
fintech product. User satisfaction is created from the ease, usefulness, and attitude of 
users on sharia fintech products. The rapid development of fintech occure because 
users feel that fintech products provide convenience for them in solving financial 
problems, same with sharia fintech. Previous research conducted by Chuang et al. 
(2016) states that it is important to test fintech in different concepts with different 
norms to see users‟ attitude. In addition, the phenomenon of sharia practices is grow-
ing and in demand by many people, especially in Indonesia with a Moeslim popula-
tion that reaches 85% of the total population of Indonesia. Therefore, this study uses 
the concept of sharia fintech to understand the role of sharia fintech in solving finan-
cial problem. 
 
2. Development of Hypotheses 
2.1 Financial Technology (fintech) 
Fintech is an industry that uses IT technology centered on gadgets (e.g mobile 
phones and tablet computers) to improve the efficiency of the financial system (Kim 
et al., 2015). Fintech refers to changes in the industry derived from the convergence 
of financial services and information technology. One example of fintech practice is 
the phenomenon of non-financial businesses that use innovative technology to pro-
vide services, such as remittances, payments, and investments without cooperation 
with Bank. In Indonesia, such services are included in Non-Bank Financial Industry 
(IKNB). 
Financial technology (fintech) is growing rapidly in Indonesia in last two years. 
This development is based on human needs in modern and practical life. The online 
transaction system is preferred over the manual system as it allows the user to access 
and transact financial products. The development is marked by the number of emerg-
ing startup that provides financial services that are packed using technology. Alt and 
Puschmann (2012) mentioned that fintech refers to a new solution that demonstrates 
the development of innovative applications, processes, products, or business models 
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in incremental financial services industry. The practical function of fintech encour-
ages business owners to look at fintech products.  
 
2.2 Sharia Financial Technology (Sharia fintech) 
The issue of sharia-based financial institutions began to steal public's attention. 
No exception to business owners in financial industry. In fintech world began to ap-
pear startup doing funding and investment practices using sharia principles. In 
Southeast Asia, there are two largest sharia fintech namely Ethis Crowd and Kapital 
Boost. The products offered by fintech are not only for commercial but also provide 
facilities for people who want to become donors for various charitable activities. All 
products use sharia principles. In Indonesia, the development of sharia fintech has a 
very wide opportunity, because not many business owners who founded sharia 
fintech. Indonesia is one of the largest market share for sharia-based products. Cur-
rently, sharia fintech business in Indonesia which is growing among them is Paytren 
and SyarQ. Paytren is sharia fintech with the most users established in 2013 by offer-
ing payment services, purchases, deposits, investments, and insurance. SyarQ is a 
new startup in March 2017 by offering merchandising services based on wa'ad and 
murabahah. People who start to turn to sharia products make sharia fintech business 
become favorite in the future.  
 
2.3 Technology Acceptance Model (TAM) 
TAM was introduced by Davis in 1986. TAM explains that the individual's in-
tention to use information technology is determined by PU and PEoU that is integrat-
ed with the individual's attitude (Davis, 1989). TAM explains that acceptability of 
new technologies is influenced by individual beliefs explained by two variables: 
PEoU and PU (Geven et al., 2003). PEoU is an indicator of cognitive effort required 
to study and to use an information technology product. PU is a measure of individual 
subjective judgment on utility provided by a new information technology product 
(Hu et al., 1999). Davis et al. (1989) defines PEoU as a user belief that using fintech 
services is easy to do and does not require a great effort to learn it, whereas PU is de-
fined as user confidence interpreted through the level of usability in using fintech 
services. Attitude is defined as the level of user ratings (positive/negative) in using 
the fintech service (Ajzen, 2002; Halilovic & Cicic, 2011). 
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Nam et al. (2016) states that the important point of TAM is PU directly affect the 
attitude when PEoU affect PU and attitude. That is, PEoU emphasizes the level of 
individual belief that using sharia fintech products is not a difficult thing but in prac-
tice is easy to use (Davis, 1989). Furthermore, the use of sharia fintech products will 
encourage increased PU. The level of individual confidence that sharia fintech prod-
ucts can improve their performance is influenced by the ease of operating the prod-
uct. Previous research conducted by Wixom & Todd (2005) and Shipps & Phillips 
(2012) states that PEoU affects PU. Therefore, based on the perception that sharia 
fintech product is an easy to use product, the usefulness of sharia fintech product can 
be felt, so the first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1 PEoU has a positive effect on PU 
 
TAM describes two specific constructs that influence the attitude of PEoU and 
PU (Chen, 2016). The acceptance of the new technology of sharia fintech is ex-
plained by individuals‟ attitude to use product. PEoU emphasizes the amount of ef-
fort required to use sharia fintech products whereas PU is usefulness level of sharia 
fintech products (Kim et al., 2016). Attitude is a positive or negative feeling and as-
sessment in general when individuals use new technology (Ajzen, 2002; Halilovic & 
Cicic, 2011).  
Chuang et al. (2016), Nam et al. (2016), Wixon & Todd (2005), and Shipps & 
Phillips (2012) states that attitude is influenced by PEoU and PU. Increasing the in-
tention to use sharia fintech products requires user trust that sharia fintech products 
are easy to use and useful (Chau & Hu, 2002; Davis 1986, 1989). Users believe that 
sharia fintech is easy to use and useful in solving their financial problems thereby 
helping to improve the attitude of users towards sharia fintech services (Chuang et 
al., 2016). Based on TAM model and previous research result, the hypothesis is for-
mulated as follows: 
H2 PEoU have positive effect on attitude 
H3 PU has positive effect on attitude 
 
2.4 User Satisfaction 
User satisfaction becomes the benchmark of the usefulness of sharia fintech 
products. Through the level of satisfaction it can be seen how big the role of sharia 
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fintech products provide ease in solving various financial problems. User satisfaction 
is derived and is based on experience in using a product (Sahin et al., 2011). User 
satisfaction is defined as a set of feelings and beliefs about the activities of individu-
als (Cetin, 2011). Satisfaction can also be interpreted through individual reactions to 
product experience they use. User satisfaction is seen from the indicators of the use-
fulness, effectiveness, efficiency, and performance of a product (Mather et al., 2002). 
Mariani et al., (2013) states that information technology is a factor that affects the 
level of user satisfaction. The characteristics of information technology are interpret-
ed using PEoU, PU, and attitude. 
TAM is a valid construct for explaining user satisfaction (Mather et al., 2002). 
User satisfaction has been used by previous researchers to test positive user behavior 
after using information technology products (Chiu & Wang, 2006; Dalcher & Shine, 
2003; Szymanski & Hise, 2000; Wixom & Todd, 2005). The results of previous re-
search indicate that PU and Attitude have positive effect on user satisfaction (Al-
Hawari & Mouakket, 2010; Shipps & Phillips, 2012). Research conducted by Jung et 
al. (2015), Wong et al. (2014), and Hou et al. (2013) indicates that PEoU and PU 
have a positive effect on user satisfaction. Based on the concept of TAM and the re-
sults of previous research, then PEoU, PU, and attitude have a positive effect on user 
satisfaction, so the hypothesis is formulated as follows: 
H4 PEoU has a positive effect on user satisfaction 
H5 PU has a positive effect on user satisfaction 
H6 Attitude has a positive effect on user satisfaction 
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Figure 1: Research Model 
 
3. Research Methods  
This research uses survey method. Survey method is quite effective and efficient 
to be applied in primary data collection. Although survey methods have low internal 
validity, this method makes it easy for us to reach samples spread in Indonesia. This 
research is a quantitative descriptive research that try to understand respondent gen-
eral answer about perception on sharia fintech. Variables in this study are PEoU, PU, 
attitude, and user satisfaction. Data were collected using online surveys directly an-
swered by users of sharia fintech. The questionnaire contains closed and open ques-
tions to measure users‟ perception of sharia fintech. Sample in this study is Paytren 
user spread all over Indonesia. Paytren users are selected because Paytren is sharia 
fintech from Indonesia with the largest users.  
TAM measured using an instrument developed by Davis (1989) and used also by 
Davis et al. (1989), Mathieson (1991), and Hu et al., (1999). PEoU measure using 
two question items, PU measure using six question items, attitude measured using 
two question items. Furthermore, user satisfaction measured using instruments from 
Sahin et al. (2011). The instrument consists of three question items and three open 
questions. Each variable is measured using a 5-point Likert scale. To test the hypoth-
esis, data obtained from the survey were analyzed using multiple linear regression. 
Multiple linear regression is based on functional relationship between more than one 
independent variable (Cooper & Schindler, 2011). Multiple linear regression is used 
to understand the effect of variables in TAM‟s model. In this study, regression analy-
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sis consists of three models tested using statistical analysis tools SPSS 23 which can 
be seen in Table 3. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Respondents in this research are 30 sharia fintech users spread in Indonesia. 
Bryman (2012) mentioned that the number of samples has been adequate because it 
has reached the minimum number. Respondents consist men and women, age rang-
ing from 20-50 years old, education ranging from high school to master degree, sta-
tus ranging from students, employees, entrepreneurs, and work experience ranging 
from 6 month up to over 2 years. Data show that the respondents came from various 
cities in Indonesia which show that sharia fintech has been accepted by Indonesian 
people. 
Before testing the hypothesis, it is necessary to test the validity and reliability of 
the instrument so that data obtained reliable and valid (Cooper and Schindler, 2011). 
The results show that variables in this study is reliable with cronbach Alpha values 
for PU 0.919, PEoU 0.866, attitude 0.728 and satisfaction 0.886. In addition, validity 
test show good values with KMO values 0.716 and Barlett's 297,282 with a signifi-
cance level of 0.000. Furthermore, instruments of each variable are already concen-
trated on their factors that have been tested using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  
The measurement model consists of four latent variables and each variable con-
tains two up to six indicators represented by survey questions. Indicators of each var-
iable can be seen in the following table. 
Table 1: Factor Analysis and Measurement Item Result 
Factor Mean S.D 
Factor 
Loading 
Item Label - Item Description (Indicator) 
Perceived 
Usefulness (PU) 
Cronbach α = 
0,919 
4,60 0,67 0,849 Paytren allows me to complete work faster 
4,57 0,63 0,915 Using Paytren can improve my performance 
4,63 0,61 0,918 Using Paytren can improve my productivity 
4,63 0,56 0,619 
Using Paytren can improve my business 
effectiveness  
4,67 0,34 0,828 Overall, Paytren is useful in completing my work  
Perceived Ease 
of Use (PEoU) 
Cronbach α = 
0,866 
4,90 0,30 0,795 
It is easy for me to operate Paytren according to my 
needs  
4,83 0,46 0,888 
It is easy for me to understand the use of Paytren  
Attitude 
Cronbach α = 
0,728 
4,90 0,30 0,824 Using Paytren for my work is a good idea 
4,73 0,52 0,765 
Using Paytren for my work is a wise thing  
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Satisfaction 
Cronbach α = 
0,886 
4,67 0,48 0,868 I am satisfied with service provided by Paytren  
4,77 0,43 0,806 I am satisfied with Paytren  
4,60 0,56 0,849 The services provided by Paytren are very satisfying 
KMO Test 0,716 
Barlett‟s Test 297,282 
Sig. 0,000 
 
4.1 Hypothesis Testing 
Correlation analysis is required before hypothesis testing by calculating mean 
and standard deviation for each variable and make correlation matrix used to test hy-
pothesis. The results of correlation analysis show in Table 2 below. 
Tabel 2: Mean, Standard Deviation, Cronbach α , and Correlation Analysis 
Variable Mean DS 1 2 3 
Perceived Usefulness (PU) 4,62 0,51    
Perceived Ease of Use (PEoU) 4,88 0,27 0,403 (*)   
Attitude 4,78 0,37 0,705 (**) 0,746 (**)  
Satisfaction  4,70 0,40 0,524 (**) 0,714 (**) 0,842 (**) 
* The correlation is significant at 0.05 level 
** Significant correlation at 0.01 level 
 
Table 2 shows that majority of respondents indicated a positive response to sha-
ria fintech at a relatively high scale for each variable. PEoU (mean = 4.88) was the 
highest, followed attitude (mean = 4.78), then satisfaction (mean = 4.70), and the 
lowest is PU (mean = 4.62). This indicates that respondents feel the ease (PEoU) and 
benefit (PU) in sharia fintech, and also have a positive attitude towards sharia 
fintech. In the end, respondents feel relatively high satisfaction with 4.70 from scale 
of 1-5. We saw a significant relationship between PU, PEoU, attitude, and satisfac-
tion that correlated positively at P <0.01 then PEoU correlation with PU significant 
at P <0,05 level. 
Regression analysis use to test hypothesis. Regression output consists of model 
1, model 2, and model 3. Regression test results can be seen in Table 3 below. 
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Table 3: Regression Analysis of Model I, Model II, and Model III 
 
Model I 
Perceived Use-
fulness 
Model II 
Attitude 
Model III 
Satisfaction 
Collinearity Statistics 
 Beta Sig. Beta Sig. Beta Sig. VIF Tolerance SE 
Perceived 
Ease of Use 
H1, H2, H4 
0,766 0,027 0,766 0,000 0,245 0,305 2,416 0,414 0,234 
Perceived 
Usefulness 
H3, H5 
- - 0,353 0,000 -0,076 0,514 2,133 0,469 0,115 
Attitude H6 - - - - 0,836 0,001 4,024 0,249 0,217 
R2 0,163 0,751 0,730 
 F 5,539 40,751 23,447 
Sig. 0,027 0,000 0,000 
 
Table 3 shows some information. First, model 1 shows PEoU as independent 
variable and PU as dependent variable. Statistically, regression analysis on model 1 
has a significant positive effect with F value = 5,439; R2 = 0.163; P = 0.027 where F 
arithmetic is greater than F table, then Ho is rejected and Ha is accepted. This regres-
sion analysis indicated that PEoU had a significant positive effect on PU (P <0.05; β 
= 0.766). This indicates that H1 is accepted.  
Model II shows PEoU and PU as independent variable and attitude as dependent 
variable. Statistically, regression analysis on model II has a significant positive effect 
with F value = 40,751; R2 = 0.751; P = 0,000 where F arithmetic is greater than F ta-
ble, then Ho is rejected and Ha is accepted. This shows that PEoU has a significant 
positive effect on attitude (P <0,01; β = 0,766) and PU have positive significant ef-
fect on attitude (P <0,01; β = 0,353). This indicates that H2 and H3 are accepted. 
Model III shows PU, PEoU, and attitude as independent variable and satisfaction 
as dependent variable. Statistically, the regression analysis on model III has signifi-
cant positive effect with F value = 23,447; R2 = 0,730; P = 0,000 where F arithmetic 
is bigger than F table, Ho is rejected and Ha is accepted. This shows that PEoU has 
significant positive effect on satisfaction (P <0,01; β = 0,245) and attitude has signif-
icant positive effect on satisfaction (P <0,01; β = 0,836). Then PU has a significant 
positive effect on satisfaction (P <0.01; β = 0.076). This indicates that H4, H5, and 
H6 are accepted. 
Other information based on multi collinear test indicates that VIF value is less 
than 10, tolerance value is more than 0.01, and standard error value is less than 1. 
Data indicate that there is no multi collinear problem, so statistical test is reliable and 
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robust. Regression results show that all hypotheses are supported significantly. 
4.2 Open Question Analysis 
We gave an open question to know users‟ perception and reason in using sharia 
fintech products. Furthermore, We grouped the answers into several factors based on 
the core similarity of respondents' answers. Open question analysis can be seen in 
Table 3 below. 
Table 4: Open Question Response 
Item Question Factor Frequency 
Percentage 
(%) 
Reasons to use Paytren 
Ease of Transaction 8 19 % 
Ease of Use 3 7 % 
Business Ease 11 26 % 
Business Objectives 14 33 % 
Alms 6 14 % 
Paytren supports ease in doing busi-
ness / job?  
Yes / No (the reason) 
Effective and Efficient 12 30 % 
Flexible 6 15 % 
Complete 2 5 % 
Facilitate Business 13 33 % 
Profitable 7 18 % 
Do you know fintech sharia besides 
Paytren? 
Yes 1 3 % 
No 29 97 % 
 
Table 4 shows that respondents‟ reason using sharia fintech at most is for busi-
ness purposes that is 33%. Furthermore, a second open question analysis shows that 
respondents feel that sharia fintech provides ease in conducting transactions and run-
ning their business. The information is known from the answers of all respondents 
who answered "yes". We group respondents‟ reasons into several factors as listed in 
table 4 above. Based on statistical analysis, it can be seen that 33% respondents feel 
sharia fintech facilitate the business, then 30% response to feel sharia fintech make 
business become effective and efficient. 
 
4.3 Discussion  
TAM explains that individual's intention to use information technology is deter-
mined by PU and PEoU integrated with individual attitude (Davis, 1989). This study 
focuses on user perceptions and attitudes toward sharia fintech products and the re-
sults are as expected by us that sharia fintech supports easiness in conducting trans-
actions and business. Then, we also gave an open question to re-confirm respond-
ents‟ reasons using sharia fintech. We analyzed and classified respondents' answers 
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into several factors that became the reason they used sharia fintech. The reasons are 
provide ease of transaction, ease of use, ease in doing business, and concept of alms. 
The most important finding is discovery of information that innovation in fintech 
products by applying sharia principles is very useful, promising, and growing.  
Other facts show that most respondents do not know other fintech sharia than 
Paytren, this is in accordance with our investigation that there is few sharia fintech in 
Indonesia. But we are optimistic that sharia fintech development will grow rapidly 
like sharia bank, potential of Muslim population in Indonesia is very big, the better 
economic development, the more advanced technology, the more fintech transactions 
in Indonesia today, and more and more innovative businessmen who are always 
looking for promising business opportunities. 
In accordance with the results of previous studies conducted by Wixom and 
Todd (2005) and Shipps and Phillips (2012) using TAM models to test the responses 
of technology users, as well as research by Chuang et al. (2016) testing TAM model 
on fintech, the result is not much different from TAM model on conventional fintech 
and sharia fintech context. This is indicated by the acceptance of hypotheses pro-
posed in this study. Users feel that fintech sharia products are easy to use and useful, 
so users have a positive attitude on sharia fintech products and ultimately provide 
satisfaction for users (Jung et al., 2015; Wong et al., 2014; Hou et al., 2013). 
Thus, although the birth of fintech can disrupt conventional monetary system and 
need to be anticipated by existing regulations. The government must remain flexible 
and be able to collaborate with entrepreneurs who are always innovating. This needs 
to be watched because consumers are very satisfied and feel the benefits of these in-
novations (fintech). Regulation must follow the development era because this infor-
mation age will produce various business model innovation as a domino effect from 
the development of information technology, artificial intelligence technology, and 
robotic technology which of course will change human life. If firms are too comfort-
able and lazy to innovate, then zombie company will be faced by the financial indus-
try in Indonesia and causing the company can not compete. 
Consumer market driven is the current marketing paradigm, means companies 
create a product or service based on consumers‟ wants and needs. Although the new 
innovations can create chaos, it is undeniable that the benefits of innovation are felt 
September 6, 2017  Nusa Dua, Bali 
Proceeding International Seminar on Competition Policy and Law | KPPU  
115 
as evidenced by the start-up successes in technology such as Gojek, Traveloka, 
Bukalapak, and so on that are able to change the market structure in this modern era. 
Therefore, disruptive innovation must be dealt with in collaboration. We can take ex-
amples from sharia concepts that collaborate with existing modern systems such as 
sharia banking, sharia fintech, sharia capital markets, and etc. Obviously, the concept 
of sharia provides a win-win solution for companies and consumers. 
5. Conclusion 
5.1 Conclusions and Implications 
This study understand the role of sharia fintech in facilitating business owners or 
consumers to solve their financial problems. To know the role of sharia fintech, we 
use TAM‟s construct to know their satisfaction perception on sharia fintech products. 
TAM explains user satisfaction on fintech products that is influenced by PEoU, PU, 
and their attitude. The results show that PEoU is positively associated with PU. The-
se results support previous research conducted by Wixom & Todd (2005) and Phil-
lips (2012). If the product is easy to use then the usefulness of sharia fintech product 
can be felt. Another result shows that PEoU and PU are the determinants of attitude. 
User believes that sharia fintech is easy to use and useful in solving their financial 
problems so the user attitude towards sharia fintech services increases (Chuang et al., 
2016). These results support research conducted by Nam et al. (2016), Wixon & 
Todd (2005), Shipps & Phillips (2012). Furthermore, PEoU, PU, and high attitude 
have a positive effect on user satisfaction. User satisfaction becomes the benchmark 
of the usefulness of sharia fintech products. These results support research conducted 
by Al-Hawari and Mouakket (2010), Shipps and Phillips (2012), Jung et al. (2015), 
Wong et al. (2014), and Hou et al. (2013).  
Based on open questions, sharia fintech users feel the benefits of the products 
they use, that is make it easier for them to make transactions, run business, and solve 
their financial problems. This happens because the services of sharia fintech products 
are very suitable with what they need and because sharia fintech perform activities in 
accordance with sharia principles (without usury). 
This study provides some important contributions both practically and theoreti-
cally. Practically, this study provides important information to businesses that there 
is a market share waiting for sharia fintech products that can simplify business pro-
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cesses and solve financial problems. This is an opportunity for businesses to create 
new business (startup) in accordance with current issues. Theoretically, this study 
contributes literature by conducting TAM's construct test on sharia fintech. There is 
no previous research linking that two topics so that the results of this study provide 
new knowledge in the academic world. 
5.2 Applicative Opportunities 
5.2.1 For Practitioners 
The results of this study can be used as a reference for corporate managers to be 
a consideration in determining the strategy in running the business. Companies must 
be up to date on innovations that accelerate. Sharia fintech has an advantage because 
there are elements of alms and the benefit of ummah, where devout Muslims will feel 
better when using sharia fintech as free from the element of usury. The results of this 
study are important enough to understand attitudes and behavior of consumers in us-
ing sharia fintech. In this information technology era, to succeed the marketing of 
new technology, marketers should focus on consumers.  
Practitioners have to continue to innovate because the development of technolo-
gy is very fast. We are optimistic about sharia fintech industry opportunities that can 
be an alternative for the financial industry. Fintech could be a substitution of conven-
tional finance industry. This is because the pattern of human life tends to lead to 
things that are instant, flexible, and easy. Seeing the success of EthisCrowd in 
Singapore that can raise funds and utilize with sharia methods to help businesses 
spread across Southeast Asia, fintech in Indonesia will start implementing sharia 
system in their business model and help society closer with sharia principles. 
5.2.2 For the Government  
New business models can be an opportunity and threat to established business 
models. The rapid innovation entering into various industries (including the financial 
industry) can lead to disruptive innovation and conflict if not properly regulated. This 
should be noted by government as regulators to anticipate fintech phenomenon that 
growth and investment levels grow exponentially. For the government as regulator, it 
is necessary to pay attention to regulations that can control the development of 
fintech so as not to become disruptive economy, because rules in many interrelated 
fields in this transition of new industry era are still not clear. Government needs to 
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determine a more flexible legal concept in order not to turn off the innovation but not 
too free because it will lead to unhealthy competition. The balance between the inter-
ests of goverment, society, and business actor needs to be considered for the common 
good.  
Sharia fintech can be an excellent alternative to overcome these problems, be-
cause the concept of sharia fintech exemplified by Paytren has an advantage in bal-
ancing technological advances, business efficiency, social, and spiritual. Using this 
concept, benefits arising from innovation can be felt and negative impacts arising 
from innovation can be minimized. The Financial Services Authority (OJK) needs to 
issue a policy explaining the fintech border and requirements that can stand as sharia 
fintech. Most consumers use sharia products simply because they see sharia labeling 
on a financial product, but do not fully understand whether the product characteris-
tics are really in accordance with sharia principles. For irresponsible businessmen, 
this weakness can be utilized to provide sharia labels on products that do not fully 
use sharia principles. OJK can evaluate sharia-labeled financial products so that sha-
ria not only as a marketing strategy but as a real sharia-based product. As explained 
by Pratama (2017) that the legal system conducive to business actors is not a law but 
rather a policy such as directive or guidance so that the structure does not interfere 
with the existing legal order. Therefore, it is appropriate if OJK issued a clear direc-
tion policy on sharia fintech products so that there is no difference in understanding 
the views of sharia practice.  
5.2.3 For Consumers 
Today, people need a modern and practical life. The online transaction system is 
preferred over the manual system because it allows user to access and transact finan-
cial products. Based on analysis, consumer confidence increased in sharia fintech 
products. In addition to providing convenience in the transaction, sharia fintech 
products based on sharia principles and free from usury. Consumers have other alter-
natives in doing financial transactions. The wider the reach of sharia fintech the more 
people will turn to shariah products. Society will be free from doubt in using finan-
cial products. The Indonesian people are interested in products labeled kosher (halal), 
not least in financial products. Emergence of sharia fintech in Indonesia is very help-
ful for society in selecting financial products. 
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Abstract 
Future competition now expanding from online commerce, the online com-
merce offers from their exists in the resource integration and terminal consum-
ers. O2O mode is new commerce model which does a deeper explore to the 
sales channels, and has a very good prospect. Klikmall is a company engaged 
in e-commerce with a marketplace concept. The purpose of this study is to 
evaluate the company‘s O2O business model design to see whether it is suited 
to be launched. The method used in this study is a descriptive method using 
qualitative data. The evaluation is done based on the findings of the previous 
study about the development of O2O business model by Xingang Weng dan Li-
ying Zhang. The conclusion of this study is that the O2O business model made 
by the company is suited to be launched even if the mobile network still needs to 
be improved.  
Keywords: O2O Mode, Online and Offline, Mobile Commerce, E-Business 
 
Introduction 
Online Business in Indonesia is growing rapidly. We can see this growth by 
looking at the increase of the number of transaction done online. The value of trans-
action done via online in Indonesia rises from USD 8 Billion in 2013 to USD 12 Bil-
lion in 2014 and it is predicted that this number will rise in the future (Kominfo, 
2015). Even with the rising number of transaction done by e-commerce, there are 
still people who doesn‟t do online shopping because of the shipping cost. Research 
by Nielsen in 2014 shows that 50% of Indonesian people doesn‟t want to do online 
shopping because of the shipping cost. To deal with this problem, one of the alterna-
tive that can be used is Online-to-Offline (O2O). 
O2O is a model of e-commerce where customer purchases product online and go 
to the offline store to take the product (Du & Tang, 2014; Wu, Sun, & Xu, 2014; 
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Xing & Junxuan, 2014). By using this model, customer will not be charged by the 
shipping cost. O2O is first introduced in United States and now is growing rapidly in 
China. O2O is an electronic commerce mode based on online effective interactivity. 
This efficient integration mode between virtual world and real world gets support 
and recognition from all walks of life. O2O aims to maximize the use of offline and 
online resource; they promote each other and depend on each other to achieve a win-
win situation (Tiansheng & Jiong, 2015; Weng & Zhang, 2015). 
Klikmall Lintas Korpora (Klikmall) is an e-commerce company created by 
groups of retailers working together. Those groups are Boga Group, Kompas Group, 
Panca Group, PT. Bersama Cipta Rasa, PT. Britannido Mitra Pratama, PT. Central 
Mega Kencana, PT. Delami Garement Industries, PT Fun World Prima, PT Hero Su-
permarket. Tbk, PT. Marche International, PT. Monica Hijau Lestari, PT. Nusantara 
Sejahtera Raya, PT. Optik Melawai Prima, PT. Pilofice, PT. GF Culinary, Ratu 
Pertiwi Group, and Warung Podjok in Indonesia for creating a concept of online 
companies (E-Commerce) with O2O model. This company is created in 2015 and is 
still in preparation stage. The company has already made a design of O2O model that 
they want to use to do their business. 
Seeing as O2O concept is still new in Indonesia and there is too little company 
that adopts it, the researcher is interested to do an evaluation to the model designed 
by the company to help them prepare them self before the launching to help the com-
pany to make a better preparation for its launch. The purpose of this study is to eval-
uate the O2O model design that Klikmall has made whether it is suitable to be 
launched or not. 
 
Literature Reviews 
Offline business is a business model that uses real stores and does not use inter-
net media to perform its operations. This method is done by showing the product or 
service directly to the customer. Advantage of offline business is a strong relation-
ship from company to customer so that customer loyalty is better than online con-
cept. In addition, this concept makes it easier for customers to trust the product be-
cause customers can directly see and touch the product. The disadvantage of an of-
fline business is the cost that must be provided to make this a large offline business. 
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In addition, offline business is difficult to reach areas far from where he operates. 
O2O business model is a new emerging E-Commerce business model in America 
that combines online business or e-commerce concepts with offline business. O2O 
stands for Online to Offline, which combines e-commerce features with offline ser-
vices. In operation, the O2O model has a basic operation that can be seen in the fol-
lowing figure. 
 
Figure 1 Operation Flow Chart 
Source: Adapted from (Weng & Zhang, 2015) 
 
O2O business model is a newly emerging business model in America that com-
bines the concept of online business or e-commerce with offline business. In Indone-
sia, one of e-commerce that offering this service is matahari mall. Matahari mall of-
fering order through online and take the product from the outlet that already chosen 
by buyer. But the payment can be through credit card, transfer or cash on pickup. 
The payment should be make before customer pickup the product from the outlet. 
According to research conducted by (Tiansheng & Jiong, 2015) stated that there are 
four models of O2O based on the way it operates: 
1. Online to Offline: The concept of O2O where the customer is collected and 
transact online but the value obtained by the customer is offline 
2. Offline to Online: The concept of O2O where customers are given product in-
formation through offline promotional activities and customers will be di-
rected to the online shop to find additional information or conduct transac-
tions. 
3. Online to Offline to Online: The concept of O2O where the customer will be 
given information online, then the customer will try the products we have of-
fline and then the customer back to online to make transactions. 
4. Offline to Online to Offline: The concept of O2O where customers are col-
lected offline, then view or try products online, then perform transactions of-
 4. Feed Back Online 
3. Offline Consumption 
2. Order Processing 
O2O E-Commerce 
Offline Entity Consumer 
1. Search service online 
and online put order 
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fline. 
Based on the results of research by (Shang & Yang, 2015), there are five types of 
O2O business model: 
1. Commerce O2O: The model in which retail companies create a method of 
spending so that customers can buy products online. 
2. Try on O2O: The model in which an E-Commerce company builds a physical 
channel for customers to try the product they want to buy. Customer will 
place an order online and come to one of the channels to try. 
3. Promotional O2O: The model in which companies conduct online promotions 
for online users to come to offline stores. 
4. Experience O2O: The model in which the company provides information 
about the products in the offline store. 
5. Crowdsourcing O2O: a model in which an E-Commerce company builds a 
website or application that gathers sellers or shopkeepers and customers to 
transact through the website. 
According to (Weng & Zhang, 2015), there are five important networks that 
must be considered in making business model: 
1. Physical Network 
Physical network is a network where customers can conduct transactions. 
There are two forms of physical network that is physical store and online 
platform. Physical store: physical store is a real store where customers can 
take goods or receive physical services from the store. Physical stores must 
be equipped with tools that support online activities such as spending, adver-
tising or advertising, and payments. An example is the Paradise Dynasty res-
taurant which is equipped with promotional tools featuring QR code that can 
be scanned by the customer and tent card on his desk. 
Online Platform: Online Platform is a place that can be accessed by customer 
to do goods search and purchase transaction. All activities related to the 
search for goods, information dissemination, digital advertising, purchases, 
and payments. An example is the Website Lazada.com which offers a wide 
range of products online where customers live to access his website to start 
shopping. 
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2. Service Network 
A service network is a network system used on the physical network and a 
mobile network that allows both networks to perform the process. Service 
networks allow companies to transmit information, communicate with users, 
serve customers and respond to complaints and questions. Service Network 
also allows companies to perform service processes such as order acceptance, 
discount service, agreement making, information dissemination and so forth. 
Development service network can be integrated with the use of social media 
that is widely used by customers such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and 
other social media 
3. Logistics Network 
Logistic network is a network that allows companies to deliver products and 
information to the customer. The construction of the logistics network for 
O2O will vary according to user demand requirements. Its development must 
be integrated with the Internet, logistics network, service network, and mar-
keting network. The construction of this logistics network should support the 
process carried out in the service network and integration of data from each 
product to the addition and reduction of the product amount so that customers 
can feel the advantages and ease in the search of the product. 
In the O2O model, the core of the Logistics Network is Virtual Warehouse. 
The virtual warehouse is a concept where the amount of inventory is moni-
tored significantly based on data exchange with the help of information sys-
tems. By using the Virtual Warehouse, the company can sync inventory on 
the O2O platform, so that transaction fulfillment can be made to stores in dif-
ferent areas. The development of logistics networks will ultimately provide 
benefits in the areas of efficiency, cost, and consumer experience. 
4. Data Network 
Data network is a network that made the company so that companies can get 
data that can be used to perform analysis and calculations in the system. All 
data types from customer orders to brands, from brands to raw materials, 
from raw materials to other relationships using data to enter into an industry 
chain, so that data collection is very important to do. Data network on O2O 
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model collects data from user where the process to collect data is data collec-
tion, data preparation, data conversion, data extraction, data mining, using 
data which then used to analyze characteristic of group user, then analyze 
personal characteristic and preference to get Valuable knowledge for the 
company. 
The collected user data is data on age, gender, residence, personal data of us-
ers, and user habits to spend money to shop. These data are then analyzed to 
determine the preferences of a group of users and users individually to be 
able to do the right marketing and effective. With the mobile internet 
equipped with location based service, then the data about the user address 
can be collected more easily. In addition, to make the user willing to share in-
formation about himself then the company should encourage the user to share 
the information. One way that is used is to provide marketing incentives. The 
form of marketing incentive is various, can be a voucher, promotion, event, 
various other promotional activities. 
Once the data about the user address is collected, then the company can ana-
lyze the specific character of a group which then becomes the basis for mak-
ing the decision to conduct marketing activities. 
5. Mobile Networks 
Mobile network is a network that is used so that users can access and perform 
the shopping process anywhere and anytime. Seeing that in the present day 
the use of internet through smartphone has become a trend that has become 
the habit of almost all people by using mobile network internet or Wifi is 
available free of charge in various locations, the mobile network is a must to 
have an e-commerce company to be able to compete with other companies.  
Mobile networks must be able to perform all services provided through the 
physical network. Mobile networks must be able anytime and anywhere to 
provide services such as order receipt, information dissemination, member-
ship handling, and other services available in the company. Mobile networks 
also allow customers to make payments online and cashless so there is no 
money exchange in the form of cash. 
To build a mobile network, companies must be able to create a system that 
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can transmit information from a user's mobile phone, disseminating infor-
mation through network service, logistic network, and integrated network da-
ta over the internet. Mobile network should be able to use the advantages of 
LBS (Location Based Services). Location Based Service is a general term 
used to describe the technology used to locate the device the user is using. 
Use of this technology will facilitate the company in running its service and 
logistics company. 
In addition to the system must also note the level of data security and security 
systems that make the company can maintain the confidentiality of user data. 
The company's mobile network must be able to keep the data provided by the 
user confidential and privacy. In the end, a mobile network will have all the 
functions that exist in the physical network, but its use will be more common 
as well as mobile network will optimize location based service. One form of 
this mobile network is the mobile application. 
Research Methods 
The framework analysis will be using by the study from O2O business model 
(Weng & Zhang, 2015). The result of this result says that in developing an O2O 
business model, there are 5 networks that we need to take attention to. Those 5 Net-
works are physical network; service network; logistics network; data network; and 
mobile network. There is still limitation from this framework analysis, the O2O 
business model only evaluate from infrastructure that already prepared by organiza-
tion. So, this analysis only evaluate the readiness of organization in implement this 
O2O business model. This research will evaluate whether the design made by 
Klikmall has the suitable networks in it. 
1. Physical Network. The analysis carried out on the physical network is the 
analysis of the platform used and the hardware used to connect the business 
processes of offline and online business model drafted by the company. 
2. Service Network. Analysis of service network is done by analyzing the media 
used in O2O model which has been designed by company to support the ac-
tivity done in physical network. The service network should be able to facili-
tate the company's operational activities such as handling complaints and 
providing assistance. 
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3. Logistics Network. Analysis of logistics network is done by analyzing how 
the company perform its activities is how companies deliver products and in-
formation about the products from the company to the customer. In addition, 
the analysis is also conducted on how the company manage the synchroniza-
tion of inventory data in offline stores with existing data in the company sys-
tem so that customers can get the best service and the company can improve 
efficiency and reduce costs. 
4. Data Network. The analysis of network data is done by analyzing how the 
company design can collect information and how the company system can 
analyze data and do the right marketing with the target. In addition, the anal-
ysis is carried out on the methods used by the company to encourage custom-
ers to be willing to provide information to the company through the platform. 
5. Mobile Platform. The analysis of the mobile platform is done by analyzing 
how the function of the mobile platform that has been designed by the com-
pany can perform the same function with the physical platform and how the 
mobile platform can assist in dissemination of information that optimize lo-
cation based services. Location Based Service can facilitate the company to 
provide information to customers and facilitate corporate promotions. 
Research Findings 
The model used by the company Klikmall.com is a Crowd sourcing model O2O 
where Klikmall.com collects merchants to open an online store on its website. 
Klikmall is using 2 ways to deliver the product to customer. There is a delivery 
method which is the same as the other online store and another method called pick up 
in store which is the basics of O2O. The result of this analysis is shown below: 
1. Physical Network 
To make O2O model, Klikmall uses 2 types of physical network. They are 
online platform and offline platform. The online platform used by Klikmall is 
a virtual 3D Platform that can be accessed by using a web browser, going to 
www.klikmall.com. This platform is used as the place where the transaction 
take place. The offline platform used is the physical store that the merchants 
have. The use of this store is to let customer pick up the products they buy. 
The online platform can be accessed by using a computer or mobile phone 
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that has a web browser. 
2. Service Network 
The service network allows users to communicate with each other or do 
transmit information. Klikmall used an application called Zopim to enable 
users to communicate each other. Also, Klikmall has prepared an information 
center in the online platform for users who have problems using the platform. 
Klikmall also uses social media to connect with its users. The social media 
used by Klikmall are Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram 
3. Logistics Network 
The logistics network is used to enable products to be transferred to customer 
and the information of this product to be seen by customer. For logistics pur-
poses Klikmall has create an arrangement with JNE to connect its counting 
system and deliver the product. This is only used when customer has chosen 
to use delivery method. For pick up in stores, the customer must come to the 
store that they have chosen as the pickup place. The address of the stores is 
shown in the platform, so the customer can just choose where to take their 
products. The process is as seen on Figure 2 and Figure 3. 
4. Data Network 
Data network is used to collect data to be used in decision making for mar-
keting campaign. Data first collected when customer sign up into the plat-
form. The data taken is name and email address. The data about the traffic is 
collected by using UTM system in Google analytics. UTM system records 
every time a link is clicked and user get in to the store. Google analytics then 
will show the recap of the records for klikmall to use. 
5. Mobile Network 
The mobile network allows user to access the platform by using mobile de-
vices. There are 2 ways to access platform by mobile devices. They are web 
based platform, the same as the online platform, and an application. The ap-
plication needs to be downloaded first and it has a feature of QR code scan-
ning. 
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Figure 2. Delivery Proses 
Source: Author 
 
 
Figure 3 Pickup in Store Process  
Source: Author 
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Conclusions 
The conclusion of this research is that the O2O model design made by Klikmall 
is suitable to be launched for these reasons, like the physical networks supports the 
transactions to be done; the service networks supports information from user or 
Klikmall to be transmitted and allows users to communicate; logistics network al-
lows products and information about the products to be accessed by customer; data 
network allows Klikmall to record the traffic data; mobile network allows user to get 
into Klikmall platform anywhere and anytime even though it is not taking advantage 
of its Location based services. In developing a mobile network, Klikmall should take 
advantage of location based services as it makes promotion and information trans-
mission easier and more accurate. 
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Abstract 
Since 2010 there are a downward trend for emerging market economies 
(EMEs) growth which has been driven by structural factors such as diminishing 
capital accumulation and productivity gains and waning global trade integra-
tion. Global credit aggregates explains part of the cyclical movement in output 
for most EMEs which raise the growth of EMEs and make strong capital inflow 
that can boost economic activity in EMEs. Therefore, the main objective of this 
research is to find out the factors affecting financial cycle that is approached by 
variables stock market capitalization to GDP. This research used a panel data 
that consist of 15 annual data from 2000-2014 and 8 cross section such as In-
donesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippine, India, South Korea, and 
China which is taken from World Development Indicators (WDI) and Global 
Financial Development Database (GFDD). The variable which is used as de-
pendent variables is stock market capitalization to GDP. Meanwhile, another 
variables which is used as independent variables comprised bank net interest 
margin, foreign direct investment, net inflow, stock market return, bank cost to 
income ratio, real interest rate, and inflation as GDP deflator. The method used 
to answer the research‘s objective is panel regression with fixed effect model 
(FEM) modified seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). The empirical result 
showed that foreign direct investment net inflow, stock market return has a sig-
nificant effect positively, while bank net interest margin, bank cost to income 
ratio, real interest rate, and inflation has a significant effect negatively. Thus, 
the increasing of foreign direct investment, stock market return and controlling 
bank net interest margin, bank cost to income ratio, real interest rate, and in-
flation can become the solution to maintain financial cycle (stock market capi-
talization to GDP) on the determined and future year. 
Keyword: Financial Cycle, Emerging Market Economies, Fixed Effect Model  
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1. Introduction 
Emerging market economies (EMEs) generally do not have the same level of 
market efficiency like advanced economies, but emerging market do typically have a 
physical financial infrastructure, including banks, a stock exchange, and a unified 
currency. However, since 2010 there are a downward trend for EMEs growth which 
has been driven by structural factors such as diminishing capital accumulation and 
productivity gains and waning global trade integration (European Central Bank, 
2016). In addition, external factor also give an impact for a slowdown of EMEs 
growth comprises global trade dynamics, the global financing environment, and 
commodity market fluctuation. 
European Central Bank (ECB) finds that financial cycle information as captured 
by the behavior or domestic and global credit aggregates explains part of the cyclical 
movement in output for most EMEs which raise the growth of EMEs and make 
strong capital inflow also helped to boost economic activity in EMEs countries. Ger-
hard Runstler (2016) showed that if the properties of financial cycles are sufficiently 
different from those of regular business cycles, then monetary and fiscal policy are 
imperfect instruments for addressing them and the case for macro-prudential policy 
as a separate third stabilization policy is strengthened. 
Peter Praet (2016) in a panel on International Monetary Policy also indicated that 
a natural tendency and capacity of financial intermediaries to transfer this expected 
increase in future income is a factors which closely correlated with financial cycles. 
Moreover, Global financial cycles are associated with surges and retrenchments in 
capital flow, boom and bust in asset prices and crisis (Helena Rey, 2015). 
There are several considerations to weaken the potency of the global financial 
cycle such as act on one of the sources of the financial cycle, act on the transmission 
channel cyclically, act on transmission channel structurally and impose targeted capi-
tal control. Adrian Blundell (2015) showed that economic theory predicts that capital 
control have significant negative effects: they reduce the supply of capital; raise the 
cost of financing; increase financial constraints for domestic firms that do not have 
direct access to international capital market; reduce the discipline of markets on deci-
sion making; increase the risk of corruption; lead to costly effects of avoidance and 
enforcement; and reduce property rights so that approvals for long-term investors. 
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Based on those problems, the main purpose of this research paper is to find out 
the factors affecting global financial cycle which is approached with variables of 
stock market capitalization to GDP. Meanwhile, another variables which is used as 
independent variables comprised bank net interest margin, foreign direct investment, 
net inflow, stock market return, bank cost to income ratio, real interest rate, and in-
flation as GDP deflator. 
2. Theory and Literature Review 
Stock market capitalization to GDP ratio is used to determine whether an overall 
market is undervalued or overvalued. If the ratio around 50%, it indicates that the 
market is undervalued, while the ratio greater than 100%, it indicates the market is 
overvalued. Overvalued and undervalued as the classification of condition from stock 
market capitalization to GDP. Overvalued or undervalued stock has a current price 
that is not justified by its earnings outlook or price/earnings ratio, so it is expected to 
drop in price. Thus, the fluctuation of those price can describe a financial cycles. 
Based on Stijn et al (2011), financial cycles closely follows that of business cycles 
that divided by recovery phase and contraction phase. The main characteristic of fi-
nancial cycle are duration, amplitude, and slope. 
The structure of market economic in emerging market has a resistance during the 
global financial crisis. Based on Kose and Prasad (2010), characteristic of EMEs 
tend to have less dependence on foreign finance currency-denominated external debt. 
The majority of emerging markets have become a lot less reliant on foreign finance, 
particularly external debt. EMEs also has a large buffer of foreign exchange reserves, 
following the Asia financial crisis of 1997-1998, emerging markets around the world 
have built up large buffers of foreign exchange reserves, partly as a result of export-
oriented growth strategies and self-insurance against crises. 
In particular, commodity-exporting countries have been shielded to some extent 
from the slowdowns in the advanced economies by strong growth in EMEs. In addi-
tion, emerging markets have become more diversified in their production and export 
patterns, such diversification offers limited protection against large global shock. 
Broader divergence of EME business cycle from those of the advanced economies. 
This has happened on account of the factors noted above, along with greater intra-
group trade and financial linkages. Emerging market economies also has more stable 
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macroeconomic policies, including flexible exchange rates. In another side, rising per 
capita income levels and a burgeoning middle class have increased the size and ab-
sorptive capacity of domestic markets. From those reason, the stability condition in 
emerging market economies will impact the behavior of cycle business in Asia Pacif-
ic region that extend enterprises to diversify their asset. 
Panel data is a combination between time series and cross section data. Based on 
Gujarati (2014), using a panel data bring a several benefit such as cope heterogeneity 
problem explicitly, give a huge information and variation, give an appropriate infor-
mation of changing dynamic, measure and detect an impact that can‟t be covered by 
cross section or time series, give a simple understanding of complexity model, and 
minimize a bias from individual aggregation. 
The general form of panel regression according Baltagi (2013): 
yit = a + X‟itP + Uit 
where I denote a cross section and t denote a time series, a is a scalar, p is a matrix K 
x and Xit is an observation of it from K as explanatory variables, yit is dependent 
variables for individual i and time series t. 
The research by Stijn Claessen et al (2011) entitled Financial Cycles: What? 
How? When? has an objective to provide a comprehensive empirical overview of 
financial cycles. The method is using classical methodology that conclude financial 
cycles tend to be long and severe, especially those in housing and equity markets, 
they are highly synchronized within countries, particularly credit and house price cy-
cles, and financial cycles accentuate each other and become magnified, especially 
during coincident downturns in credit and housing markets. Another research by 
Adrian Blundell-Wignal and Caroline Roulet (2014) entitled Capital Controls on 
Inflows, The Global Financial Crisis and Economic Growth: Evidence for 
Emerging Economies has the purpose to further investigate the issue of whether 
countries that had such controls on inflow in place prior to the crisis were indeed less 
vulnerable during the GFC, and also to examine the more general question of wheth-
er capital controls have an adverse effect on economic growth over the entire eco-
nomic cycle. The method used probit model approach, the alternative is using panel 
regression. The result showed that study on controls on capital inflows in emerging 
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economies, using a probit regression are replicated and tested for stability. Moreover, 
capital restriction on inflows to emerging markets are strong and upward pressure on 
managed exchange rates and reserves accumulation is greatest. 
3. Methodology 
The data is obtained from World Bank website, World Development Indicator 
(WDI) and Global Financial Development Database (GFDD). The period of data 
from 2000 – 2014 including 8 emerging market economies (EMEs) countries such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Philippine, India, South Korea, and China. 
The data that is used in this research are stock market capitalization to GDP as de-
pendent variable, bank net interest margin, foreign direct investment, net inflow, 
stock market return, bank cost to income ratio, real interest rate, and inflation as in-
dependent variables. The following details of the explanation of each variable: 
 
Table 1 Sources of Data Summary 
No. Data Unit Sources 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
1 Stock Market Capitalization to GDP % GFDD 
2 Bank Net Interest Margin % GFDD 
3 Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflow % WDI 
4 Stock Market Return % GFDD 
5 Bank Cost to Income Ratio % GFDD 
6 Real Interest Rate % WDI 
7 Inflation, GDP Deflator % WDI 
 
4. Result and Model Specification 
4.1 Descriptive Analysis 
Descriptive analysis is used to describe the center measurement such as mean, 
median, modus and dispersion measurement such as standard deviation and variance. 
Below, the table of descriptive analysis: 
September 6, 2017  Nusa Dua, Bali 
KPPU | Proceeding International Seminar on Competition Policy and Law 
138 
 
 
Source: World Bank (edited) 
 
During 2000-2014, almost EMEs countries have a fluctuate movement of stock 
market capitalization to GDP. Singapore and Malaysia always has value greater than 
100, it indicates that market in those country is overvalued. Overvaluation may result 
an emotional buying spurt, which inflates the stock‟s market price. As theoretical, it 
also indicates that the market is perfectly efficient which also ideal for investor. 
Meanwhile, another countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, Philippine, India, South 
Korea, and China have an undervalued market averagely. It indicates that those 
countries is still depend in traditionally economic activities, but from 2000-2014 
those countries has an upward trend and has a potential market. Stock market capital-
ization to GDP can show the condition of financial cycle in those countries. 
 
4.2 Inference Analysis 
The best model to estimate these parameters is using fixed effect model. There 
are a several test to get the best model, chow test is conducted to select the best mod-
el between common effect model and fixed effect model. The decision is reject H0 
which proved by p-value under 0.05 and conclude that fixed effect model is the best 
model rudimentary. The next step is continuing with Hausman test to select the best 
model between fixed effect model and random effect model, the decision is generat-
ing p-value under 0.05, it concludes that fixed effect is the best model. The adjusted 
model around 0.9908, it means 99.08% of the variance of dependent variable can be 
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explained by independent variables. If we investigate in simultaneous test (F-test), 
we found that F-statistic around 991.52 with p-value 0.00. It indicates all independ-
ent variables affect the dependent variables simultaneously. Finally, the result shows: 
Table 2 Estimation Financial Stability Model 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Stat Prob. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
NIM -2.82 0.46 -6.17 0.000 
INFLOW 1.95 0.33 5.88 0.000 
STOCKRETURN 0.14 0.03 4.009 0.000 
COST INCOME -0.39 0.05 -6.56 0.000 
INTEREST -5.17 0.37 -13.61 0.000 
INFLATION -4.67 0.38 -12.09 0.000 
C 138.34 4.58 30.23 0.000 
Adj R2 0.990843 
F-stat 991.5236 
Prob 0.000 
 
Bank net interest margin (NIM) has a negative relationship with stock market 
capitalization to GDP and significant in alpha 5%. Statistically, the output showed 
that increasing 1% of bank net interest margin will decrease stock market capitaliza-
tion to GDP around 2.82%. It indicated that the higher bank net interest margin is as-
sociated with higher operating expense which reduce a possibility to invest in stock. 
Therefore, it disrupt a transaction of stock. 
Foreign direct investment net inflow (INFLOW) affect stock market capitaliza-
tion to GDP significantly in 5%. The increasing of net inflow will give a positive im-
pact to stock market capitalization to GDP due to increasing funding flow in domes-
tic region that stimulate investor to invest their money either in real sector or mone-
tary sector. Thus, increasing 1% of foreign direct investment net inflow will increase 
1.95% of stock market capitalization to GDP. 
Stock market return (STOCKRETURN) described a profitability which is gained 
from stock market transaction. Consecutively, increasing a stock market return will 
increase stock market capitalization to GDP due to enhancement of capital formation 
in their financial cycle. Therefore, the model explained that increasing 1% of stock 
market return will increase 0.14% of stock market capitalization to GDP. 
Bank cost to income ratio (COST_INCOME) showed a ratio between bank reve-
nue and bank expenditure. The higher bank cost to income ratio adduce an ineffi-
ciency of banking management. Moreover, it also increasing a likelihood a bankrupt 
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due to ineffective of investment. Thus, the model elucidate increasing 1% of bank 
cost to income ratio will decrease stock market capitalization to GDP around 0.39%. 
Real interest rate (INTEREST) has a negative relation to stock market capitaliza-
tion to GDP. According to the model, increasing 1% of real interest rate will de-
crease 5.17% of stock market capitalization to GDP. It showed that real interest rate 
give the biggest impact for stock market capitalization to GDP rather than another 
variable. The increasing of real interest rate will push an investor to deposit their 
money in banking sector that decrease investment either in real sector or monetary 
sector. Thus, the low and stable interest rate will keep stock market capitalization to 
GDP enthusiastic. 
Inflation (INFLATION) has a negative relation to stock market capitalization to 
GDP. The model explained that increasing 1% of inflation will decrease 4.67% of 
stock market capitalization to GDP. It indicated that increasing of inflation will re-
duce the purchasing power of people and make people reluctant to invest their mon-
ey. Thus, it will bring an impact to stock market capitalization to GDP negatively 
due to people tend to use their money. 
 
Individual Effects 
 
Table 3 Individual Effects 
No Country Effect 
(1) (2) (3) 
1 Indonesia -6.915 
2 Malaysia 37.800 
3 Singapore 74.277 
4 Thailand -22.953 
5 Philippine -16.495 
6 India 0.014 
7 South Korea -16.531 
8 China -49.196 
 
Individual effect can be interpreted as a value of dependent variables in model 
when all independent variables are constant. According table 3, when all independent 
variables are constant, stock market capitalization to GDP Singapore is the highest 
than another country, while China is the lowest one. 
Singapore‟s statistical modeling has an intercept around 212.617. It indicates that 
economic activity of Singapore has a high dependency in stock traded. Singapore al-
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so well known as a country which rely service sector especially banking and finan-
cial traded. Therefore, when bank net interest margin, foreign direct investment net 
inflow, stock market return, bank cost to income ratio, real interest rate, and inflation 
are constant, stock market capitalization to GDP of Singapore is the highest one and 
become the most competitive country of financial cycle in EMEs. 
In statistical modeling of China, the intercept is 89.144. This intercept is the low-
est than another country. It indicates when bank net interest margin, foreign direct 
investment net inflow, stock market return, bank cost to income ratio, real interest 
rate, and inflation are constant, stock market capitalization to GDP of Singapore is 
the highest one and become the less competitive country of financial cycle in EMEs. 
It shows that economic of China is still depend on real sector, while in finance sector 
China still have a several problem that must be constructed. Another country such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippine, India, and South Korea also have an inter-
cept near Singapore and still have a potency to develop their financial sector. 
 
5. Conclusion 
According to the result, foreign direct investment net inflow, stock market return 
has a significant effect positively. Meanwhile, bank net interest margin, bank cost to 
income ratio, real interest rate, and inflation has a significant effect negatively. The 
result indicated that emerging economies countries should apply tight monetary poli-
cy to keep real interest stable and control the movement of inflation. Moreover, in 
banking sector, management should arrange an efficiency from revenue and expendi-
ture. In fiscal policy, stabilization of political and security is the most priority to in-
vite foreign investor to invest their money. In addition, to keep high of stock market 
capitalization to GDP, government should facilitate stock transaction effectively to 
encourage stock market return. 
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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to understand the development of supplier perfor-
mance in domestic packaged processed food supply chain which is influenced 
by regulations, competition and buyer power of retailers. The paper presents 
the results of a survey of suppliers of the package processed food of micro up to 
large scale enterprises. The findings of the research result indicate the hetero-
geneity of the performance of the package processed food suppliers in modern 
retail supply chains. How suppliers are faced with regulation, competition and 
buyer power in modern retail supply chains, but on the other hand suppliers 
tend to be influenced by the way suppliers deal with modern retailers. it may be 
indicated that some suppliers benefit from the presence of modern retailers, but 
they face some of the challenges posed that cause some terms of relationships 
to be unfair, unilateral price fixing, and poor supervision so that the develop-
ment and growth of supplier performance are subject to limitations. The further 
research is needed to refine the results of this initial study. 
 
Keywords: Supplier performance, Modern Retail Supply Chains, Regulation, 
Competition, Buyer power. 
 
Introduction 
The trade sector including the retail industry is an important and noteworthy in-
dustrial sector, especially in its contribution to the Indonesian economy. Various 
types of modern retail formats do business activities in Indonesia, but generally 
found three types, namely minimarket, supermarket and hypermarket. Retail sector 
has a large enough position and opportunity to develop from year to year. Modern re-
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tail growth annually records a range of 10% to 30%. This is indicated by the expan-
sion of modern retail to the rural areas as well as entering the residential areas of the 
people (Pandin 2009). 
Berasategi (2013) concluded that in anticipating unfair trade practice, the para-
digm of thinking of competition authorities in advanced and developing nations is 
growing from the conventional, to evolution and to modern paradigm of thinking. 
Conventional paradigm of thinking puts forward observations about sellers‟ power 
that includes inter-brand competition and intra-brand competition (Moraga, 2013). 
Under such conventional paradigm, modern retailer having the strong buyer power 
could not only get lower buying price but also determine a lower selling price (Chen, 
2008). At the evolution paradigm, modern retailers expand market share and market 
concentration, resulting in an increase in buyer power that would bring about 
unbalanced in bargaining power in supply chain (Stichele and Young, 2009). Modern 
paradigm stated that the platform of modern retailer is place having constraint and 
potential to bring about unfair competition (competitive bottlenecks) and have two-
sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2005). 
An increase in the buyer power of modern retailers results in transfer of risks and 
reducing the competition among suppliers and would influence consumers through 
reduction of innovation, long term losses, choices, and higher prices. The effects are 
often neglected, that affects sustainability of consumption and production (Nicholson 
and Young, 2012). The majority of modern retailers, in a bid to slow rising bargain-
ing power of their suppliers, first increase their market share and market power of 
downstream. Control of market and dominant position could be used as an effective 
instrument in negotiating terms with suppliers in upstream market by setting more 
favorable conditions such as price discount by modern retailers (Roller, 2004).  
Competition among modern retailers and their suppliers in Indonesia is very tight 
with the fast growing number of outlets of modern retailers and their suppliers, fol-
lowing the liberalization in the regulation on retail industry. Tight competition has 
led to concentration and strengthening of bargaining position, growing buyer power 
of modern retailers that result in the emergence of anti-competition move and caused 
an unbalanced condition in the supplier-modern retailer relationship that hurts the 
suppliers (Muslimin and Nuryati, 2007; Pandin, 2009). 
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Although the government has sought to prevent such malpractice by issuing a se-
ries of regulations and policies including Presidential Regulation (Perpres) 112/2007, 
Trade minister regulation (Permendag) no.53/2008, Law no.5/1999, Law no.8/1999, 
unfair competition continues. In 2005, modern retailer Carrefour introduced business 
relations which was not fair to its suppliers and in 2009, Carrefour increased market 
concentration and exploited the surplus in its suppliers, resulting in condition of be-
ing unbalanced and negative impact on competition. Competition authorities in Indo-
nesia (KPPU), based on the competition policy of the Law /5/1999 have punished 
and fined modern retailer Carrefour on the two competition offences (KPPU 2009). 
The condition of being unbalanced in the supplier-modern retailer relationships 
concerned complex factors, but what is worth research is how far the regulation, 
competition, bargaining power and buyer power could determine partnership or rela-
tionships between suppliers and modern retailers in supply chain of modern retailers 
and how much the impact on the performance of the suppliers. Therefore, this re-
search is aimed: (1) Examining empirically the impact of regulations on competition 
and suppliers-modern retailers relationship, competition on suppliers-modern retail-
ers relationship, buyer power on suppliers-modern retailers relationship, suppliers-
modern retailers relationship on the performance of suppliers; (2) Developing buyer-
seller relationships models based on the theory of relationship marketing within the 
scope of the content and implementation of regulation; (3) Improved regulation Per-
pres 112/2007, Permendag 53/2008 and competition policy UU/5/1999 amendments. 
 
Review of Literature 
Regulations: A number of researchers have identified the main characteristics of 
regulation. Baldwin and Cave (1998) in Amod (2009) stated that regulation is: (1) 
Imposition of rules by the government with mechanism in control and its upholding, 
normally applied through public agency; (2) Regulation is a direct intervention in 
economy and the intervention could be in any forms; (3) Regulation is all mecha-
nisms of social control, consisting of all mechanisms of social control and have im-
pact on all aspects of characteristics of sources intentionally or unintentionally.  
In addition, Stigler (2003) stated that regulation is an act of the pressure group 
and produces law and policy supporting the business sector and protecting consum-
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ers, workers and the environment. Udayasankar et al. (2009) stated that regulation is 
a mandate, designed to protect shareholders or investors. Regulation could also be 
interpreted as a restriction on efficiency in business. Mayasari et al. (2011) stated 
that the main objective of deregulation is to increase and improve industrial competi-
tiveness and efficiency, and reduce the price without sacrificing quality. Nugroho 
(2012) stated that regulation is issued by the government to serve the public, to con-
trol market competition, prevent monopoly which could endanger the country‟s 
economy.  
Soekanto (1985) stated that effectiveness of regulation or law is reflected by the 
condition having been created and how far the target has been reached. From the 
point of views of culture, or law, a regulation is effective if implementation of the 
regulation is backed up by commitment, no conflict of interest, understanding of all 
concern, consistency, professional integrity or honesty, without discrimination 
(Sosiawan, 2011). Maloni and Benton (1999) stated that regulation would have 
impact on relationships between suppliers and buyers that could seen in the 
transactions they made. 
 
Competition: Porter (1980, 1985) in Hunt (2001) stated that competition is a contin-
ued attempt by corporations to grab comparative advantage in resources that will 
give leading position in market competition and most important to have a super fi-
nancial performance. Udayasankar et al. (2009) stated that competition is a mecha-
nism of market operation that allows a company to operate naturally and has a ten-
dency, if competition is tighter creating greater market efficiency. Competition is a 
match between companies in selling goods and service they produce (KPPU, 2009).  
Competitive market structure can be divided into four categories that include 
perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic competition and oligopoly. In markets 
characterized by perfect competition, there are many firms, each of which small rela-
tive to the entire market. A monopoly is a firm that is the sole producer of a certain 
type of goods or services in the relevant market. In a market characterized by mo-
nopolistic competition, there are many firms and consumers, just as in perfect com-
petition. In an oligopolistic market, a few large firms tend to dominate the market. 
Concentration ratio measure how much of the total output in an industry is produced 
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by the largest firms in that industry. The most common concentration ratio is the 
four-firm concentration ratio. Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is the sum of the 
squared market shares of firms in a given industry, multiplied by 10,000 (Baye, 
2009).  
The model of Porter‟s five forces explained that structure of an industry deter-
mines the characteristics of competition between companies, bargaining power of 
suppliers, bargaining power of buyers, threat of new entrants, threat of substitute 
products or services and competition among existing firms, and would make industry 
more attractive and potential to gain profit. Therefore, competition in an industry will 
depend on the five basic forces of competition (Porter, 2004). In competition, 
suppliers could have weak or strong bargaining power, which will have its impact on 
the terms and conditions of transactions made. Transactions between suppliers and 
buyers will create value for both sides. However, if the buyers have better bargaining 
power, the possibility of suppliers to earn a higher proportion of value would be 
smaller and the profit would be lower. The bargaining power of buyers would deter-
mine the amount of profit earned by suppliers. The bargaining power of buyers is one 
of five forces that determine the intensity of competition in industry (Porter, 2004 ; 
Ehmke et al., 2009).  
 
Buyer Power: Specifically a number of researchers describe the buyer power as a 
bargaining power or a countervailing power. But a number of other researchers de-
fine buyer power as a strength of demand for lower price that: (1) The buyer power is 
wider than the strength of monopsony; (2) The buyer power is more than just the 
ability to cut prices (Chen, 2008). Dodd and Asfaha (2008) cited a number of defini-
tions of buyer power from three researchers: (1) There will be buyer power when a 
company has dominant position as a buyer of goods or services or because the com-
pany has a strategic advantage and leverage because of its economic scale or other 
factors, that it would have more favorable conditions of trade transaction with sup-
pliers than other buyers from suppliers (OECD, 2008); (2) There is buyer power 
when a company or group of companies have more favorable conditions of trade 
transactions with suppliers than other buyers or are given lower prices or more favor-
able non price conditions than under normal competition (Dobson et al., 2001); (3) 
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Buyer power is a bargaining power of buyers, facing suppliers in business negotia-
tion. With economic scale and the significance of purchases, the buyers have the 
ability to change alternative suppliers (Dodd and Asfaha 2008)  
Buyer power is the ability of buyers to cut selling prices of suppliers to below the 
normal price level that the buyers would earn larger profit or the ability of buyers to 
demand more favorable trade terms. Normal selling prices are prices that give maxi-
mum profit for suppliers under a situation when buyers have no power. Under perfect 
competition market structure among suppliers, the normal selling price of suppliers is 
a competitive price and buyer power is a monopsony power. Under an imperfect 
competition market structure among suppliers, the normal selling price is above the 
competitive price and buyer power is a countervailing power (Chen, 2008).  
Buyers will have the biggest power when making big purchases. If suppliers sell 
to large scale buyers, the buyer will have a greater leverage to force suppliers to low-
er the price and give more favorable conditions for the buyers as the suppliers do not 
want to lose potential buyers. Buyers also have certain level of power facing suppli-
ers, but the bargaining power is not always the same. They are not the same in sensi-
tivity to prices, quality and services. The presence of powerful buyers would reduce 
the potential profit for suppliers. By demanding price cut, negotiating improvement 
of quality, increasing the services and arranging suppliers, the buyers would be able 
to increase their market competition and reduce the profit of industry (Porter, 2004). 
 
Buyer-Supllier Relationships: Relationship marketing is a concept that includes in-
teraction between buyers and sellers at a point where relationships or partnership is 
developed to provide room for future business deals. The goal of marketing relation-
ship marketing is to expand and serve the consumers through partnership or relation-
ships between suppliers and buyers. Buyer-seller relationships is mutually beneficial 
relationships or partnership. It would expand through exchange of mutual benefit. In 
order that the relationships could last, harmony, interaction, lasting period of ex-
change would be needed. Relationships is developed with interactions in a certain pe-
riod. Relationships between two units (units could be organizations, persons, com-
munities even states), each unit has a role to play and expected norms of characteris-
tics (Walz, 2009).  
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The main definition of buyer-seller relationships is that there is at least an eco-
nomic interaction. Further interactions are expected to take place. The parties in-
volved must know the identities of each other, they must be convinced that there are 
relationships, interdependence. Definitions of relationships is that parties must share 
information, must trust each other, must be convinced that there is relationships, at 
least there is one economic interaction, parties must know the identities of each other 
(Walz, 2009).  
There are a number of main factors determining relationships between suppliers 
and modern retailers to be integrated. They are commitment, conflict, conflict resolu-
tion, cooperation, trust (Maloni and Benton, 1999). Business needs other companies 
as partners, to share cost, risks, increase core competence and speed to reach the 
market (Reagan, 2002). The minimum degree of cooperation needed in relationships 
and closer cooperation reflects the degree of trust and mutual help. Relationships be-
tween suppliers and buyers is relationships between two or more companies, cooper-
ating and involved in information sharing, harmonization of decisions and incentives 
aimed at achieving super performance (Simatupang and Sridharan, 2005).  
 
Performance: From the point of view of suppliers, performance depends on ele-
ments of inter-relationships that is to expand closer trade cooperation to direct sup-
pliers to boost business by focusing on management category decision related to con-
sumer value, better understanding of the role of trade promotion, controlling man-
agement technology aspect effectively, seeking to understand concrete cost of supply 
chain and efficiently managing it, in line with respective targets of modern retailers 
(Hamister, 2007). 
The performance of suppliers is determined by a number of complex factors. In 
connection with the aspect of performance of suppliers, performance of suppliers 
constitutes results of the impact of factors, that is relationships between suppliers and 
buyers, asymmetric powers of two parties and intensity of competition (Chuah et al., 
2010). Business relationships between suppliers and modern retailers concerns trans-
action costs. Based on the relation contracting theory, an effective contract could 
strengthen relationships between suppliers and buyers and create stronger competi-
tiveness of buyers. If the competitiveness is applied to management of suppliers, it 
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would increase the value of supply chain that will contribute to the better perfor-
mance of suppliers (Chuah et al., 2010).  
Power is defined as a function, the opposite of relative dependence between buy-
ers and suppliers. Power could and could not be mediated. Power asymmetry would 
result in variation in performance. Under a condition of power asymmetry, buyers 
would tend to maintain exploitation or integration (Maloni and Benton, 1999). Rela-
tionships between buyers and suppliers do not always without conflict. It is often that 
conflict would hurt the suppliers. Imbalance in power between modern retailers and 
suppliers would force both sides to maintain and rely on their respective powers. The 
power of mediation relationships tends to be bad for buyers and on the other hand the 
power that hurt suppliers does not always come to surface. Suppliers would look for 
ways of bringing balance to the asymmetric power (Maloni and Benton, 1999).  
 
Conceptual Framework: Those theories and concepts and earlier research if com-
bined are expected to support and provide a comprehensive study on models of com-
bination of influence of regulations, competition and buyer power over relationships 
between suppliers and modern retailers and their influence on the performance of 
suppliers.  
 
Hypothesis of Research: The hypothesis being presented is as follows: H1: Regula-
tion has its influence on competition; H2: Regulation has its influence on relation-
ships between suppliers and modern retailers; H3: Competition has its influence on 
relationships between suppliers and modern retailers; H4: Buyer power has its influ-
ence on relationships between suppliers and modern retailers; H5: Relationships be-
tween suppliers and modern retailers has its influence on the performance of 
suppliers. The Figure 1 below shows the conceptual framework of research. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework of Research  
 
Research Methods 
This research is a quantitative research which is descriptive and verifying in na-
ture. Population or units of analysis are 3555 supplier companies of foodstuff, mostly 
based and operating in the Greater Jakarta area. Supplier companies are large scale, 
medium, small and micro enterprises (Law on UMKM, 2008). 217 supplier compa-
nies are selected through sampling non-proportional strata. 
Questionnaires: Questionnaires served as an measurement instrument according to 
conceptual framework and practical ways. All primary data were collected from the 
answers to the questionnaires. Questionnaires used five-point Likert scale and hybrid 
ordinally-interval scale (Hermawan, 2009).  
Modeling: This research is verifying in nature, to see the relationships between vari-
ables through hypothesis and modeling as well as solution techniques using the 
method of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) analysis was utilized using Partial 
Least Square (PLS). PLS is part of SEM, but it gives an advantage of providing sam-
ple of data being not too big, theory could be in the form of government regulation, 
could analyze reflexively, formatively, etc. (Chin, 2000; Chin, 2001; Yamin and 
Kurniawan, 2011; Ghozali, 2011; Mateos, 2011). 
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Results 
Results of Evaluation of Measurement Model 
The results of processing of all constructs of studies are descriptive and factor 
loading and Cronbach‟s‟s alpha. Test of validity and test of reliability of instrument 
in the questionnaires was made by using SPSS 18. The test of samples in 30 supplier 
respondents, which gave value of factor loading of all indicators that formed dimen-
sions, factors or constructs already had bigger value (0.553-0.960) than 0.55 (Hair et 
al., 2006). It is concluded that all indicators are valid where value at more than 0.55 
means that there is internal consistency of statements in the questionnaires that con-
struct of the entire dimensions could be formed. Similarly with coefficient of 
Cronbach‟s alpha all dimensions or construction with a number of questions, all big-
ger (0.797-0.960) than 0.60 which means all constructs are reliable. 
Evaluation of Model of Measuring 
The discriminant test of the validity of first phase through cross loading value 
produced indicators which have good discriminant validity. Second phase test to 
evaluate the discriminant validity of construct by seeing the value of Average Vari-
ance Extracted (AVE). Based on the root value of AVE all constructs have good dis-
criminant validity. Output latent variable correlation is used to compare the maxi-
mum value of construct correlation with the root value of AVE. The result is domi-
nated by construct which has higher root value of AVE than the correlation maxi-
mum value. Therefore, all constructs of dimension have good discriminant validity. 
Table 1 below shows the value of AVE and root of AVE, 
Table 1. Value of AVE and root of AVE of Research Construct 
Constructs AVE Root of AVE 
Reliability of  
Root of AVE > AVE 
KM 0.812337 0.9012974 Good 
TT 0.589027 0.76748094 Good 
PM 0.78579 0.88644797 Good 
Regulation 0.278109 0.52736041 Good 
RT 0.599505 0.77427708 Good 
PS 0.594549 0.77107004 Good 
Competition 0.517544 0.71940531 Good 
BB 0.805688 0.89760125 Good 
HR 0.768502 0.87664246 Good 
SS 0.988888 0.98877999 Good 
Buyer Power 0.573441 0.75725887 Good 
KO 0.611776 0.78216111 Good 
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KF 0.593164 0.77017141 Good 
MK 0.553904 0.74424727 Good 
KJ 0.522353 0.72273993 Good 
KP 0.501744 0.7083389 Good 
Relationships between PS-RT 0.221517 0.47065593 Good 
KE 0.903057 0.95029311 Good 
KN 0.805223 0.89734219 Good 
Performance 0.220652 0.4697361 Good 
Source: Output SmartPLS version 2.0 
 
Evaluation concerning reliability of internal consistence could be examined in 
the value of composite reliability and Cronbach‟s alpha. The output of composite re-
liability and Cronbach‟s alpha shows that the value of composite reliability for all 
constructs is more than 0.7, indicating that all constructs in the model is estimated to 
meet the criteria of discriminant validity. The lowest value of composite reliability is 
0.859191 on MK dimension construct. In the Cronbach‟s alpha, the value recom-
mended is more than 0.6 (Chin, 2000; Yamin and Kurniawan, 2011; Ghozali, 2011). 
The result showed that the value of Cronbach‟s alpha for all constructs is more than 
0.6. The lowest value is 0.698987 (HR). Therefore, it could be concluded that all 
constructs being tested have good reliability. Table 2 below shows the value of com-
posite reliability and Cronbach‟s alpha, 
Table 2. Value of Composite Reliability and Cronbach’s Alpha 
Constructs 
Composite Reli-
ability (> 0.7) 
Cronbach's 
Alpha (> 0.7) 
Construct 
Reliability 
KM 0.896308 0.775556 Good 
TT 0.918776 0.898037 Good 
PM 0.948103 0.930712 Good 
Regulation 0.842474 0.817297 Good 
RT 0.936765 0.924643 Good 
PS 0.935881 0.923525 Good 
Competition 0.95474 0.949332 Good 
BB 0.892251 0.764579 Good 
HR 0.869091 0.698987 Good 
SS 0.999899 0.999997 Good 
Buyer Power 0.868975 0.809915 Good 
KO 0.924955 0.904894 Good 
KF 0.877666 0.839065 Good 
MK 0.859191 0.791765 Good 
KJ 0.929056 0.916585 Good 
KP 0.937469 0.928258 Good 
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Relationships between PS-RT 0.959759 0.957184 Good 
KE 0.965428 0.946018 Good 
KN 0.925301 0.879787 Good 
Performance 0.959751 0.957184 Good 
Source: Output SmartPLS Version 2.0 
 
Effect of Factors, Path Coefficients, t-Statistics and Significances: 
Based on evaluation of structural model coefficient values of path coefficient 
values and t-statistics of all constructs could be determined that relationships be-
tween variables and impact of variables on other variables (significance), strength of 
relationships between variables, effect of independent variables on dependent varia-
bles to test the hypothesis of the research, could be seen (Yamin and Kurniawan, 
2011; Ghozali, 2011). Table 3 below shows effect of factors, path coefficients, t-
statistics, and significances. 
Table 3. Effect of Factors, Path Coefficients, t-Statistics and Significances 
The Effect of Factors/Constructs 
Path 
 Coefficients 
t-stat Sig. 
Effect of regulation on competition 0.421 2.191 p<0.05 
Effect of regulation on relationships between PS-RT 0.102 2.901 p<0.05 
Effect of competition on the relationships between PS-RT 0.366 5.246 p<0.05 
Effect of buyer power on the relationships between PS-RT 0.066 2.005 p<0.05 
Effect of dimensions of KO, KF, MK, KJ, KP on 
The relationships between PS-RT : 
Commitment-KO 
Conflict-KF 
Conflict resolution-MK 
Cooperation-KJ 
Trust-KP 
 
 
0.164 
0.064 
0.085 
0.244 
0.346 
 
 
2.005 
2.184 
2.804 
5.152 
6.442 
 
 
p<0.05 
p<0.05 
p<0.05 
p<0.05 
p<0.05 
Effect of relationships between PS-RT on suppliers  
performance 
0.998 449.631 p<0.05 
Source: Output SmartPLS Version 2.0 
 
Discussion 
Regulations including Presidential Regulation (Perpres) 112/2007 and Regula-
tion of The Trade Minister 53/2008, have greater details on partnership, trading 
terms and nurturing, while supervision of consumer welfare and protection with the 
Law/5/1999, on prohibition of monopoly and unfair business competition and the 
Law /8/1999, on protection of consumers. The regulations rule that cooperation be-
tween suppliers-modern retailers must be implemented under the principle of mutual 
benefit, clear, reasonable, fair and transparent and trading terms must be clear, rea-
September 6, 2017  Nusa Dua, Bali 
Proceeding International Seminar on Competition Policy and Law | KPPU  
157 
sonable, fair, mutually beneficial and agreed upon by both sides without pressure. 
Regulations have effect on the relationships between suppliers and buyers in interac-
tion of exchange between the two sides. Profit between the two sides could often be 
explained through bargaining power where there is transactions (Maloni and Benton, 
1999; Hertog, 1999; Stigler, 2003; Nugroho, 2012). 
In order that the regulation is effective, it is necessary to promote the Presidential 
Regulation and The Regulation of The Trade Minister into laws, as law regulations 
are more binding for business players or policy makers in retail industry. Sanctions, 
process of law enforcement and the law enforcers must be determine in greater de-
tails in the law regulation. As for the law enforcers, there must be an institution 
which functions specially to uphold the law. Through the model, the position of con-
trolling retail industry would be very strong and would be very strong to bind all 
stakeholders in retail industry (KPPU, 2009).  
Competition has its effect on the relationships between suppliers and modern 
retailers and the impact is strong, but not sufficiently effective. The finding in the re-
search on competition confirms the opinion that competition tends to create the po-
tential of collaboration of closer relationships between suppliers-modern retailers in 
supply chain and encourage development of products and improvement of quality, 
price reduction, flexibility, service and innovation (Maloni and Benton, 1999; Rear-
don and Berdegue 2006; Zhang et al., 2005). 
Buyer power has its effect on the relationships between suppliers and modern 
retailers. However, the effect is not significant. The finding from the research con-
firms opinion that buyer power in relationships between suppliers and modern retail-
ers could absorb suppliers‟ surplus with discount and cost to be paid by suppliers. 
Such condition could weaken the competitiveness of the suppliers and cause distor-
tion of competition in the market of suppliers. Suppliers will reduce investment and 
spending on development of new products or innovation, resulting in a decline in the 
quality of products and there would be less choices for consumers (Dodd and Asfaha, 
2008; Chen, 2008; OECD, 2008; Ehmke et al., 2009, Nicholson and Young, 2012). 
Buyers have power especially big buyers as large purchases, concentration and bar-
gaining power are significant to force price cut and relaxation of terms in their favor 
as the suppliers do not want to lose their potential customers. The suppliers are in a 
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weak position that the relationships becomes asymmetry (Dodd and Asfaha, 2008; 
Chen, 2008; Ehmke et al., 2009).  
The five dimensions of formative forms – commitment, conflicts, management 
of conflict, cooperation, trust have effect on the relationships between suppliers  and 
modern retailers. The effect could be weak or quite strong. Results of research show 
that the most important dimension with greater effect among the five formative fac-
tors is trust. The finding from the research about the dimensions of KO, KF, MK, KJ, 
KP, corroborate opinion that a number of main parameters that make relationships 
between buyers and suppliers become integrated are commitment, conflict, conflict 
resolution, cooperation, trust and information technology (Maloni and Benton, 1999; 
Duffy and Fearne, 2006; Sheu et al., 2006; Chou et al., 2011).  
The relationships between suppliers and modern retailers has effect on the per-
formance of suppliers and the effect is very strong. The finding from the research is 
related to the construct of financial performance and non-financial performance. Im-
plementation of financial performance and non-financial performance could improve 
the performance of suppliers and modern retailers. The most important factor with 
greater effect among the two factors of performance is non-financial performance. 
The higher the level of integration of relationships of business players would result in 
better performance (Maloni and Benton, 1999; Duffy and Fearne, 2006; Ou et al., 
2010).  
 
Conclusion  
Regulations have strong effect on competition showing the importance of regula-
tions in determining whether competition is good or bad. However, the impact of 
regulations is not effective partly because the regional administrations have not suc-
ceeded in fully or effectively arranging zonation and distance between retail modern 
outlets and weak regulation on licensing procedure that competition is not conducive.  
Regulations have weak effect on the relationships between suppliers and modern 
retailers as indicated by the domination of the bargaining power of modern retailers 
resulting in imbalance in the relationships between suppliers and modern retailers de-
spite the regulation on competition. The weak impact is caused by regulation being 
not effective, not firm in slapping sanctions and implementation being not clear.  
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Competition has fairly strong impact on the relationships between suppliers and 
modern retailers. The tighter the competition the closer would be the relationships 
between suppliers and modern retailers. However, the effect of competition in its im-
plementation is determined more by the characteristics of modern retailers in compe-
tition which are expansive in building up its bargaining power that the bargaining 
power of supplier is weak facing modern retailers. 
Buyer power has weak effect on the relationships between suppliers and modern 
retailers. As shown by the study, not all aspects of the relationships between suppli-
ers and modern retailers are influenced by the buyer power. The effect of buyer pow-
er is marked only by the big cost burden imposed on suppliers.  
Relationships between suppliers and modern retailers in modern retail supply 
chain have strong impact on the performance of suppliers. Asymmetry in power 
which is controlled by modern retailers causes strong effect of relationships between 
suppliers and modern retailers on the performance of suppliers in improving the per-
formance of suppliers.  
Big suppliers and those selected by modern retailers have showed an improve-
ment in performance but other suppliers such as micro and small suppliers have re-
mained in the doldrums. Therefore, improvement is necessary in The Presidential 
Regulation Number 112/2007, Regulation of The Trade Minister Number 53/2008 
and in the implementation of the competition policy UU/5/1999. The regulations 
have to be properly implemented and there should be coordination between the cen-
tral government and the regional administrations. Detailed and clear guidelines 
should be provided in maintaining good relationships between suppliers and modern 
retailers. Micro and small suppliers should be effectively involved. Socialization 
needs to be intensified and violations should be strictly dealt with sanction. 
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